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Abstract
Among the most important choices made by groups ghting a civil war|
governments and rebels alike|is how to allocate available military and pecuniary
resources across the contested areas of a conict-ridden territory. Combatants use
military force to coerce and money to persuade and co-opt. A vast body of literature
in political science and security studies examines how and where combatants in civil
wars apply violence. Scholars, however, have devoted less attention to combatants'
use of material inducements to attain their objectives.
This dissertation proposes a logic that guides combatants' use of material ben-
ets alongside military force in pursuit of valuable support from communities in the
midst of civil war. Focused on the interaction between the military and the local
population, the theory envisions a bargaining process between a commander and a
community whose support he seeks. The outcome of the bargaining process is a scal
strategy dened by the extent to which material benets are distributed diusely or
targeted narrowly. That outcome follows from key characteristics of the community in
question that include its sociopolitical solidarity (or fragmentation) and its economic
resilience (or vulnerability).
I evaluate the theory of scal strategies through a series of case studies from the
Philippine-American War of 1899{1902. As a further test of external validity, I con-
sider the theory's applicability to key events from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
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ixChapter 1
Money and Military Force
Men must be either pampered or crushed.
- Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince
Sovereignty depends on the consent or acquiescence of the citizenry. When a citizen
submits to the rule of a political regime, she does so either because she is powerless
to resist or because she benets from the arrangement. Sovereignty, in short, rests on
both coercion and co-optation.
A civil war is a violent competition for sovereignty. Although coercion is a
dening feature of a civil war, co-optation through the provision or promise of benets
is also a tool for combatants aiming to win valuable support from the population. Just
as coercion looms in the shadows of peaceful society, gold as well as steel serves as a
weapon in warfare.
1Among the most important choices made by groups ghting a civil war|
governments and rebels alike|is how to allocate available military and pecuniary
resources across the contested areas of a conict-ridden territory. A vast body of
literature in political science and security studies examines how and where combat-
ants in civil wars apply violence. Scholars, however, have devoted less attention to
combatants' use of scal strategies|the provision of material benets (or access to
material benets) with the aim of advancing the central objective in irregular warfare,
namely territorial control.1 Combatants employ scal resources as complements to,
or in lieu of, the use of force. The scale of reconstruction spending undertaken by
the United States and its allies in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan|and the accom-
panying confusion surrounding its strategic impact|underscore the need for a basic
theory of battleeld political economy.
The logic of scal strategies entails more than a simple inversion of the logic of
coercive violence explored extensively in existing scholarship. Co-optation, induce-
ment, and persuasion are conceptually dierent from coercion|not merely its oppo-
site. First, unlike force, no amount of material benet oered can compel behavior or
physically destroy, dislocate, or isolate anyone or anything. Fiscal strategies can only
work by persuading their \targets" to make particular choices. Second, many material
benets|money, most obviously|are fungible; they can be divided up, passed on, or
traded, opening up possibilities for indirect eects. Money is also easily measurable
and has natural substitutes. Force cannot be similarly transferred from one individ-
ual to another or substituted for some other thing. Third, the psychological impact
on the target of a scal strategy diers from that felt by the target of coercive force.
1Varying denitions of the term \strategy" abound. I use it to refer to the alignment of means
and ways with some sought-after end or objective. Among the various denitions considered by
Gray (1999, 17{19), this usage most closely follows that of Wylie and Wylie (1967, 14) who states
that strategy is a \plan of action designed in order to achieve some end; a purpose together with a
system of measures for its accomplishment."
2Where scal strategies can induce trust, dependence, gratitude, or greed, coercion
produces fear, awe, or resentment. Fourth, and perhaps most signicantly, concil-
iatory strategies create institutions and concentrations of power distinct from those
that result from coercive strategies, and these institutions have divergent inuence on
the societies that emerge in the aftermath of hostilities. These and other dierences
make scal strategy a substantively distinct aspect of irregular warfare|and one that
has been under-explored.2
The application of scal strategies by combatants exhibits wide variation be-
tween and within individual conicts. First-hand narratives and historical accounts
tell of attempts by governments and rebel groups to sway the sympathies of local
inhabitants with benets and inducements. These works highlight the diversity of
approaches employed, from projects that emphasize public health, education, and
rule of law, to those focused on economic development, employment, and infrastruc-
ture, to others that promise land, cash, or political positions as rewards or bribes.
And some villages or neighborhoods seem to receive a disproportionate share of com-
batants' largesse while others are neglected. Fiscal strategies thus dier from one
place to another according to the types of goods and services provided and the seg-
ment of the community that stands to benet from them. How do we explain this
variation, and what does it tell us about how scal strategies \work"?
Existing scholarship on the wartime provision of goods, services, and cash to
win public support does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the diversity of
scal strategies we observe. This deciency is particularly acute when it comes to
accounting for variation within individual wars. First, most existing work largely ig-
nores the characteristics of the very public whose support is sought. In explaining why
combatants use their scal resources in the ways they do, the literature focuses on fac-
2Thanks to Jerey Friedman for his contribution to these insights.
3tors external to the interaction of combatants with local actors. These factors|such
as organizational biases, bureaucratic politics, public opinion, or military doctrine|
tend to constrain combatants' choices, but leave a great deal of variation unexplained.
This study seeks to explain variation in scal strategies by looking beyond the ex-
ternal constraints that combatants face to the way they make choices within those
constraints. Second, comparative studies neglect to distinguish among dierent s-
cal strategies, often lumping them together simply as attempts to \win hearts and
minds." This study asserts that|just as violence may be selective or indiscriminate
and may be used to compel, deter, punish, or terrorize|scal strategies have distinct
forms and purposes that give them signicance. Only by recognizing these distinct
forms and their varying eects on dierent local settings can we understand where
and how combatant groups employ their scal resources.
This dissertation proposes a logic that guides the choice of the specic scal
strategies adopted by combatants in pursuit of valuable support from the local popu-
lation. The main argument is that the variation we observe in combatants' choices of
scal strategies results, in a systematic way, from variation in the communal structure
and economic security of the communities the combatants seek to control. Implicitly
or explicitly, combatants engage in a bargaining process with local political actors
whose power is itself the result of struggles for social and political resources within
their communities. The distribution of political power at the community level dictates
whom combatants must bargain with, while the degree of their economic vulnerability
to external inuence determines their relative bargaining power. The outcome of the
bargaining process is a scal strategy dened by the extent to which its benets are
targeted or distributed diusely.
The rst section of this chapter introduces the concept of scal strategies, ex-
plaining their usefulness to combatants in garnering support from the local population
4as a means toward advancing military objectives. The discussion also highlights the
wide array of applications to which combatants dedicate their scal resources. The
second section turns to existing scholarship, summarizing its contributions to our un-
derstanding of scal strategies, while highlighting the gap in the literature this study
intends to address. The third section presents the methodology by which this disser-
tation will evaluate the theory presented in Chapter Two and highlights the scope
conditions that specify the theory's applicability. The fourth section concludes the
chapter with a brief outline of the body of the dissertation.
1.1 Fiscal strategies in irregular warfare
In 2005, American forces in Iraq brought together a variety of reconstruction and
funding initiatives under an umbrella program called \Money as a Weapons Sys-
tem." The doctrine that emerged subsequently stated, \Money is one of the primary
weapons used by warghters to achieve successful mission results in [counterinsur-
gency] and humanitarian operations.... Money must be placed on the battleeld
just like a weapons system to create the desired eects" (CALL, 2009b). Describ-
ing the use of his scal arsenal in one Baghdad neighborhood, a former American
army ocer explains, \I bought time, loyalty, and street credibility in a way that the
promises of a free election never could.... By granting contracts to friendly power
brokers, I gave them the money and authority to employ people loyal to them.... I
backed the burgeoning inuence of loyal power brokers with my authority and my
weapons" (Whiteley, 2010, 4). In the Malayan Emergency of the late 1950s, the
British oered an intricately calibrated menu of rewards for information on insur-
gents. It paid out according to the insurgent's rank and whether he surrendered, was
captured, or was killed. The payouts were enormous. One insurgent supplier, for
5instance, earned $12,000 for information that led to the ambush and killing of three
rebels|the equivalent of 17 years' pay for an average laborer (Ramakrishna, 2002,
333). Rebels, as well as government forces, employ scal strategies to supplement
military force. Maranto and Tuchman (1992, 257) discuss the approach adopted by
the National Liberation Front (NLF) during America's war in Vietnam: \the NLF
oered schools, land reform, and reasonably honest and ecient government.... The
most important benets were contingent on NLF success. If the government returned
to a village, a poor peasant might have to pay for land that the NLF had given him
for free.... Peasants thus had strong incentive to work for NLF success."
These examples hint at the variety of forms scal strategies may take, while sug-
gesting a common purpose. Whatever their form, the foremost aim of scal strategies
is to extend the control of one's forces over a given territory by diminishing the
enemy's freedom of maneuver there. Although there is often a humanitarian com-
ponent to scal strategies, combatants assess the success or usefulness of persuasive
approaches according to their eect on the security environment. They achieve this
eect by winning support from the local population.
Unique to irregular civil war as opposed to other forms of warfare is the pivotal
role often played by the civilian population. \The inhabitant in his home," states
Trinquier (1964, 29), \is the center of the conict.... Like it or not, the two camps are
compelled to make him participate in the combat." Nearly all observers|practitioners
and scholars alike|assert the indispensable importance of civilian support to eorts
of both insurgents and government forces (inter alia, Galula, 1964; Kalyvas, 2006;
Kilcullen, 2010; Kitson, 1971; Nagl, 2002; O'Neill, 1990; Smith, 2008; Thompson, 1966;
Wickham-Crowley, 1992).3 As the Handbook for Volunteers of the Irish Republican
Army (IRA, 1985, 17) states, \Successful guerrilla operations involve the people. It is
3Whether civilian \support" is best won through persuasion or coercion is the subject of a debate
discussed below in Section 1.2.
6the quality of their resistance to the enemy and support for the guerrillas which in the
end will be the decisive factor ...In fact, a guerrilla force will be unable to operate
in an area where the people are hostile to its aims." According to this perspective,
the support of some signicant subset of the state's population is a vital, or perhaps
the vital, objective of the vying sides in a civil war.
\Support," if is to be meaningful, cannot be merely a preference or an attitude; it
must be translated into specic behavior that aids in extending the territorial control
of one of the actors (Kalyvas, 2006, 91{104). For the government forces, tactical gains
are contingent on the ability to nd and destroy the rebels, to force them out of a
given area, to deny them needed supplies, or to compel them to surrender.4 Among
the most valuable advantages derived from popular support is information. Irregular
civil wars, by denition, are fought by soldiers not identiable as such. Because they
are conventionally weak, rebels and their supporters hide among, or blend in with, the
noncombatant population. Information that distinguishes rebel from civilian enables
counterinsurgents to apply their superior repower selectively to clear rebel forces
and re-establish incumbent control. Thus for the insurgents, betrayal is devastating.
Crucial is their ability to determine who among the local population provides this
information to incumbents, making rebel forces vulnerable. Once identied by the
rebels, \collaborators" can be threatened or targeted for sanction or elimination.
Other forms of support involve contributions to manpower, logistics, or nances.
Supportive civilians, at times, can use their own social or material resources to deny
or enable rebels the ability to operate in the local area. Finally, some inducements
4I use the terms \government," \incumbent," and \counterinsurgent" interchangeably to refer
to the armed group ghting to re-establish the regime's control of a given area. I use the terms
\insurgent," \rebel," and \guerilla" to denote the irregular forces seeking territorial independence,
autonomy, or the overthrow of the regime. The term \combatant" may refer to either group.
7for support target not civilians, but the ghters themselves. Such policies aim to
persuade insurgents to stop ghting or even join forces with government troops.5
Most studies of civilian behavior in wartime agree that only a small percentage
of the noncombatant population tends to be ideologically committed to either side
and willing to act on that commitment (e.g., Galula, 1964; Greene and LaPalombara,
1974; Mueller, 2007; Wood, 2003). Lichbach (1998, 16-19) marshalls evidence from
a wide range of resistance movements to conclude that they \attract a very small
percentage of the population"|a feature that holds even for movements that turn
out to be successful. The vast majority of the community is most concerned with
self-preservation and the pursuit of interests unrelated to the war's political objec-
tives. For rebel sympathizers within this group|or even some of the combatants
themselves|support they provide to the insurgency is contingent upon these other
considerations. The uncommitted and weakly-committed portions of the population
are those which scal strategies most attempt to sway.
In his seminal work on civil war violence, Kalyvas (2006, 132) argues that mean-
ingful active support from the population depends foremost on a combatant's terri-
torial control, which \presupposes a constant and credible armed presence." While
acknowledging the endogenous nature of the relationship, his work centers on estab-
lishing the causal path that leads from control to \collaboration." Even sympathetic
civilians will be unwilling to provide support to an actor who is unable to protect
them from retaliation by the other side. As Kalyvas (2006, 114) notes, \Once the
war is underway, war-related reesources such as violence tend to replace the provi-
sion of material and nonmaterial benets, inducing individuals, for whom survival is
important, to collaborate less with the political actor they prefer and more with the
political actor they fear."
5On the role of positive incentives in inducing rebel defection, see Goodwin (2001); Kalyvas
(2008); Staniland (2012).
8What, then, of scal strategies|which operate through persuasion rather than
coercion? If force is what really matters, why do governments, foreign occupiers, and
rebel groups bother with oers of material benets? Kalyvas (2006, 139) hints at
an answer when he observes, \Once a civil war is on, the military requirements for
the establishment and preservation of control over the entire territory of a country
are staggering." There are simply not enough military resources to establish control
everywhere through an iron grip.
And capacity is not the only limitation on what can be accomplished by force
alone. Summing up the sources of Viet Cong support, Elliott (2007, 5) explains that
\force was a supplement to but not a substitute for incentives and moral suasion.
When the revolutionary movement encountered problems, compulsion alone did not
provide a solution. The role of coercion in politics cannot therefore be ignored, but
should be viewed as one factor among many that aect political behavior." Without
discounting the argument that control is a path to collaboration, this study seeks
to explain the opposite causal direction|how combatants induce collaboration that
then leads to control.
Combatants' attempts to peel away support for the adversary or to shore up the
support of allies are predicated on the belief that individuals allocate their support
according to some form of a cost-benet calculation (e.g., Mason, 1996; Maranto and
Tuchman, 1992; Popkin, 1979). They weigh their perceptions of risk and reward|
both material and non-material|and choose a position along a spectrum of support
that ranges from armed participation to other forms of assistance to neutrality (Lich-
bach, 1998; Petersen, 2001). Fiscal strategies do not require an assumption that
material benets are the overriding determinants of local support. For example,
Hugh Carleton Greene, head of the British Emergency Information Service during
the Malayan Emergency, designed a policy in which \push pressures"|security force
9operations|were reinforced by \pull pressures" aimed at the \materialistic impulse
of the average rural Chinese peasant and terrorist" (Ramakrishna, 2002, 338). To be
eective, the pull pressures of scal strategies must change an individual's cost-benet
calculus enough to tip the scales, inducing movement along the spectrum of support.
Eorts to tip the scales come in a bewildering variety of forms, even within a
single war. In some areas, commanders take approaches that involve the distribution
of public goods and services to a diuse pool of beneciaries. In other areas, they
eschew scal approaches almost entirely, relying on threats and coercion. In some
areas, combatants try to \subcontract" the provision of security, granting broad-based
autonomy and ample resources to local allies. In other areas still, scal strategy
centers on inducing a willing few to provide vital information or services. How to
explain the observed variation is a motivating question for this research, and by
answering it, we can gain key insights into the application of non-military resources
to attain objectives in war. As a rst step, we turn to existing scholarship to situate
this project in the context of the broader literature.
1.2 Contributions of existing scholarship
Studies that address the provision of material benets in civil wars fall into three
broad, often overlapping, categories. The rst, which I call the \external constraints"
category, considers a question closely related to that motivating this dissertation,
asking why some combatants make extensive use of scal resources and strategies
of persuasion while others do not. By way of explanation, most of the literature in
this category identies factors external to the interaction between combatants and the
communities whose support they seek. This dissertation explores local factors driving
scal strategy choice, drawing on insights from an emerging research agenda on the
10\micro-dynamics" of conict. The second category, \strategy evaluation," concerns
an ongoing debate in security studies literature over the eectiveness of strategies that
emphasize, alternatively, persuasion or coercion. The third, the \program evaluation"
category, includes research that assesses the impact of specic development programs
during conict on outcomes of interest, such as violence, health, or migration.
The external constraints category addresses the question of strategy variation
directly. The ndings point to factors external to the conict itself that delimit the
range of scal strategy options available. National characteristics, regime type, factor
endowments, or organizational impediments are examples of constraints that gure
prominently in the literature. Strategy, by these accounts, is less a choice than a
predisposition. Considerations of the conditions \on the ground" or of the behavior of
other relevant actors are swamped by organizational, cognitive, or resource constraints
that limit meaningful choice.
A number of works stand out in this line of research. Several scholars suggest
that specic historical experience in small wars abroad has driven the emergence of
national \styles" unique to Americans, British, French, and Russians, among oth-
ers (e.g., Beckett, 2001; Joes, 2004). The authors do not suggest that these styles
are immutable, but that they present an available and organizationally-accepted ap-
proach and thus tend to be chosen by default. Studies also point to regime type as
a factor that helps explain strategy choice (Arregu n-Toft, 2001; Engelhardt, 1992;
Feaver and Gelpi, 2004; Jentleson, 1992; Lyall, 2010; Zhukov, 2007). Although this
argument is usually cast in terms of combatants' latitude to escalate violence, it is a
plausible explanation for variation in scal strategy choice, as well. Voters in demo-
cratic regimes, for instance, may demand a humanitarian emphasis and renounce
strategies that rely on bribery. Force structure presents another potential constraint;
to the extent that well-crafted scal strategy depends on good human intelligence,
11capital-intensive armies may be at a disadvantage. As Lyall and Wilson (2009, 75)
argue, mechanization and modernized logistics \inhibit the collection and vetting of
the context-specic information required to wield power discriminately"|and to de-
velop locally-tailored scal strategies. Finally, the bureaucratic nature of military
organizations themselves can be a constraint on scal strategy choice. As authors
such as Krepinevich (1988) and Nagl (2002) note, organizations can be paralyzed by
impediments to learning and adjustment that keep military forces from responding
to the imperatives of the local environment. In such a case, scal strategy is set far
from and without regard to the communities in which it is employed.
External constraints explanations such as those outlined above are essential
to understanding macro-level variation in the behavior of dierent combatants in
dierent conicts, but do not explain the variation we observe at the micro level.
These ndings are not wrong, they are simply underdetermining; after taking into
account the factors that constrain combatants' scal strategy choices, there remains
substantial unexplained variation. The external constraints noted above operate at
the state or organizational level. How to account for the range of scal strategies
adopted by a single force within a single war? The variation within the constraints
documented above is the focus of the present study.
Other areas of research on civil wars have, until recently, suered from the same
inattention to the local factors that drive outcomes of interest. Prior to the last
several years, little systematic research on civil wars included analytic frameworks or
empirical tests to account for the scope of social, economic, and political character-
istics that distinguish individual communities from one another. The cross-country
studies that dominate the civil war political science literature can aid in identifying
broad conditions from which conict tends to emerge, but they cannot explain many
of the dynamics that shape individual conicts. Much of the theory meant to account
12for the causes, consequences, and dynamics of violent conict fails to incorporate the
mechanisms that link individual-, household-, or group-level variables to the outcomes
of interest.
Growing awareness of this lacuna inspired a new research agenda into the
\micro-dynamics" of conict. Among its aims is a better understanding of \how
micro-level economic factors and decisions inuence the start of violent conicts, and
how those processes change and evolve through the conict" (Verwimp, Justino and
Bruck, 2009). The research has already begun to address a variety of questions related
to the dynamics of violence, patterns of recruitment and displacement, and processes
of demobilization (Czaika and Kis-Katos, 2009; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008;
Justino, 2009; Kalyvas and Kocher, 2009; Steele, 2009). Adopting a micro-dynamics
approach towards the study of scal strategies promises to be fruitful precisely be-
cause the eects of these strategies are contingent upon local responses. A central
objective of this dissertation is a better understanding of the features of the local
environment that drive combatants' choices of scal strategies.
The strategy evaluation category consists of a body of work that that considers
the relative merits of persuasion and coercion as approaches to securing popular sup-
port and, ultimately, success in a counterinsurgency. A touchstone for disagreement
on this point is America's war in Vietnam. Competing interpretations of the war's
strategic imperatives divided|and continue to divide|scholars, practitioners, and
observers. Roughly, some contend there was too much emphasis on repower and
body counts, while others maintain that a strategy focused on enemy attrition was
not given sucient time to show results, and that, in fact, more coercive pressure
should have been used.6 Over the past decade, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
re-ignited the debate and brought the two sides back to their respective camps.
6The contours of \the unending debate" are summarized in Hess (1994) and Andrade (2008).
13Associated with one side are the advocates of \population-centric" counterin-
surgency theory, which emphasizes addressing the people's needs for security, rule of
law, and access to economic and educational opportunity. By pursuing \legitimacy"
the counterinsurgent diminishes the political appeal of the rebels. This stance is
rooted in works on the conicts in Indochina and Malaya by Galula (1964), Thomp-
son (1966), and Kitson (1971) and draws on more recent contributions such as Nagl
(2002), Smith (2008), and Kilcullen (2010). The embodiment of current conventional
wisdom among American practioners, the U.S. Army's Counterinsurgency Field Man-
ual, also supports this approach. \Political power is the central issue in insurgencies
and counterinsurgencies; each side aims to get the people to accept its governance or
authority as legitimate," it declares (U.S. Army, 2006, 1:27). Together, these works as-
sert the decisive impact of strategies designed to persuade rather than coerce support
from local populations and further emphasize that violence can be counterproductive.
The alternative to population-centric counterinsurgency is an approach that
takes as its primary objective the destruction of the insurgent's ability or will to
continue ghting. Popular support is crucial to identifying the enemy and denying
him sanctuary, but popular preferences, as such, are immaterial. Trinquier (1964,
8), the most prominent exponent of this approach, writes that if popular support
doesn't exist, \it must be secured by every possible means, the most eective of
which is terrorism." Coercive population-control measures, punishment, and even
torture should be used to gain information and deter active support for the insurgency.
Contemporary advocates of this view, such as Dunlap (2008), Gentile (2008), Luttwak
(2007), and Peters (2007), are somewhat more restrained, but nonetheless maintain
an \enemy-centric" approach in which coercion is often the best method to secure
the acquiescence of the population.
14While literature in this category presents a useful starting point, this study
departs from it in several ways. First, to the extent that the \debate" portrays coer-
cion and persuasion as distinct approaches, it presents a false choice. Coercion and
persuasion are better conceived as complements rather than substitutes. Providing
goods and services in pursuit of legitimacy will require security that is enforced with
coercion. Likewise, gathering intelligence needed to nd and destroy the enemy may
call for persuasion to make individuals more willing to come forward with informa-
tion. Second, there is no reason to believe that any given combination of coercion
and persuasion will be optimal or even eective across the variety of settings and
circumstances in which civil wars are fought. Dierent social and economic charac-
teristics of contested areas are likely to call for dierent approaches and should be
accounted for by any widely applicable theory. Finally, there is a need to distinguish
among non-coercive strategy types. Approaches that spend money on public health
improvements, for instance, are likely to have an impact in dierent settings and in
dierent ways than approaches that operate through patronage.
Opposite the sweeping conjectures of the strategy evaulation category are the
micro-level analyses of the program evaluation literature. Researchers in this category
reach statistically rigorous conclusions concerning the eectiveness of specic recon-
struction and development programs as counterinsurgency measures. Studies in this
category can be divided roughly into two dierent approaches. The rst approach
applies sophisticated econometrics to sort through statistical noise in available con-
ict data and identify the eects of particular tactics on outcomes of interest, such
as insurgent violence. The second approach exploits unique opportunities to employ
careful experimental design in the implementation of development programs in order
to establish their impact.
15Examples of the rst approach include a group of studies that aims to assess the
impact of small-scale reconstruction projects during the Iraq War (Berman, Shapiro
and Felter, 2011; Gorkowski, 2009; Iyengar and Hanson, 2009). The studies draw
from data on war-related violence and on funding through the U.S. military's Com-
mander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). In one study, Berman, Shapiro and
Felter (2011) use panel data on attacks against Coalition and Iraqi forces to deter-
mine the impact of district-level CERP spending, controlling for a number of other
predictors of violence including sectarian status, economic grievances, and natural re-
source endowments. The authors report a small but statistically signicant negative
eect. Similar studies examine this question in other settings (Bodnar and Gwinn,
2010; Crost and Johnston, 2010) and related questions using other variables (Berman
et al., 2011; Nunn and Qian, 2012).
An example of the second approach is a recent study of the eects of the Na-
tional Solidarity Program (NSP), Afghanistan's largest development project (Beath,
Christia and Enikolopov, 2011). The researchers use a large-scale randomized eld
experiment to assess the impact of the NSP on measures of violence, attitudes to-
ward the government, and perceptions of well-being. The results indicate a positive
eect on all three outcomes outside of areas with high levels of violence. Blattman,
Fiala and Martinez (2008) and Collier and Vicente (2008) use similar methods in
conict-prone areas in Uganda and Nigeria, respectively. Though an ideal way to
determine the true eect of a given program, eld experiments are dicult to design
and implement. Humphreys and Weinstein (2009), however, point to growing work
in this area.
Given the dearth of rigorous empirical research on scal strategies, these studies
are invaluable sources of data and preliminary evidence of the eects of reconstruction
and development-related expenditure. From the perspective of the present inquiry,
16though, this research suers from two main limitations. First, large, data-driven eval-
uations tend to control only for those characteristics of the local environment that
are readily quantiable. For instance, these studies overlook heterogeneity in the
social structure between villages, a consideration cited in the rst-hand accounts of
many practitioners.7 As Bakke and Wibbels (2006) observe, \many of the conict-
ing hypotheses in the literature result from a failure to consider the diverse social
makeup" of districts and localities. Second, as evaluations, studies in this category
emphasize outcomes over processes. Assessing whether a policy works is distinct from
understanding why or how it works. The research designs are built to demonstrate
whether a given intervention causes an outcome of interest, but they are often unable
to distinguish among dierent theorized causal mechanisms that could lead to similar
outcomes. The theory developed in Chapter Two makes specic claims about the
causal mechanisms at work and derives hypotheses to assess those claims based on
their observable implications.
1.3 Methodology
Ultimately, we are interested not only in explaining combatant behavior, but in draw-
ing insights about what makes particular scal strategies eective. This study allows
us to make inferences from the choices that combatants make. To begin, it develops
a model that predicts those choices based on assumptions|such as rationality|and
beliefs about what variables matter|in this case, particular social and economic
characteristics of a community. Next, we compare the model's predictions to what
combatants actually do. Even if the model is \right," however, we cannot expect
7Discussing his approach to counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, for example, General Stanley
McChrystal states, \[Y]ou cannot assume that what is true in one province is true in another. That
goes for ethnic, geographic and economic issues. You cannot even assume that what is true in one
valley is true in the next any more than you can assume that one neighborhood in London is exactly
the same as another" (McChrystal, 2009).
17that combatants' decisions will match the model's predictions. For one, the coun-
terinsurgent forces, at the outset of their campaign, have scant information about
local conditions in the areas in which they operate. Also, they are sometimes inex-
perienced or have mistaken beliefs about the best strategy to employ. So, perhaps
their initial choices are far dierent from the predictions. But if we make the further
assumption that the combatants can learn|by acquiring knowledge about the lo-
cal area and by evaluating dierent approaches through trial-and-error|their choices
should, over time, come closer and closer to those predicted by the theory. And while
positive ndings do not constitute proof of the theory, they suggest the model as a
valuable starting point for continued work along this line of research.
In the next chapter, I construct a typology of scal strategies available to com-
batants and put forth a theory based on the characteristics of a local setting that
recommend a particular scal strategy as the optimal choice. The model I pro-
pose captures two dimensions that dene a bargaining process between a military
commander and the population whose allegiance he seeks to sway. The rst, local
communal solidarity (or fragmentation), determines the members of the community
who will conduct negotiations with the commander. At one extreme, a single repre-
sentative may bargain on behalf of the community as whole; at the other extreme,
each household may bargain individually. The second, economic resilience (or vulner-
ability), determines the parties' bargaining power relative to that of the commander.
Those whose economic well-being is least susceptible to disruption will be able to
make higher \demands." The commander's response to the community's demands is
the scal strategy that minimizes his costs in extending control over the community
using some combination of coercion and co-optation.
In developing the theory, I borrow from literature on state formation and clien-
telism, which addresses a comparable set of questions. The overall construct for the
18theory of scal strategies follows those employed by Boone (2003), Geddes (1991,
1994), La Ferrara and Bates (2001), and, especially, Levi (1988). In specifying the
foundation of political order within a society, these studies downplay characteristics
of the regime itself by assuming that all rulers share a similar aim of maintaining
power and that they use rational strategies to attain that end. This simplication
allows the authors to focus on the societal-level variation that drives diering institu-
tional outcomes. Similarly, I imagine that governments facing rebellion seek foremost
the re-establishment of control and that they pursue this aim in a rational way that
seeks to minimize cost in blood and treasure. There are also parallels to the work
of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005), which depicts politics as a competition between
the leadership and a challenger for the support of some portion of the selectorate,
the set of people whose decisions ultimately choose the government's leadership. In
their model, political actors seek winning coalitions whose support \endows the lead-
ership with politcal power over the remainder of the selectorate as well as over the
disenfranchised members of the society." Coalition building requires providing coali-
tion members a share of benets set aside for supporters. Political actors seek to
minimize the cost of building the coalition, and a key implication is that the smaller
the coalition needed to rule, the larger the proportion of private benets relative to
public benets contained in the spending package oered by the coalition-builder.
To evaluate this dissertation's theory, I investigate patterns in scal strategy
selection during the Philippine-American War of 1899{1902. By selecting cases within
a single conict, I am able to control for confounding variables that existing literature,
as discussed above, suggests account for some of the variation in scal strategies across
dierent conicts. Specically, the focus on a single combatant army within a single
war makes dierent outcomes less likely to be attributable to doctrine, organizational
biases, national \styles," prevailing norms, and so forth.
19The Philippines is an ideal setting for an evaluation of the theory of scal
strategies because of the wide variation on the independent variables exhibited among
its many distinct communities. The geography of the Philippine archipelago separates
communities by sea and mountains, fostering the development of divergent communal
structures, forms of property relations, and roles for traditional authority. Further,
the islands are home to ve major ethnic groups, consisting of an even wider variety
of distinct tribal and non-tribal groups, speaking a total of 27 individual dialects.
Economically, the turn of the twentieth century was a moment of signicant upheaval
for the Philippines, bringing tremendous growth in trade, the commercialization of
agriculture, the modernization of industry, and mass migration of the labor force.
The upheaval spread unevenly throughout the islands, however, and economic change
came in dierent manifestations and at dierent times in each province.
Recent scholarship on the Philippine-American War also demonstrates vast dif-
ferences in the nature of military operations island by island and province by province.
President William McKinley's call for a policy of \benevolent assimilation" ensured
that scal strategies would be part of the military eort, but local commanders would
determine their form and extent. Whether due to explicit delegation or the necessities
imposed by geographic isolation, ocers at the provincial level enjoyed substantial
autonomy. The experience of Brigadier General Marcus P. Miller, commander of a
brigade on the island of Panay, is representative. Linn (2000, 69) explains, \Like sub-
sequent commanders in the provinces, Miller had to develop policies that conformed
both to the directives he received from Manila|specically the army's mandate to
serve as an agent of benevolent assimilation|and to local realities. This required
him to combine civil projects with military operations, to nd a proper balance of
conciliation and coercion." Commanders with similar autonomy operated throughout
20the archipelago, working to nd and strike the balance appropriate to their unique
areas of operation.
To determine how the scal strategy choices made by those commanders com-
pare to the theory's predictions, I examine the American approach to pacication in
four separate districts within the Division of the Philippines. I chose the districts to
examine, researched the evolution of the scal strategies employed by the commanders
of those districts, and compared their choices with the theorectical predictions.
In selecting the districts, I considered factors both methodological and prac-
tical. Methodologically, my approach was to select districts whose sociopolitical
and economic characteristics stood in distinction from one another and resembled
most closely the ideal types envisioned in the theory|discussed in far greater depth
in Chapter Two. Figure 1.1 summarizes these choices. The Ilocos region and the
Sulu archipelago were, at the time of the war, characterized by solidary communal
structure. Communities in these ethnically homogeneous districts exhibited hierar-
chical social organization based on the recognized authority of leaders in traditional
kin-centered groups. By contrast, Nueva Ecija and Negros were manifestations of
fragmented communal structure. Both were focal points of mass migration in the
late nineteenth century and were consequently melting pots of competing Philippine
ethnic groups and ashpoints of class animus. As islands highly dependent on ex-
ternal trade, sources of wealth on Sulu and Negros were vulnerable to embargo by
the dominant U.S. Navy. By contrast, attempts to disrupt the sources of wealth for
communities in the Ilocos and in Nueva Ecija were costly and threats to do so were
less credible. Self-sucient subsistence farmers in the Ilocos and planters growing rice
for domestic consumption in land-locked Nueva Ecija were therefore comparatively
resilient economically.
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Figure 1.1: Case studies.
The predominant practical consideration for selecting cases was the availabil-
ity of data, a particular concern for a researcher conducting provincial-level analyses
of conditions over a century ago. Coding districts according to the independent
variables required provincial-level information on social organization and economic
conditions during the specic time period of interest. For this aspect of the study I
relied mostly on secondary-source literature, including ethnogeographical and histor-
ical studies by Western researchers, provincial histories published in the Philippines,
and unpublished dissertations by Western and Filipino authors. In addition, the
American Pronouncing Gazatteer and Geographical Dictionary of 1902 and Census
of the Philippine Islands of 1903, along with a few rst-hand accounts from the con-
temporary period, were invaluable. With these sources, I identied four cases whose
contrasting socioeconomic characteristics met the methodological criteria.
22Having chosen districts for evaluation, I investigated the evolution of the s-
cal strategies employed by the commanders of those districts. Secondary sources
provided context for the study, but to understand the scal strategies adopted by
the commanders in each district, I relied on a variety of primary sources. Among
other government reports, the extensive Annual Reports of the War Department in-
clude detailed accounts from lower-level commanders that provide insight on how
they saw the war and how they used their scal resources. Numerous memoirs per-
form a similar function, but, as they are written retrospectively, may be less reliable.
More ne-grained and \in the moment" are the archival records from the individ-
ual districts. Each district's record includes thousands of daily telegraphs and let-
ters between commands|issuing orders, recounting operations, providing intelligence
summaries, and discussing strategies. These records are invaluable, allowing one to
understand not only what commanders were doing, but what they were thinking.
This last point is important for assessing whether, in fact, commanders were learn-
ing and making corresponding adjustments as operations proceeded, in line with the
assumption noted above.
Finally, having documented commanders' use of their scal resources in each
of the districts, I compare their practices to the theory's predictions. To make this
comparison, I assess how their practices evolved over time and to which, if any,
of the ideal typical scal strategies they correspond. Findings that commanders
adopted scal strategies consistent with the theory's predictions lend support to its
underpinning logic.
As a preliminary test of validity beyond the Philippine War, the penultimate
chapter applies the theory's insights to cases from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
For each war, I selected a campaign for which there exists a relatively detailed un-
derstanding of the local conditions and the course of events. In Iraq, I look at the
23\Anbar Awakening" in which the tribes of western Iraq \ipped" from supporting
the insurgency to supporting the American-led coalition. In Afghanistan, I look at
operations in Helmand province during which NATO and Afghan troops attempted
to displace the Taliban from the country's largest opium-producing region.
The scope of the dissertation is limited to the experiences of incumbents in
weak states that receive external assistance in the ght against rebellion on their ter-
ritory. Rebels as well as government forces can employ a variety of scal strategies
and should, according to the theory, select among them with similar reasoning. How-
ever, both the availability of data and the need to select the most comparable cases
drives the choice to limit this study to the government side. Furthermore, irregular
or \asymmetric" warfare usually implies a mismatch between the capabilities and re-
sources of the government and the rebels. Typically, the scal resources available to
the government are vastly greater than those that can be mustered by the insurgents.
The study of rebel scal strategy selection is left for future research.
Important distinctions also exist between civil wars in weak states and those
in failed states. Rotberg (2004, 14) underscores the dierence. The ability of weak
states \to perform positively for their citizens has atrophied. But ...that atrophy
is neither inevitable nor the result of happenstance." In failed states, by contrast,
\leaders and states engaged in self-destruction usually possess too little credibility
and too few resources to restore trust and claw back from the brink of chaos. Many
leaders hardly recognize or care ...about the depths of their national despair." In a
context in which the state is unable or unwilling to act based on accurate information
about rebel forces, popular support that generates this sort of information will not
matter. This study thus exempts civil wars in failed states from the cases the model
seeks to explain.
24The rationale for emphasizing cases involving external assistance is two-fold.
First, by the time civil war has broken out, the balance of regime coercion and co-
optation has broken down. At that point, as Murshed (2002, 392) notes, \whatever
the precise pattern of broad-based spending required, the necessary scal transfers
must somehow be nanced. Achieving peace from this starting point is exceedingly
dicult." Outside assistance brings the resources necessary for a range of scal strate-
gies, and hence, the possibility for variation on the dependent variable. Second, in-
tervention to prevent or stanch conict in the developing world is topic of interest to
policymakers and scholars alike. Rich, industrialized states can oer scal resources
of signicant magnitude; understanding how these resources bend the trajectory of
conict is a matter of the rst concern.
...
Fiscal strategies have signicant and long-lasting implications; the institutions that
coalesce as a result of these transfers often do more to reshape societies in the midst of
war than does violence itself. A government's wartime scal strategy, on the one hand,
may entail increased local autonomy or a signal of commitment to greater interregional
or interethnic equality; on the other hand, it may presage the strengthening grip of
state repression or establish a foundation for dependency.
The issues addressed here also apply to questions of how to manage the inux
of external resources that sometimes accompanies the outbreak of hostilities. In
the wake of vexing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Western appetite for forceful
intervention into conicts in the developing world, already light, is likely to shrink
further. Yet given a persistent interest in the stability and governance of these regions,
intervention may increasingly take the form of scal aid. Insight into the application
of these resources will thus be of great importance to embattled governments and
their external supporters.
25This dissertation is an attempt to advance our understanding of the use and
usefulness of money on the modern battleeld. The study is structured in nine chap-
ters. Building on the concepts set forth in this introduction, Chapter Two presents a
complete discussion of the theory of scal strategies. I present the theory's dependent
and independent variables, and describe a model that links them to generate specic,
testable hypotheses.
The main body of the dissertation is an evaluation of those hypotheses as applied
to a series of historical cases from the Philippine-American War of 1899{1902. To
provide context for the case studies, Chapter Three presents an overview of Philippine
society and economic conditions at the close of the nineteenth century, a synopsis of
the war, and a general discussion of the American approach towards pacication
during the war. Chapters Four through Seven compare the predictions of the theory
of scal strategies to the course of the war in four separate districts within the Division
of the Philippines.
Chapter Eight takes a preliminary step toward demonstrating the theory's rel-
evance to irregular warfare in the twenty-rst century by evaluating its applicability
to events from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The nal chapter reects on the
longer term implications of scal strategies that are often selected for their short-term
eects. Fiscal strategies, I conclude, oer both promise and peril to the combatants
who employ them.
26Chapter 2
The Theory of Fiscal Strategies
If money can buy the end, we must use it.
- Tunku Abdul Rahman, Chief Minister of Malaya, 19541
The scal strategies adopted by combatants, even within a single war, vary consid-
erably from place to place and over time. Why is there such variation? How do
we explain divergent outcomes? And what might a systematic account tell us about
the use and usefulness of scal strategies? The chapter that follows addresses these
questions by proposing a logic according to which combatants in irregular civil wars
employ their scal resources to control contested territory.
I begin by introducing an analytic framework for distinguishing among scal
strategies and illustrating the logic underlying each strategy type. Just as violence
can be selective or indiscriminate, benets oered by combatants can be targeted
1Quoted in Barber (1971, 319).
27or diuse|governments and guerillas can provide public goods, selective incentives,
private goods, or no goods at all.
To consider the factors most relevant to selecting among scal strategies, I con-
struct a simple illustration based on a documented scenario from the Iraq War. The
illustration reects factors characteristic of irregular warfare at varying places and
times. The scenario suggests that scal strategy choice can be depicted as the result
of a negotiation between a combatant force and the members of a community. A com-
mander oers material benets in exchange for cooperation from local inhabitants.
The participants in the negotiation and the magnitude of their demands are the key
determinants of the scal strategy adopted.
Merging the implications of the scenario with literature on state-building and
civil conict, I propose a bargaining model of scal strategy choice. In the model, a
military commander negotiates with members of a community for their support or ac-
quiescence, using both the threat of coercion and the oer of material benets. Local
communal structure dictates whom the commander will bargain with; the vulnera-
bility or resilience of their economic livelihoods determine their relative bargaining
power and thus the size of the oer they are willing to accept.
In the model, the commander then chooses a scal strategy that minimizes
the cost of control, whether in scal or military resources. Variation in communal
structure and local economic vulnerability implies, according to the model, specic
variation in the optimal scal strategy choices for the commander. The model pro-
duces a set of empirically veriable hypotheses that allow us to evaluate the theory
against historical cases.
282.1 Classifying scal strategies
What scal strategies are available to a military commander seeking to extend control
over a contested territory? In some communities, combatants implement projects that
aim to improve the quality of life for all local inhabitants, such as public health and
infrastructure improvement; at times, the opposing forces oer incentives to those who
volunteer support or who can credibly pledge not to assist the enemy, incentives such
as payment for information or employment as paramilitaries; elsewhere, combatants
contract with local chiefs, power brokers, or warlords who can assist in providing
order.
I distinguish among four stylized strategy choices according to the type of eco-
nomic goods they provide. A strategy of consensual rule distributes public goods and
services to entire segments of the population in an eort to raise the opportunity cost
of rebellion. A strategy of indirect rule provides private goods to a cooperative local
power-holder who leverages his privileged access to social capital and local knowledge
to establish security and order. A divide-and-rule strategy oers selective incentives
to those willing to cooperate with the government, isolating the irreconcilable ele-
ments of the insurgency. Finally, a coercive rule strategy provides no goods and relies
entirely on force to establish control. As the discussion will illustrate, each strategy
type entails a trade-o between competing goals pursued by the state.
This typology is not the only method conceivable for categorizing programs
aimed at persuasion or co-optation. Other classications could, for instance, empha-
size the particular good or service being provided, such as health care, electricity, or
sanitation. However, I contend that the identity of the beneciary is of far greater
importance than the specic benet provided|of signicance is not what is given,
but to whom it is given. Fiscal strategies are meant to engender political outcomes;
as such, the eect of a strategy is contingent upon how its impact is felt by those
29holding political power. Power may be concentrated or diuse. The strategy types
outlined below dier foremost in the extent to which their benets are targeted to-
ward select members of the community or are more broadly distributed. Each has
advantages and disadvantages that make one or another comparatively attractive in
dierent settings and circumstances.
2.1.1 Consensual rule
A strategy of consensual rule entails the provision of public or collective goods.
Strictly, public goods are those that are non-excludable and non-rivalrous. The goods
provided under a consensual rule strategy approximate these characteristics. The key
trait is that they are disseminated widely and without prejudice as to the identity of
the recipient. Furthermore, they are not contingent upon any particular behavior on
the part of the recipient. Of the strategy-types, consensual rule is the most closely
associated with popular conceptions of \winning hearts-and-minds" and with certain
aspects of the population-centric approach in current U.S. doctrine. The logic behind
this strategy is multi-faceted; through the provision of public goods, the state signals
its legitimacy while addressing grievances underlying the presumed dissatisfaction
with the status quo. In economic terms, the provision of public goods raises the op-
portunity cost of rebellion by making more attractive the alternatives to ghting the
state and risking death or imprisonment.
Consensual rule provides goods like public utilities and infrastructure, primary
education, health care, dispute resolution and contract enforcement, evenhanded gov-
ernance, and public security. Generally speaking, in communities where these goods
are provided, individuals cannot be excluded from enjoying the benets. When this
strategy succeeds, the political agenda of the insurgency holds less appeal for the
population who come to view the regime as legitimate and not predatory to their
30interests. Individuals are less willing to assist the insurgents and more willing to
support the government forces. Information on rebel activity is forthcoming, and in-
surgents who do not capitulate are increasingly squeezed by military operations. As
the regime's authority gains acceptance and support and hardcore rebels are captured
or killed, requirements for force diminish. Residual violence will be mostly criminal
in nature and not directed against the state.
Consensual rule through the commander's provision of public goods is often
not possible to extend throughout the entirety of a developing state, even if it were
the preferred choice. It may be too costly, exceeding the resources and technical
capacity of the state (Kiser, 1999). These limitations are likely to be exacerbated as
a civil war proceeds and the urgency of demands on the embattled state multiplies.
Consensual rule can also distort the local economy and labor market with an inux
of expenditure in particular sectors. In the long-term, consensual rule can stymie the
maturation of local self-governance and create a dependence upon external actors. In
addition, the expansion of the reach and authority of the state|even in a seemingly
benign manner|may threaten the position of traditional power-holders, stirring their
resistance.
2.1.2 Divide-and-rule
A strategy of divide-and-rule rests on the provision of selective incentives. In his clas-
sic work, Olson (1965, 51) states that such incentives operate \not indiscriminately,
like the collective good, upon the group as a whole, but rather selectively toward the
individuals in the group. The incentive must be `selective' so that those who do not
join the organization working for the group's interest ...can be treated dierently
from those who do." Under divide-and-rule, benets are oered to all, but only those
who take certain actions will receive them. By making access to benets contin-
31gent upon behavior that gives support to government forces or provides a credible
commitment not to support the rebels, the commander seeks to separate pockets of
hardened resistance from the reconcilable population. Those who are less committed
to the insurgent cause or who face lower costs for collaboration with the military will
be the rst to respond to selective incentives.
Some examples serve to illustrate the use of a divide-and-rule approach. One of
the most widespread and eective uses of selective incentives is payment in exchange
for information about guerilla forces. Since the identity, activity, or whereabouts of
insurgents are often known to local inhabitants, any are eligible for the rewards oered
to informers. Similar incentives may work to induce defection from rebel ranks and, in
the words of one ocer, \drive a wedge between the leaders and the rank and le."2
Trinquier (1964, 33) suggests another common manifestation of a divide-and-rule
strategy, noting, \[W]e may always assure ourselves of [individuals'] loyalty by placing
them within an organization it will be dicult to leave once admitted." One such
organization is a local paramilitary or security force. In exchange for employment,
enlistees assist the counterinsurgent forces or, at a minimum, forgo their opportunity
to participate in or provide support to the rebellion. Discussing their decision to join
the pro-Israeli South Lebanese Army, two local men explained, \We were poor. The
only work was their army. If you're in the army, you can live. If you are not, you can't"
(Sontag, 2000). Non-security employment programs can also be part of a divide-and-
rule strategy when the jobs function to eliminate opportunities for participation in
or support to the insurgency. Even a successful divide-and-rule strategy will require
the presence of a robust security force. While the rebels will be somewhat isolated,
eliminating them will require the use of precise and ecient force. Just as important,
2Quoted in Ramakrishna (2002, 337).
32the commander must oer sucient protection to the cooperative elements of the
population if the government's incentives are to be of value.
Although it can be inexpensive in comparison to consensual rule, a divide-and-
rule strategy is dicult to establish and administer. Informers and paramilitaries can
be dicult to recruit and maintain. Additionally, the state must monitor behavior
and vet information to ensure that the stream of benets it provides can be cut o if
transgression occurs. Further, the provision of selective incentives may lead to more
violence than it prevents. It can exacerbate existing divisions within a community
and trigger spirals of revenge. Additionally, because rebel groups rely on cooperation
from some part of the community and, at a minimum, the nonbetrayal of nearly the
entire community, selective incentives from the military pose a major threat to the
rebels. Thus rebels often target for punishment most vehemently those who receive
the government's selective payouts (Kalyvas, 2006). In pursuing a divide-and-rule
strategy, then, the state may indirectly cause greatest harm to it most important
latent allies.
2.1.3 Indirect rule
A strategy of indirect rule seeks to form what Scott (1972, 92) calls \instrumental
friendships." Under this arrangement, the commander grants autonomy and provides
private goods to chosen local leaders, contingent on their delivery of security and qui-
escence in the areas under their inuence. In eect, the commander \subcontracts"
the provision of order to a more ecient producer. Local elites have sources of power
independent of the state that they can draw upon. Boone (2003, 31) notes some of
those sources: \Land ownership or personal wealth, land rights commanded by corpo-
rate entities such as lineages or royal families, social status and legitimacy, religious
powers, and heredity." Relying on these material and social resources, together with
33superior local knowledge, local leaders may be able to provide order and security in
their communities more eciently than the government. To the local leader whose
\friendship" is sought, the private goods provided under indirect rule represent an
opportunity to gain or consolidate power, to pay o debts, or to get rich.
The transfers made under an indirect rule strategy may be in the form of cash
payments or anything else of value. From a methodological standpoint, there is some
risk of observational equivalence between the goods provided under indirect rule and
other scal strategies. For instance, something that appears to be a public good|a
water well, perhaps|is more accurately identied as private good when it is dug on
the local leader's property or somewhere else he requested specically. During the
war in Iraq, directing reconstruction projects to a sheikh's preferred contractor was
a common method of distributing private goods, even when the contract was for a
public project (e.g., Whiteley, 2010). Accurately identifying a strategy of indirect rule
requires identifying the beneciary and the terms on which goods are provided. The
beneciary will be chosen deliberately, and his continued access to the private goods
will be contingent upon his willingness to cooperate with the commander and the gov-
ernment. His cooperation might mean the non-participation of people from his area
in the rebellion, the safe presence of government forces in his area, the free passage
of forces through the area, or other security-related outcomes. When successful, the
local leader controls|or assists the military in controlling|the area and individuals
under his inuence, and the iterative nature of the exchange provides implicit en-
forcement of the agreement (Hicken, 2011, 292{293). Imposing order under indirect
rule may still require the use of force, but it will often be supplied privately, through
local militias organized by the favored traditional elites. In other circumstances, the
military will work closely with local leaders to defeat the insurgency in the area.
34Indirect rule is an imperfect solution for the commander, exposing him to ma-
nipulation and deceit, inviting a host of principal-agent problems, or stoking internal
rivalries. Information asymmetries make monitoring the compliance of local agents
dicult; divergent goals and incentives between the local leader and the military
commander strain cooperation; and the possibility of \capture" by local agents exists
if the commander nds himself without alternative local partners. In some cases, the
military commander risks complicity with the repressive practices of ruthless local
leaders. Further, indirect rule supplies both autonomy and resources that can be
used later in opposition to the government.
2.1.4 Coercive rule
A nal strategic alternative eschews the employment of scal means in the ght to
establish control. Coercive rule entails the use of force to compel cooperation, acquies-
cence, or non-betrayal from the noncombatant population while military operations
against the insurgency proceed. In some settings, coercion may provide the only
meaningful incentive; in others, it may simply be a more cost-eective alternative to
any of the strategies that include persuasive measures.
Coercive rule is identiable by the absence of most positive incentives. Aspects
of French operations during the Algerian War are famous|and extreme|examples
of this approach. In Algiers, French forces imposed mass internments, imposed strict
curfews, limited civilian movement, and used torture to gain information. In the
countryside, the regroupement policy resettled more than two million rural Algerians
into fortied villages built by the French (Metz, 1994). Coercive strategies are not
solely the domain of unscrupulous armies, however, and coercive rule does not imply
human rights violations. Despite noteworthy transgressions, the American military
in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, enforced strict rules of engagement meant to
35protect noncombatants in the areas in which it applied coercive rule. Successfully im-
plementing a coercive rule strategy in a rebellious territory requires extensive military
force to patrol aggressively, execute cordon-and-search operations, enforce population
control measures such as curfews and check-points, secure large numbers of detainees,
and conduct interrogations.
Like consensual rule|coercive rule's polar opposite|a main drawback to this
approach is the resource requirement. While extreme levels of coercive rule are likely
to be eective at restoring or preserving order, mustering the required manpower and
resources may be politically or economically infeasible. Eective forces also take a
great deal of time to recruit, train, and equip; commanders have a limited pool of
available manpower and military equipment, placing a constraint on the extent to
which they can apply coercive rule. Moreover, the approach may stoke resentment,
create new opposition, and further iname the very grievances driving the insurgency.
The discussion that follows considers how a commander might choose between
consensual rule, divide-and-rule, indirect rule, and coercive rule when trying to es-
tablish control over a community.
2.2 An illustration of scal strategy choice
In mid-2011, American military commanders prepared for the daunting challenge of
moving most of their forces and equipment out of Iraq along the main supply route
that ran through the southern half of the country. The challenge was not merely one
of logistical planning|providing security for the convoys posed a dicult military
dilemma. The New York Times reported that,
In recent weeks, insurgent ghters have stepped up their eorts to kill
American forces in what appears to be a strategy to press the United
36States to withdraw on schedule, undercut any resolve to leave troops in
Iraq, and win a public relations victory at home by claiming credit for
the American withdrawal. American commanders say one of the gravest
threats to the 46,000 troops here is that they could become easy targets
for insurgents when they begin their nal withdrawal this summer and
head for the border along a 160-mile stretch of road cutting through the
desert into Kuwait (Schmidt, 2011).
In its essentials, the challenge that faced the American commanders is similar in
nature to those confronted by commanders in irregular wars throughout history. By
considering how a commander might use his scal and military resources in this
scenario, we can gain insight into the factors that drive scal strategy choice in civil
war more generally. The scenario thus represents a starting point for theory-building.
The illustration below portrays the circumstances faced by the U.S. military
leaders attempting to control the supply route through southern Iraq. While simpli-
ed, it depicts this operation in the context of several characteristics of the security
environment that are consistent across irregular civil wars. Of foremost importance
is popular support. If locals do not reveal the rebels to government forces, Kalyvas
(2006, 91) explains, it is either because \the people do not know who is really an in-
surgent, which is sometimes true about spies and clandestine agents; or, much more
commonly, they refrain from identifying the insurgent combatants who hide among
them|out of diverse motivations, including sympathy and fear. Herein lays the rele-
vance of popular `support.'"3 From this observation follow the three key assumptions
of the illustration that follows. First, government forces have inferior knowledge of
local conditions in comparison to the people who live in the area. Second, rebel ac-
tivity is observable to local civilians where they live and work. Third, rebel activity
3Emphasis added.
37is only possible with the active support, tacit consent, or reluctant acceptance of the
population; rebel viability requires, at minimum, non-betrayal.
In the scenario, the outcome sought by the commander is the safe passage of his
convoys through a series of villages that sit astride a key supply route. In each village,
the commander must choose among the four strategies outlined above to implement.
Each household in the villages can observe the section of road immediately in front
of it and can act (by informing government forces, for example) to prevent rebels
from using that section of road to attack a convoy. Household i will do so if the
state's scal strategy oers benets that meet the household's \reservation price,"
ci. Alternatively, the commander can secure each section of road by force, at a xed
cost, f, per section. Lacking acute local knowledge|but aware of past experiences
or the general sympathies of the inhabitants|government forces can observe the
distribution of reservation prices in each village, but do not know the reservation
price of any individual household.
cmax ≤ f Public goods = ncmax
c1 ≤ f
cn ≤ f c2 ≤ f
c3 ≤ f
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f
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= fiscal allocation
Figure 2.1: Village A: consensual rule.
Village A, depicted in the left frame of Figure 2.1 is a village of n autonomous
households. Each household's reservation price is less than or equal to the unit cost of
force; that is cmax  f. What choices are available to the commander? He can secure
38the road by force for a total cost of nf, or he can provide benets to the residents
at a value of cmax per household|ensuring that each household's reservation price is
met|for a total cost of ncmax. The commander chooses the lower cost alternative and
opts for a strategy of consensual rule. He delivers benets to each household in the
village through the provision of public goods. The right frame is a plot of household
reservation prices, depicting the cost of the consensual rule strategy for this village.
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Figure 2.2: Village B: divide-and-rule.
Many inhabitants of Village B, in the left frame of Figure 2.2, have higher
reservation prices than the residents of Village A; here cmin < f, but cmax > f. In
Village B, the commander chooses a strategy of divide-and-rule. He makes an oer
of selective incentives valued up to a marginal unit cost of f, the point at which the
state is indierent between coercion and co-optation. Households with reservation
prices below f accept the oer and assist the commander along their stretches of
road, while the remaining parts of the route must be secured by force. The total
value of military and scal resources expended is nf. The right frame depicts the
costs of the divide-and-rule strategy.
Like the residents of Village A, inhabitants of Village C have low reservation
prices, cmax  f, as shown in Figure 2.3. Households in Village C, however, are
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Figure 2.3: Village C: indirect rule.
not autonomous decision-makers, but fall under the authority of a \chief," whom
they obey and who can observe their individual reservation prices. He alone will
negotiate with the commander on behalf of the village as a whole (and can prevent
any individual household from making a side deal with the commander.) The chief of
Village C can secure the supply route using his private resources at a cost of
Pn
i=1 ci
through payments to each household at their exact reservation price. The commander,
for his part, would be willing to pay up to nf to secure this stretch of road. He will
choose indirect rule and strike a deal to provide private goods to the chief, but at
what price? If there are alternative chiefs with whom to negotiate|perhaps there is
competition among households to be chief|the commander will secure a price near
Pn
i=1 ci = ncavg. If there are no alternatives, the chief will extract a price near nf.
These outcomes are depicted in right frame of Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.4 presents Village D, also presided over by an authoritative chief. Resi-
dents of this community have high reservation prices. Because cavg > f, the comman-
der will choose a strategy of coercive rule, providing no goods and relying on force
alone to secure the supply route at a cost of nf.
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Figure 2.4: Village D: coercive rule.
The situation on which this illustration is based did, in fact, prompt U.S. com-
manders to employ scal strategies. Observing what appears to be an indirect rule
approach, the Times noted that,
Ocially, the money is paid to have Iraqis clean the crucial roadway of
debris, an apparent pretense because an Iraqi-American agreement bars
outright payments for security. The sheiks keep some of the cash and
use the rest to hire 35 workers each who clear the road of trash.... The
money also helps the sheiks solidify the loyalty of their own people by
giving them the power to dole out jobs.
An American colonel stated, \`There are real incentives for them to keep the highway
safe. Those sheiks we have the best relationships with and have kept their highways
clear and safe will be the most likely ones to get [their contracts] renewed for the
remainder of the year.'" This approach appears to have succeeded; both roadside
bomb attacks on American and Iraqi vehicles and rocket attacks against nearby bases
decreased after the approach was implemented. Further underscoring the appeal of
scal strategies, Schmidt (2011) reports, \The contracts, ocials said, cost far less
than nearly all the other measures the military has used in Iraq to ensure security."
412.3 Bargaining
The simplied depiction of the Iraq War scenario suggests the possibility of seeing
scal strategy choice as the outcome of an implicit or explicit negotiation between
a commander and a community whose support he seeks. The conceptualization of
scal strategy selection as the result of a bargaining process corresponds to the state-
building theories of Levi (1981, 1988). Her \predatory theory of rule" seeks to explain
variations in the decisions taken by rulers in establishing state institutions for the ex-
traction and distribution of wealth. Levi focuses on the ruler, who seeks to maximize
his wealth and power, and on the bargaining process through which his subjects try
to wrest concessions and protect their own resources from his preying. She writes,
\My thesis is not only that the ruler is predatory in that he attempts to formulate
policies that maximize his personal objectives but that his success is dependent on his
bargaining power vis- a-vis subjects, agents, and external actors" (Levi, 1981, 438).
Merging Levi's characterization of the ruler with the dynamics of scal strategy
choice depicted above, the focal point of the theory of scal strategies is the military
commander|the individual who decides how a xed supply of military and scal
resources are to be allocated within a delimited area of operations. Acknowledging
dierences among commanders in terms of their dispositions, expertise, and experi-
ence, I make two key assumptions regarding their similarities. First, I assume that
they are \thinly rational" in the sense that they seek to maximize a consistent set of
preferences and are capable of comparing costs and benets. They do not have per-
fect information when making decisions, but they can learn through trial-and-error.
Second, I assume that their aim is to maximize territorial control throughout their
areas of operation. Doing so requires that they use their resources eciently|that
they minimize the amount of military and scal resources expended on establishing
control in any discrete locality.
42In the course of negotiations with the community, commanders make threats
and oer benets in exchange for quiescence or support. Citizens accept, reject, or
bid up those oers. In the Iraq War scenario, two features dened the bargaining
process. First, with whom must the commander bargain? Is there an individual who
can negotiate on behalf of the group as a whole? Or will the commander need to strike
bargains with subgroups or individuals? Second, what is the \reservation price" of
the commander's counterpart(s) from the community? What is the magnitude of the
concession the counterpart would be willing to accept? Or, to put it dierently, what
is the relative bargaining power of the commander vis- a-vis his counterpart?
These two decisive features of the bargaining process are reections of cor-
responding characteristics of the community. First, the extent to which local so-
cial, political, and economic power is concentrated|\communal structure"|denes
whom the commander will negotiate with. Second, the extent to which local ac-
tors' sources of wealth depend upon cooperation with the commander|\economic
security"|denes the relative bargaining power and the size of the oer local inhab-
itants will accept.
2.3.1 Communal structure
In their eorts to garner support from the public, combatants must rst identify
whom within the population to target for co-optation. Do certain local actors have
disproportionate inuence over outcomes? The theory suggests that a key distinc-
tion among communities that impacts scal strategy choice is the extent to which
communal structure is hierarchical and authoritative, concentrating local political
clout.
Research on institutional choice identies patterns in the processes and out-
comes of state-making. By these accounts, social organization at the local level is a
43key variable in explaining political change and institutional outcomes. In her work on
\political topographies" in Africa, Boone (2003, 20-21) demonstrates the pivotal role
of communal structure in accounting for the variation she observes in institutions for
rule within African states. Introducing the term she writes,
Communal structure consists of the microscopic matrixes of social orga-
nization and control that dene politics at the local level. Key variables
here are settlement patterns, land tenure and inheritance regimes, and
relations of cooperation, dependency, and coercion in the organization of
production. In agrarian society these elements intertwine with rules and
institutions that distribute political power at the local level, govern access
to land and other productive resources, and enforce social cohesion.
This description is necessarily broad; the sources of communal structure are complex
and often idiosyncratic. What is it that emerges from this mix of history, geography,
and culture that provides a salient basis for comparison between communities?
A number of historical accounts highlight the signicance of communal struc-
tural in providing a basis for political organization and mobilization. Hechter and
Brustein (1980) explains patterns of state formation in early modern Europe by
contrasting the social organizations that resulted from regionally distinct modes of
production. Feudalism, entailing a hierarchical system of vassalage that both aided
political coordination and engendered class conict, provided more fertile soil for cen-
tralized state formation than sedentary pastoral or petty commodity systems. In his
seminal study of agrarian social revolution, Moore (1966) depicts communal struc-
ture as a cardinal determinant of the likelihood of rebellion as well as its form. He
contrasts villages marked by solidarity with \atomised" communities, citing as an
example of the latter Marx's comparison of small-holding French villages to sacks of
potatoes (Marx, [1852] 2008). Scott (1976, 203) similiarly compares \communitar-
44ian" to \socially fragmented" villages. He resists drawing conclusions that relate these
structures to the likelihood of revolt, but notes their signicance to the dynamics of
conict already underway: \The dierence in those two structures seems, to me at
least, to lie less in their explosiveness per se than in the manner of the explosion once
it takes place ..."
These and other similar accounts point to the distinguishing feature of social
organization at the village level: the locus of political power. I follow Boone (2003,
21-22) who compares communal structures by the \extent to which they concentrate
or disperse control over persons and resources." Concentration, she continues, \pools
political resources in the hands of a narrow set of actors. It creates a rural elite that
has more political clout|more clout in dealing with the state|than a dispersed set
of small asset holders would have." In the context of civil war, the existence of a
local elite who have the social and material resources to decisively inuence activity
in their communities provides combatant forces a narrow set of actors with whom to
bargain.
Powerful local elites with inuence over traditional social networks can be at-
tractive partners for government forces seeking to reassert or maintain control of an
area. Tribes can be powerful, and their power often rests in the hands of a single
individual or a small group of individuals within the tribe. Describing Iraqi tribes,
Meilahn (2007, 5) observes, \Today's sheikh is the mayor, judge and social worker.
As judge, he gives verdicts that are not the `law' but any member who goes against
his decision does so without the support of the tribe." Drawing on events from the
Vietnam War, Maranto and Tuchman (1992, 261) note the inuence of local leaders:
\While a single individual can seldom alter the course of a nation, one can alter the
course of the revolution in one's own village."
45Few actual communities, if any, are perfectly solidary or perfectly fragmented.
Rather then being a binary categorization it is more accurate to conceive of com-
munities as sitting somewhere on the spectrum between these two ideal types. The
point at which any particular community sits on that spectrum is a function of a
somewhat idiosyncratic combination of factors that contribute to the authority of
local elites and the community's capacity for collective action. There are, however,
several characteristics that tend to be present in many solidary communities. One
factor is the extent to which traditional political authority overlaps with economic
power or religious authority. By denition, the more aspects of local power that fall
under the control of a central gure, the more solidary the community. Fragmented
villages may be marked by high levels of intra-elite competition. Also important is
the pattern of landholding that prevails in a community; the strength of patron-client
bonds that follow from landholding arrangements factors into communal solidarity.
Empirically, ethnic homogeneity is often a factor in the capacity for collective action.
Conversely, ethnic heterogeneity is a marker of communal fragmentation in an area
with a history of ethnic tension. Finally, in a civil war, incidences of entire towns or
villages switching sides provide ex post evidence of communal solidarity.
Communal structure suggests whether combatants must pursue bargains with
individual households and subsets of the population or can, through local elites,
bargain with the community as a whole. For the commander, solidary and hierarchical
communities can be a blessing or a curse. On the one hand, the existence of a
local elite can vastly simplify the bargaining process by providing a focal point for
negotiations, reducing transaction costs, and minimizing the threat from spoilers once
a bargain is struck; on the other hand, should that bargaining process fail, solidary
communities may be the most dicult to control due to their capacity for collective
action.
462.3.2 Economic security
In negotiating a settlement based on the provision of material benets, the threat of
deprivation is a counterweight to the prospect of gain. In other words, if a local actor
depends on cooperation with the military or the state for his economic well-being|
or if a commander can credibly threaten to take away his wealth|the actor is in a
weaker bargaining position in attempting to extract concessions from the commander.
By contrast, local actors who are not reliant economically on cooperation with the
combatant have less to lose by walking away from the table and are therefore in a
position to make higher demands.
Thus, the scal strategy chosen by the commander will reect the bargaining
power of his counterpart from the community. The relative bargaining power of a local
actor vis- a-vis the military commander with whom he is negotiating is attributable
foremost to the actor's economic security. I dene economic security as the degree of
independence of a local actor from the military and the state for access to sources of
wealth or economic livelihood.4
Implicit in the denition of economic security are two counteracting charac-
teristics. Vulnerability reects the ease with which a combatant or the state can
expropriate or deny access to an actor's means of livelihood. Local actors may de-
pend on the state for enforcement of property rights or access to trade facilities, for
example. But they also depend on the state not to destroy their property or interdict
their trade. A combatant's ability to disrupt economic activity depends on the role of
the state in the local economy and the military technology that the commander can
4Unlike the concepts of economic security in the literature on \livelihood diversication," the term
is used here in reference only to vulnerability or resilience eected by the military/state, and not to
the full range of hazards and shocks to which actors may be susceptible. For instance, a farmer's
livelihood might be threatened by a drought, but this fact would only gure into the concept of
economic security if the farmer counted on the state for crop insurance or food supplements during
times of hardship.
47employ. Resilience is the degree to which an actor is able to cope with or adapt to
economic disruption, should it befall him. Coping mechanisms may include various
forms of insurance, as well as the diversication of economic enterprises or inputs.
Vulnerability and resilience are opposing forces. I describe as \resilient" communities
in which resilience is high and vulnerability is low, and I label \vulnerable" communi-
ties in which the opposite is true, as depicted in Figure 2.5. When both components
are either high or low, economic security is \moderate."
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Figure 2.5: Economic security.
Nearly all economic production activity involves three elements, each of which
can be assessed in terms of vulnerability and resilience. Whatever the specic activity,
it will involve, rst, \access to an initial asset, resource or endowment;" second, \the
actual physical process of transformation or production;" and, third, \some degree
of exchange" (Start and Johnson, 2004, 22). No actor's well-being is limited to the
element of economic activity in which he is directly engaged. Asset-holders cannot
derive value from what they possess if production is disrupted, and producers rely
48on the accessibility of markets for their products, just as merchants require products
to trade. Assessing an actor's economic security therefore requires a look at each
element of the economic activity on which he depends.
Asset wealth derives from ownership or control of raw materials and capital
required for production; land; labor; relevant skills and knowledge; and money or
other liquid stores of value (Levi, 1988, 19). An asset's vulnerability relates to how
easily it can be destroyed or expropriated. Livestock, for example, is generally easy
to destroy; a gold mine is more dicult. An asset's resilience turns on how important
it is to an actor's wealth or livelihood, as well as how easily it can be rebuilt or
replaced. Depending on the circumstances, replacing the livestock or re-digging the
mine may be more or less vital to the actors and more or less dicult to accomplish.
Possession of liquid wealth makes replacement of lost assets easier and provides a
source of sustenance in the interim.
Production transforms raw assets into something of greater value. Production
may be rendered vulnerable through the destruction of inputs and the disruption
of the process itself. The relative factor intensity of production is central to both
its vulnerability and resilience. Though circumstances will dier from case to case,
capital-intensive production is more likely to be vulnerable. Machinery can be de-
stroyed, fuel can be denied, electricity can be shut o, and expert managers can be
detained. In the developing world, where state failure and civil war is most common,
replacements or substitutes for these inputs may be dicult to acquire. By contrast,
the primary inputs for labor-intensive production|low-skill workers|are probably
more dicult to \destroy" and can be more easily replaced.
Trade and exchange allow the producer to realize the value of whatever he has
created. The degree of vulnerability or resilience inherent in exchange relates to
distribution and demand. That is, a producer is vulnerable if he is unable to get his
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robust trade networks or routes that are dicult to interdict. For instance, if a railway
junction were blocked, a resilient producer could move his goods by an alternate route
bypassing the junction, or he could ship his product by road or water. Alternatively, a
producer may use a single route that is dicult to interdict|perhaps it runs through
territory under rebel control or through terrain were it cannot be detected. Resilient
demand turns on the availability of purchasers for an actor's produce. In the face of
an embargo, a resilient producer can nd new customers.
The discussion suggests two important caveats related to the commander's use
of technology to threaten assets, production, or exchange. First, technology is only
relevant if the rules allow the commander to use it. Particularly when it comes to the
assets of noncombatants, the mere technological capacity to seize or destroy them is
insucient to render those assets vulnerable if rules prevent it. Prevailing norms and
rules of conduct must be taken into account when assessing the technology \available"
to the commander. Similarly, with respect to production, permissible conduct may
not include killing civilian laborers or preventing them from working, though it may
allow, for instance, cutting o electricity to the factory owned by an uncooperative
civilian. Second, technology is only relevant if the enemy is unable to counter it or
prevent its use. For instance, aircraft capable of bombing a factory do not render it
vulnerable if the enemy possesses eective anti-aircraft defenses in the area. Likewise,
a navy makes merchant shipping vulnerable only if it has superiority at sea sucient
to establish a blockade.
The aggregate assessment of an actor's economic security corresponds to the
most vulnerable element of the economic activity on which he depends. The com-
mander's leverage in the bargaining process derives from the threat he can pose to
economic well-being, whatever the source of the threat. In other words, even if as-
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makes the overall assessment of economic security correspondingly vulnerable; the
commander can pose a threat to economic well-being by interdicting distribution,
perhaps.
In sum, economic security is a function of countervailing forces of resilience
and vulnerability. Determining which force is predominant for a given actor requires
looking at all elements of the economic production activity he depends on for his liveli-
hood. Each element is assessed in terms of resilience and vulnerability to inuence
by the military or the state. The most vulnerable aspect of economic activity corre-
sponds to an actor's economic security|and to his bargaining power if he negotiates
with the commander.
2.4 Choosing scal strategies
What remains is to bring together the pieces to demonstrate how a bargaining pro-
cess dened by a community's sociopolitical structure and economic vulnerability
leads to a commander's selection of a particular scal strategy from among the avail-
able choices. The \structural constraints" noted in the literature discussed in Chap-
ter One|national traits, regime type, and organizational impediments|may limit
a commander's available choices. Within those constraints, however, a great deal of
variation remains. This theory accounts for that variation.
A commander seeking to extend control over a rebellious territory has a limited
pool of military and scal resources from which to draw. Within the territory are
districts, towns, and villages that dier in their communal structures and levels of
economic security. In any given community, the commander seeks to minimize the
total cost of military and scal resources required to establish control. Where it is
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scal resources to co-
opt members of the community rather than relying on force alone to compel their
compliance.
Figure 2.6 depicts the theory's hypotheses. In fragmented communities that are
economically vulnerable, the commander will choose to provide public goods to the
community as a whole. Where solidarity is lacking but many sources of wealth are
resilient, the commander will opt for the provision of selective incentives to induce
cooperation. In solidary communities whose sources of wealth are vulnerable, the
commander will be able to strike a bargain with local elites, oering them private
goods in exchange for their cooperation. In solidary communities with more economic
resilience, a bargain will be elusive and the commander will have to rely primarily on
force to establish control.
Communal Structure 
Economic Security 
COERCIVE RULE  DIVIDE & RULE 
INDIRECT RULE  CONSENSUAL RULE 
Figure 2.6: Selecting scal strategies.
The commander's rst step is to identify whom within the community he should
bargain with, oering material reward in exchange for cooperation. It would be a
waste of resources, he reasons, to provide benets to those who lack the ability to
52make independent choices regarding their allegiance. In perfectly solidary commu-
nities, a single individual is able to speak authoritatively for the entire community
and is thus the individual with whom the commander must negotiate. In perfectly
fragmented communities, by contrast, each individual or household may be an inde-
pendent decision-maker, and the commander must negotiate, explicitly or implicitly,
with each of them.
Second, having identied the party with whom to negotiate, the commander
considers what oer to make. The possibility of a deal rests on the existence of over-
lapping oers and demands|\bargaining space." For the commander, any potential
oer is limited by the cost of applying military resources relative to scal resources.5
The commander chooses to employ scal resources up to the point at which the use of
military force becomes more cost-eective. In other words, if it is cheaper in relative
terms to control a village by force than by paying o the villagers, the commander
will use force, and vice versa.
On the other side of the negotiation is the community itself. All else being
equal, the economic incentives needed to secure popular support correspond inversely
to the economic losses likely to accrue should an agreement fail to emerge. Economic
security is the driving factor in a community's demands; those that are economically
resilient have less to fear from a failure to strike a deal and are thus in a stronger
bargaining position, able to demand greater concessions from the commander.
Consider rst a community that lacks authoritative, centralized leadership and
in which individual households are independent and autonomous decision-makers|
that is, a community whose sociopolitical structure is fragmented. This setting is
the sort depicted by Berman, Shapiro and Felter (2011) in their study of the eects
5The relative cost of either type of resource derives from its available supply in relation to the
other. For commanders with lots of money but few troops, the application of force is more costly
than for commanders with lots of troops but little money. The strength of the enemy aects the
total amount of resources required, but not necessarily the cost of one resource relative to the other.
53of reconstruction spending on levels of violence in the Iraq War. Following a model
developed by Akerlof and Yellen (1997), the authors depict a civil war as a three-
way strategic interaction between incumbents, the community, and insurgents. The
incumbents attempt to induce collaboration by providing \public goods [that] are
available to community members only to the extent that the government controls
territory." Borrowing a term from Popkin (1979), the authors suggest that the \ra-
tional peasant" individually arrives at a decision whether or not to collaborate with
the incumbents by weighing his anticipated share of the public goods they provide
against the perceived risk of reprisal by the insurgents.
A vital factor in the cost-benet calculation of the rational peasant, I argue, is
the economic consequence to his household of failing to strike a cooperative bargain
with the commander. If his livelihood depends on mediation by the state or if it could
be easily threatened by the commander's military forces, he will accept a lower oer.
In this situation, our model predicts that the commander will adopt a strategy of
consensual rule if all (or some critical mass) of the community's households can be co-
opted at cost below that of using force to deter support for the rebels. The commander
will provide public goods to the community, the individual share of which meets or
surpasses the demands of each household. A surplus accrues to those individuals who
have lower demands than their neighbors; under most circumstances the commander
is willing to cede this surplus because it allows him to avoid the transaction costs of
negotiating individually with each household.
Alternatively, in fragmented communities where many of the rational peasants
are more resilient economically, the commander will adopt a divide-and-rule approach,
oering selective incentives to separate those who can be aordably co-opted from
those who can be controlled more cost-eectively through the use of force. Like the
provision of public goods, the bargaining is passive and implicit|individuals choose
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costs associated with bargaining are minimized. The use of selective incentives carries
other transaction costs, however. In order to ensure compliance with the terms of the
deal, the commander may have to monitor the behavior of those who accept a deal.
The structure of many communities is more complex than an aggregation of
rational peasants, however. What if we introduce a \rational sheikh" (or tribal chief or
village elder)? As noted above, these select members of the population are local elites
whose social and material resources are greater than those of the rational peasant,
and who thus face a dierent set of incentives with respect to cooperating with the
incumbent. These social and material advantages enable him to reduce the threat of
reprisal he faces if he collaborates, while also giving him a superior ability to provide
valued services to the incumbents. The state could provide compensation for these
services in the form of direct payments to the sheikh, reconstruction contracts to
his allies, development projects to his key supporters, or a variety of similar avenues
that expand his political power and wealth. In such circumstances, insurgents, now
challenging not only the incumbents but also local elites, nd themselves facing higher
costs for their activity.
The rational sheikh is himself balancing coercion and co-optation to maintain
political control in his community. These are costly activities and must be funded
either by the benets from support for the state or his expected gains from support
for the rebellion. His own level of economic security will set a oor for his demands to
the state. If those demands exceed the state's cost of controlling the community by
force, the state will adopt the strategy of coercive rule and should expect united com-
munity opposition. If, alternatively, the demands are aordable, the state's strategy
choice will be indirect rule and support from the community (to the extent it can be
monitored by the state) will be united.
55Rather than predicting a xed state of the world, however, the theory predicts a
trend. Over time|as experience accumulates and the actors learn|the commander's
choices will evolve toward the model's expectations. Several factors impede optimal
decision-making. First, the bargaining process assumed in the model may not be ex-
plicit; oers and counter-oers can be subject to interpretation and debate. Second,
at any given moment, the information available to combatants is inevitably imperfect.
Seldom are they equipped with the capabilities needed to assess quickly the economic
security or the communal structure in the areas in which they operate. Third, com-
manders' actions at a given time may or may not reect even their beliefs about these
measures. That is, the model does not assume that commanders deliberately apply
the model's logic. The operative assumption is that commanders will maintain those
strategies that prove eective in restoring order and will gradually change or replace
those strategies that fail. Thus variation over time is as relevant as spatial variation
in behavior.
...
To recapitulate, combatants' scal strategy choices are the outcomes of interest.
These choices can be classied based on the selectivity of the incentives oered. In
choosing among scal strategies, combatants take their decisions in the context of a
bargaining process between a military commander and members of a local community.
Whether, and on what terms, a deal is struck depends on two key elements of the
bargaining process: whom the commander is bargaining with; and the size of the oer
the recipient is willing to accept in exchange for his support. These factors follow from
features of the strategic setting, namely the local communal structure and the security
of the sources of economic well-being held by key actors in the community. During
the bargaining process, the commander chooses among available scal strategies so
as to extend control over the community at minimal expense in terms of military
56and scal resources. The logic leads to specic, empirically veriable hypotheses that
predict the scal strategies commanders will employ in given communities.
Chapters Four through Seven evaluate the theory of scal strategies against four
detailed case studies from the Philippine War of 1899{1902. Some background on the
late nineteenth century Philippines and the general course of the war that Americans
fought there is necessary before approaching the individual case studies. The chapter
that follows provides this context.
57Chapter 3
The Philippines and the
Philippine-American War
...but it should be an invariable rule never to resort to harsh
measures when gentler means will secure the same end.
- standard U.S. Army text on small-unit tactics, 18931
At rst blush, the Philippine War might seem an unlikely candidate for the evaluation
of a theory focused on the non-coercive aspects of irregular warfare. The popular
conceptions of the war emphasize the violent|often ruthlessly violent|headline-
grabbing tactics sometimes employed: the water cure, reconcentration camps, \civilize
'em with a Krag." As historian Brian Linn points out, this characterization of the war
is simply a misrepresentation of how 25,000 or so combat troops managed to subdue
1Wagner (1893, 110).
58an archipelago-wide rebellion and re-establish governing authority over seven million
inhabitants in the space of three years (Linn, 2000, ix). To be sure, the American
troops (and the Filipino militias they recruited and trained) applied coercion and
organized violence, but they generally did so as part of an approach to pacication
that balanced repression with a full range of scal strategies.
The theory presented in the previous chapter asserts that a given choice from
the range of scal strategies follows from certain socioeconomic characteristics of the
locality in which it is to be applied|specically, communal structure and economic
security. The provinces, villages and barrios of the Philippines mark out a tremendous
range in these key variables. As Larkin (1972, xii) notes, \The Philippines has been
and is still a series of independent and self-contained units shaped as much by internal
socioeconomic factors as by external currents emanating from Manila ...Historians
for the most part have been laboring under a notion derived from training in Western
political history that metropolitan events shaped the history of the countryside. Such
has not been the case in the Philippines."
The picture that emerges of the American counterinsurgency during the war
is one of spirited improvisation at the local level in the organization of municipal
government, dealings with local inhabitants, provisions of goods and services, and the
employment of force. Each of hundreds of company outposts|autonomous due to
geographic isolation and tenuous lines of communication|developed a signature mix
of these ingredients according to the judgment of the local commander and the result
of experience. A broad cross section of scal strategies throughout the archipelago is
the result.
This chapter sketches out the wider context for the subsequent case studies that
will evaluate the proposed logic of wartime scal strategy. The chapter is divided into
three sections. The rst section highlights some of the key social and economic con-
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ned
the setting of the contest for popular support during the war. In particular, the
islands' ethnic and cultural diversity and the uneven impact of economic moderniza-
tion suggest the range of variation on the theory's explanatory variables. The second
section presents a synopsis of the war, beginning with the background of Filipino
resistance against Spanish rule and continuing with a overview of the conventional
and guerilla phases of the conict against the Americans. The third section focuses
on American pacication eorts, validating key assumptions of the theory of scal
strategies for this series of cases. The discussion demonstrates the importance of the
full range of scal strategies, the local context for strategy choice, and the evolution
of practices over time through learning and adaptation.
3.1 Philippine society and economy
The socioeconomic characteristics of the archipelago vary dramatically from one lo-
cality to the next. This condition remains true today, but was especially stark at the
outset of the U.S. invasion and occupation, when global economic forces were further
stirring the m elange of ethnic, linguistic and religious divergence that prevailed among
the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands. Within this turbulent mix, we can begin
to make out the salient distinctions asserted by the theory to be key determinants
of scal strategy choice: the degree of concentration of social and political authority
at the local level and the extent of a community's economic resilience or vulnerabil-
ity to military intervention. These features derived from a community's experience
with Spanish colonialism, its ethnic and cultural norms, and its encounter with the
economic forces sweeping in from the outside world.
60The outlines of traditional Philippine society were set in place by the Spanish.
A colony of Spain since the sixteenth century, the Philippines was dominated by a
small European elite with vast authority over the native people. At the top of the
two-tiered class structure were the Spanish-born peninsulares and their Philippine-
born progeny, known as insulares. Mixed race Spanish mestizos were at the bottom
of Spanish colonial society, but far above the native-born indios. The privileged
Spanish tier of society exercised a near total rule that extended into the countryside
by way of the Church. Catholic friars, normally peninsulares, represented the unity
of Church and State under Spanish rule. The priests not only controlled the spiritual
lives of their parishioners, but served as an indispensable part the state apparatus, as
well. The friars oversaw the selection of local ocials and police, kept tax and census
records, held responsibility for public health and education, reported on the character
and actions of the indios and were major landholders in the predominantly agrarian
society. The resources and authority of the priests gave them enormous inuence over
local aairs (Mulrooney, 1975; Silbey, 2007).
Though inferior to the Spanish in social standing and political power, native
Filipino elite, the principalia, held positions of authority and inuence at the local
level deriving from their roles as intermediaries between the Spanish and the indio
masses. Spanish rule reinforced the traditional social and political structure of the
villages. Hereditary datus, or tribal chiefs, were made cabezas de barangay and gober-
nadorcillos, village headmen and town mayors, and saw their wealth and prestige grow
through the privileges of their administrative oces (Oades, 1974, 16-32). Between
the peasantry, or taos, and this upper strata of Filipino society in the countryside, a
strict patron-client relationship often prevailed, limiting social mobility. In exchange
for land to use for cultivation, tenants gave landlords a share of their crop as trib-
ute. \The exchange was unequal, but sustaining the relationship was a continual
61extension of material and aective surplus on the part of landlords and public loyalty
and deference on the part of tenants (Go, 2008, 95). For some farm laboring taos,
dependence upon a landholding patron encompassed nearly all aspects of life.
But the social and cultural diversity of the islands renders incomplete all but the
broadest descriptions of colonial Philippine society. In a colorful contemporary ac-
count of Philippine \ethnology," Colquhoun (1902, 55) underscores the heterogeneity
of the archipelago in the nineteenth century:
In writing of the ethnology of the Philippines, it is dicult to reconcile
the many theories put forward at dierent times as regards the wonder-
fully mixed tribes found in those islands. The discovery of their words in
dierent languages and their peculiar customs and racial characteristics
elsewhere has led to wild surmising; until, unable to digest the mass of
writings on the subject, one is apt to arise with the conviction that tribes
belonging to every race in the world are to be found there.
Apart from the ruling Spaniards, ve major ethnic groups populated the Philippines.
The mountain-dwelling Negritos, the islands' original inhabitants, included 21 dier-
ent tribes. Primarily on the island of Mindanao, the Indonesians formed a further
16 tribes. The Spaniards considered the Malayans the \civilized races" and further
classied this largest ethnic group as Visayans, Tagalogs, Bicols, Ilocanos, Pangasi-
nans, Pampangans, Moros, and Cagayanes. European mestizos, primarily of Spanish
descent, and ethnic Chinese (and Chinese mestizos) both represented small but po-
litically or economically inuential groups in the islands. Nor was there a common
language to unite these ethnic and tribal groupings; most Filipinos relied on one of the
27 dialects prevalent in 1898, and fewer than 10 percent spoke Spanish (BIA, 1902).
And beyond these ethnic and linguistic divisions, important cultural and economic
distinctions existed between Christian and Muslim adherents; between inhabitants of
62the hills, the plain and the coast; and between swidden cultivators, sedentary planters,
and paddy farmers.
The social and economic diversity encountered rst by the Americans in 1898
was not, however, merely reective of underlying ethnic, linguistic and class dierences
among the islands' inhabitants. The expansion of global trade during the nineteenth
century wrenched traditional colonial society in the Philippines towards modernity,
reshaping society along with the very landscape itself.
Beginning in the 1820s, the Industrial Revolution in the West penetrated Philip-
pine shores with demand for agricultural produce, hastening economic growth and
stirring social change. As steam power replaced the sail, international commerce
surged. By 1856, Manila hosted 13 foreign trading rms, and by 1873|4 years after
the Suez Canal opened|the Spanish had opened new ports in Iloilo on Panay, Zam-
boanga in western Mindanao, Cebu on Cebu island, and Legaspi in southern Luzon's
Bicol area (Seekins, 1993, 10). Traders no longer sought just the luxury goods and
exotica the Philippines had long oered, but the bulk commodities that fueled West-
ern production and consumption. Dominating the colony's exports were three crops:
tobacco, abaca (or hemp), and sugar.2
The burgeoning agricultural trade transformed the Filipino elite. Of increas-
ing prominence were Filipinos known as caciques whose position in the community
was based more on landed wealth than on oceholding. \By recognizing them, the
Spaniards helped the caciques to preserve their power over the people and gave them
the opportunity of getting more and more land into their hands, of making more and
more people dependent upon them ...and of reducing freeholders to the status of
tenants" (Pelzer, 1945, 89). In addition, the rise of two other segments of Filipino
society signalled the emergence of a edgling middle class. The rst, auent Chinese
2Coee was also an important export until 1890, when Philippine plantations were devastated
by insects and disease.
63mestizos, played a vital role in the cash crop economy, dominating wholesale and
retail trade and venturing into landholding and the production of export crops. The
second was the growing class of ilustrados, marked by their university education and
embrace of political reform and Filipino self-government (Oades, 1974, 32).
Urban, provincial, and village settings alike hosted caciques whose interests and
sources of wealth were reective of their locales. Broadly, those with the widest range
of commercial interests and the greatest wealth lived in the largest communities.
Manila was home to nearly all foreign rms and the most powerful clans, such as
the Roxas-Ayala family, the Elizaldes, the Buencaminos, and the Tuazons. Many of
the regional elite operated from Cebu City and Iloilo, including many mestizos whose
foremen oversaw their plantations throughout Cebu Province, the Iloilo Basin and
western Negros. At the next level down, indio landowning elite directly supervised
their tenants and laborers from the major towns of the agricultural provinces such
as Bacolor, Pampanga; Silay, Negros Occidental; Dagupan, Pangasinan; Naga, Ca-
marines Sur; and Catbalogan, Samar. Further into the countryside, small landlords
struggled to maintain positions sometimes barely distinguishable from their tenants
(Larkin, 1982, 618-619).
Solidarity or fragmentation within a community was often a result of the bal-
ance of power or alignment of interests among the various elite groups. \Local politics
consisted of struggles within these groups for control of political patronage and access
to economic opportunities. Family ties and business ventures solidied common inter-
ests. Society was built on personal relationships reinforced by economic dependence
and social respect" (Ramsey, 2007, 5).
An equally profound result of the skyrocketing demand for agricultural products
was mass internal migration and the settlement of vast new areas of the interior in
a scramble for new land to cultivate. As long-settled areas were quickly saturated,
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central Luzon plain. Cebuanos migrated far from Cebu City and the Ilongo-speaking
inhabitants of southeastern Panay occupied the Iloilo Basin and spilled into central
and northern Panay, even eventually settling northwestern Negros with other Visayan
migrants. Settled areas of rice and sugar farms encountered by the Americans at the
end of the nineteenth century in Negros Occidental, Panay, Capiz, Cebu, Tarlac, parts
of Nueva Ecija and on the edges of southern Luzon were mostly jungle in 1820.3
Mass migration and the settlement of the interior often undermined the power
of the traditional elite, but under some circumstances, these forces served to reinforce
it. The pioneers were society's displaced and dispossessed, seldom holding the estab-
lishment funds needed to homestead. Obtaining these funds meant surrendering the
possibility of becoming an independent farmer. Larkin (1982, 620) describes how a
\[m]onopoly of credit, control of information and higher education, an intricate web
of strategic marriages, and a strong network of ritual kin helped the rich retain power
and wealth and deny them to others." Entrepreneurs and landlords deliberately sub-
verted the development of an independent yeomanry, allowing the settlers to work
only as laborers or tenants and extending credit for tools and draught animals at
interest rates that left borrowers in debt bondage.
At its most extreme, the consolidation of economic, social, and political power
at the local level produced a commanding autocratic elite:
Some families owned whole villages and some, major portions of provinces ...There
developed in the Philippines a kind of culture of control, an idea that, in
a given area, all of the land and other resources as well as almost all
of the labor belonged to a single amo, a quasi-patriarchal landlord who
3For a more complete discussion of this remarkable period of settlement activity, see Echa uz
([1894] 1978), Larkin (1972), Lewis (1971), Lopez (1976), Simkins and Wernstedt (1971), and Wern-
stedt and Spencer (1967).
65dispensed justice and favors in return for the complete subservience and
total loyalty of his labor force (Larkin, 1982, 619-620).
Recalling his encounter with rural life in one area of the Philippines, an American
soldier wrote,
The people of each town were under a sort of military discipline; the alcade
or mayor would order certain work on a public road or street, specifying
the number of laborers from each barrio or ward; the order would be
published by the town crier, the lieutenants of each barrio would select
their men and march them at the appointed time to the work (Parker,
2003, 237-238).
Such near-total control of village life exercised by a single individual or family ap-
proximates the ideal-typical solidary communal structure envisioned by the theory of
scal strategies.
But while the eects of migration and an increasingly commercial economy
accelerated as the nineteenth century proceeded, they were felt unevenly across the
island chain. Regularized trade, regional markets, transport routes, and an enriched
merchant class were artefacts of modernity and prosperity, but were found in markedly
varying degrees in Philippine communities at the time. \The new social classes that
emerged in the Philippines," Oades (1974, 39-40) explains, \were not uniform in their
development throughout the archipelago. This is readily understood in view of the
fact that the stage of economic development diered from region to region." Much of
southern and central Luzon, for example, absorbed the economic changes early and
quickly, while parts of the Visayas and the reaches of northern Luzon, by contrast,
persisted in isolation and went largely unaltered through the turn of the twentieth
century.
66Surveying the social and economic terrain of the late-nineteenth century Philip-
pines, we see the hills and vales of a multi-ethnic colonial society sundered in places
by the global economy's tectonic forces. We see peaks of consolidated wealth and
authority towering over ravines of squalor and dependence; vast plateaus of economic
opportunity in export and commercial trade; and a persistent wilderness of tradi-
tional, pre-modern society. It was into this landscape the United States military
ventured in the summer of 1898.
3.2 Overview of the war
Commodore George Dewey's destruction of the Spanish eet in Manila Bay on May 1,
1898 was less the beginning of a war than it was the interruption of one that was
already under way. Filipino aspirations for independence that had begun to sim-
mer in the preceding decades boiled over into armed revolt in 1896. The American
ouster of the Spanish two years later seemed at rst to advance the Filipino cause,
but President William McKinley's eventual decision to annex the islands dashed the
rebels' hopes. When hostilities with the Filipinos broke out in February 1899, the
Americans established their conventional battleeld superiority and, with the arrival
of additional troops in November, routed the rebel forces led by Emilio Aguinaldo,
the president of the nascent Philippine Republic. Battered, Aguinaldo abandoned
conventional tactics and adopted those of guerilla warfare, hoping to draw out the
conict until the Americans forces or the American public grew exhausted. Adopting
policies and tactics that sought \benevolent assimilation" but did not demur from
harsh violence, the Americans gradually squeezed out the insurgency, province by
67province, until President Theodore Roosevelt could declare a \successful conclusion"
in June 1902.4
3.2.1 Colonial revolt
The roots of organized Filipino resistance to colonial rule trace to the mid-1800s when
many ilustrados, the educated Filipino elite, began advocating for liberal reform and
political inclusion, raising national consciousness and unnerving the colonial admin-
istration. A Spanish crackdown that followed the creation of the nonviolent Liga
Filipina in 1892 divided the peaceful ilustrado reformers from others ready to take
up arms for the cause.
In the wake of the crackdown and the exile of Philippine League founder Jose
Rizal, there emerged a more truculent organization to challenge the colonial govern-
ment. Called the Katipunan, the new association was a secret society whose mostly
Tagalog members were pledged to an extensive, though sometimes incoherent, mix of
revolutionary and nationalistic ideals. Over several years, the ranks of the Katipunan
swelled with Philippine peasants and spread throughout the provinces around Manila.
A pugnacious former night watchman, Andre s Bonifacio, ascended to leadership of
the sprawling society. Rapid growth, however, led to disorder and disunity in the or-
ganization. In August 1896, an informer compromised Katipunan plans for an armed
uprising. Bonifacio ed Manila, but issued the \Grito de Balintawak," his call for a
general revolt. Although a truly national uprising failed to materialize, anti-colonial
violence was sparked and the revolt began.
4On the years leading up to the outbreak of the Philippine-American War, see Corpuz (1989,
II:206-341), Trask (1981, 369{472), Taylor (1971, vol. I), Welch (1979, 3{23), and Zaide (1954,
1{224). For discussion of the war's conventional phase, see Corpuz (1989, 403{482), Linn (2000,
3{181), Sexton (1971), Silbey (2007), and Taylor (1971, vol. II). For the guerilla phase, see Aldecoa-
Rodriguez (1983), Birtle (1998, 108-146), Gates (1973), Larkin (1972) Linn (1989), Linn (2000,
185{321), May (1991), Ochosa (1989), Schumacher et al. (1981), and Scott (1986).
68Amidst the ghting, the 27-year-old Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy stood out as a
highly competent leader, defeating local Civil Guard and regular Spanish forces in
Cavite province. Elsewhere, however, the disorganized and disputatious insurgents
managed to hold their own only until the Spanish could muster sucient forces in
early 1897. Bonifacio proved an incapable commander and Aguinaldo deposed him
as leader and later had Bonifacio arrested and executed.
Unable to confront directly the reinforced Spanish army, Aguinaldo dispersed
his forces and directed the Sandahatan village militias to begin a protracted war
using guerilla tactics. He withdrew to a mountain stronghold sixty miles north of
Manila, where he issued a proclamation of his political aims. Aguinaldo demanded
the expulsion of the friars, political and economic autonomy for the Filipino people,
freedom of the press, religious toleration, the return of Church-seized land, and eq-
uitable treatment and pay for Filipinos. Notably, however, independence was not
among his demands.
Eager to avoid more bloodshed, the Spanish drew on their scal resources to
reach accommodation with Aguinaldo in December 1897 in the Pact of Biyak-na-
Bat o. Given 400,000 pesos, a declaration of general amnesty, and a imsy pledge
of moderate reforms, Aguinaldo accepted exile to Hong Kong where he continued
plotting for a revolution. But back in the Philippines, insurrecto violence did not
cease in the wake of Aguinaldo's departure. Fighting gripped the islands. In February
1898, the American consul in Manila reported, \War exists, battles are of almost daily
occurrence, ambulances bring in many wounded, and hospitals are full."5
The U.S. declaration of war on Spain on April 25, 1898 and the destruction
of the Spanish eet in Manila Bay on May 1 suggested an alignment of American
interests with those of the Filipino revolutionaries. Indeed, it was the American naval
5Quoted in Trask (1981, 397).
69commander Commodore George Dewey who returned Aguinaldo from Hong Kong
aboard an American ship on May 12 and provided a supply of arms to the insurrectos.
The Filipino rebels desperately sought an alliance. The absence of a clear American
political objective in the opening months of the war forced Dewey to be vague and
noncommittal in his discussions with the revolutionaries, feeding their hopes while
inadvertently priming an explosive mix of mutual misunderstanding and divergent
expectations. As Braisted (1958, 43) notes, \neither the responsible authorities in
Washington nor the insurgents were aware of the real intentions of the other until
each side was committed to policies between which there was no compromise."
In late May, Aguinaldo began military operations against the Spanish around
Manila, elsewhere in Luzon, and in Mindoro, the Visayas, and Mindanao. Dewey
viewed the insurgents as valuable \friends" against the Spanish, but the Ameri-
cans carefully avoided any political compacts with them. Evidence suggests that
the Americans had not yet decided to annex the Philippines, but sought to preserve
their freedom of action. It seems likely, however, that Aguinaldo perceived a de facto
alliance.
Misunderstandings grew as the war against Spain drew toward its conclusion.
To neither consent nor objection from the Americans, Aguinaldo proclaimed Philip-
pine independence on June 12 and set about organizing a revolutionary government
and municipal administration. When Major General Wesley Merritt arrived to lead
the capture of Manila, he observed the Filipino posture with concern. His instruc-
tions stated that \the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and
immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants." Eager to secure
\a position to issue a proclamation and enforce [his] authority," Merritt avoided coor-
dinating with Aguinaldo in his plans for the attack on Manila.6 Cosmas (1994, 188)
6Quoted in Trask (1981, 410).
70explains, \The seige of Manila developed into a curious triangular contest in which
the American eet and the Eighth Corps fought the Spaniards while simultaneously
manuevering to deny the Filipinos a share in the spoils of victory. The Filipinos
meanwhile used the strategic situation created by Dewey's success to forward their
own cause."
The Battle of Manila on August 13, 1898 was anticlimactic: a pre-arranged
Spanish surrender following token resistance to perfunctory American bombardment.
Advancing American units took pains to avoid conict with the insurrectos occupying
positions on the outskirts of Manila, but the Americans commanded the rebels not to
join in the attack or move into the city. Aguinaldo's militias captured some important
positions in the Manila suburbs, but the Americans forced them out. To the Filipino
revolutionaries, the unfolding of the battle signalled American disregard for their
contributions to the war with Spain and their political aspirations.
3.2.2 Conventional warfare
For several months following the capture of Manila, an unsteady modus vivendi pre-
vailed between the American occupying forces and the Filipino revolutionaries still
entrenched outside the city. Prior to relinquishing command to Major General Elwell
S. Otis in late August, Merritt took a number of steps to reassure the Filipino pop-
ulation of American goodwill and to reduce tensions with Aguinaldo's troops. These
measures helped to hold back violence through the fall.
By October 1898, McKinley had decided to pursue annexation of the Philip-
pines. Negotiations with Spain ensued, and on December 10, 1898, the Treaty of Paris
ended the war with Spain and conferred sovereignty over the Philippine Islands to
the United States. McKinley couched annexation in humanitarian terms, proclaiming
the intent of the occupation was \to win the condence, respect, and aection of the
71inhabitants of the Philippines ...by proving to them that the mission of the United
States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and
right for arbitrary rule" (Senate Document 208, 1900, 82-83).
With American control conned to Manila, Aguinaldo attempted to consolidate
power in the provinces and municipalities beyond the capitol. In January 1899, his
government promulgated the constitution for the future Philippine Republic. Drawn
up in the town of Malolos the previous summer, the document embraced liberal
political rhetoric but preserved the power of the principalia and stopped short of social
reform that might have garnered more support from the peasantry. At the local level,
Aguinaldo further tied the native elite to the Republican cause|often at the expense
of tenants and the landless|by allowing landowners to increase their holdings and
placing municipal governments in the hands of local magnates (May, 1983, 365-369).
Meanwhile, Aguinaldo struggled to cobble together a unied \Army of Liberation"
from the loosely organized militias arrayed around Manila and throughout the islands.
Poor training and discipline, a want of modern rearms, and an amateurish ocer
corps limited the capabilities of this force.
Several months of skirmishes and harassment culminated on the night of Febru-
ary 4, 1899 when an American sentry red on a Filipino patrol that refused to halt
when ordered. Firing spread along the opposing lines and continued throughout the
night. The following morning, the U.S. Army attacked and routed the Filipinos in a
day of intense ghting that marked the commencement of the Philippine-American
War.
In the weeks that followed, the Americans rapidly demonstrated their military
superiority, ejecting the Army of Liberation from the Manila periphery while crushing
an uprising within the city itself. The Eighth Corps captured the Republican capitol
of Malolos on March 31 and swept north into central Luzon. Aguinaldo's conventional
72tactics and formations undermined any advantages his local ghters possessed over
the invaders and sowed internal conict within his units. But Otis's forces were ill and
stretched thin and soon found it dicult to hold territory they had captured easily.
The American oensive nally stalled in the summer as Otis had to replace state
volunteers with troops recruited and trained specially for service in the Philippines.
Freshly manned, the Eighth Corps resumed its attack in November 1899. A
coordinated three-prong oensive trapped, then shattered the Republican Army in
central Luzon. Aguinaldo himself only narrowly escaped capture; Brigadier General
Samuel Young pursued him into the Ilocos region of northwestern Luzon. Turning
south in January 1900, Otis faced ineectual opposition before revolutionary forces
simply melted away. Unopposed, he occupied the Tagalog provinces of Batangas, La-
guna, and Tayabas. Amphibious forces completed the Luzon campaign with landings
in the southeastern provinces of Albay, Sorsogon, and Ambos Camarines. Meanwhile,
forces in the western Visayas established control on the important islands of Panay
and Negros; in the eastern Visayas, capture of the key ports on Samar and Leyte
went mostly unopposed. Further south, Brigadier General John C. Bates garrisoned
forces in the Moro provinces according to an agreement he struck with the Sultan of
Sulu.
Signalling the transformation of U.S. forces into an army of occupation, the
War Department in the spring of 1900 dissolved the tactical organizations of the
Eighth Corps and created in its place the Division of the Philippines, commanded
by Otis. Beneath him were four departments: the Department of Northern Luzon,
commanded by Major General Arthur MacArthur; the Department of Southern Lu-
zon, commanded by Bates; the Department of the Visayas, commanded by Brigadier
General Robert P. Hughes; and the Department of Mindanao and Jolo, commanded
by Brigadier General William A. Kobb e. Each department was divided into districts,
73usually under the command of a brigadier general or colonel. By April, the Division of
the Philippines encompassed 116 separate posts throughout the archipelago (Ramsey,
2007, 22).
But as the occupying forces settled in, any sense of triumph was gradually
replaced with a recognition that, far from being over, the war had only entered a
new phase. From northern Luzon came the report in January 1900 that \secret local
government has been or is being established by the natives in all towns occupied by
American troops ...in the name of the so-called Philippine Republic, the purpose of
which is to maintain a military as well as a civil organization."7
3.2.3 Guerilla warfare
As his Army of Liberation was being routed in November 1899, Aguinaldo met with
his council of war to reevaluate the revolutionary strategy. The result was a decree
directing his forces to separate and begin conducting guerilla warfare. Recognizing
belatedly that he could not hope to prevail in head-on engagements with enemy for-
mations, Aguinaldo devised to disperse American combat power and exhaust and
attrit the invaders, while hoping that the American public would tire of the war
and demand withdrawal. As General Francisco M. Soliman explained to the guerilla
detachments, the aim was to \annoy the enemy at dierent points ...not to van-
quish them, a dicult matter to accomplish considering their superiority in numbers
and arms, but to inict on them constant losses, to the end of discouraging them
and convincing them of our rights" (Taylor, 1971, Exhibit 1019). Aguinaldo also
hoped that the losses inicted through guerilla tactics would have a more immediate
strategic impact: inuence over the outcome of the upcoming American presidential
election in which McKinley faced the anti-imperialist William Jennings Bryan. The
7Quoted in Linn (2000, 181).
74revolutionary leadership imagined that \constant combats, ambuscades, surprises and
encounters with the enemy during these months ...will cause the defeat of McKinley
for the presidency and aid the triumph of the candidacy of Bryan, who is our hope
for the declaration of independence of our country" (Taylor, 1971, Exhibit 1084).
The turn to guerilla warfare meant a signicant devolution of control from
Aguinaldo to provincial, zone, and local commanders in the eld. Aguinaldo con-
tinued to issue directives and to serve as a symbol of the Republican cause, but
military operations were henceforth decentralized aairs. Local units consisted of
combinations of full-time insurgents, militia, and auxiliary supporters, often under
the direction of commanders drawn from the provincial elite.
On November 25, the newly-appointed commander of central Luzon, General
Pantale on Garc a, issued \Instructions for Guerillas and Flying Columns" that dis-
tilled the new tactical posture. The order directed hit-and-run tactics designed to
harass and inict losses on the enemy without becoming engaged decisively. It stressed
the importance of maintaining the support of the noncombatant population, empha-
sizing \that our mission is to defend our fellow citizens and not to abandon them
or cause injuries to their persons or property." And recognizing the threat posed
by enemy collaborators, \spies and persons of bad repute" were to be pursued and
\tried immediately on capture in order to administer the corresponding punishment"
(Taylor, 1971, Exhibit 1020).
Support from the local population was crucial to the insurgents; the pueblos
and barrios provided logistics, recruits, intelligence, and places to hide. General Jos e
Alejandrino demanded, \Could we (the army) by any means continue unless we had
the unconditional support of the people? ...Could we subsist within the provinces
occupied by the enemy's forces at a short distance only from their garrisons and at
75times even within them, if the people were not greatly attached to us?"8 Similarly, the
revolutionary leadership on Panay declared, \The greatest solidarity possible must be
secured between these two factors, `The People' and its `Armed Force,' in order that
they may proceed hand in hand to secure our common desire" (Taylor, 1971, Exhibit
1302).
Winning the support of the people was no less crucial for the Americans. Popu-
lar support would later be recognized as tactically decisive as a source of intelligence
regarding the identity and whereabouts of the guerillas; in 1899, however, the Amer-
icans viewed it mostly as a prerequisite for colonial rule. Administering a territory of
seven million inhabitants over 8,000 miles from the continental United States would
require the consent and cooperation of a large majority of the inhabitants. Accord-
ingly, Otis embraced wholeheartedly the policy of \benevolent assimilation" ordered
by McKinley with the intent to \bestow upon a grateful society a host of social, po-
litical, and economic reforms to produce a more ecient and honest government and
a more modern, rational, and organized society."9
Thus as the insurgency reorganized according to the dictates of guerilla war-
fare, the Americans prepared for colonial governance. Parallel to the newly estab-
lished department-district chain of command was the Oce of the Military Governor
(OMG)|also headed by Otis|responsible for establishing civil government and over-
seeing public works projects. Created by the Philippine Commission under its head
William H. Taft, OMG would lay the foundation for the transfer of authority in the
Islands from the U.S. Army to civilian administrators. The seeds of this eventual
aim were sown with General Orders (G.O.) 43 and 40, issued in 1899 and 1900, re-
spectively. These orders directed subordinate commanders to establish Filipino-led
municipal governments with mayors, town councils, and police forces. In addition
8Quoted in Corpuz (1989, II:449).
9Quoted in Birtle (1998, 102).
76to the military roles for which they were trained, local commanders would also be
responsible for civic works such as improving sanitation, building infrastructure, and
establishing (and often stang) schools.
Otis's focus on benevolent pacication, however, distracted him from the resur-
gent revolutionary threat. He mistook the shift from conventional to guerilla tactics
as evidence of defeat or capitulation. Far from it, rebel eectiveness was on the rise.
During the last four months of 1899, 229 engagements left 69 Americans killed and
302 wounded. During the rst four months of 1900, 442 encounters resulted in 130
killed and 325 wounded (Sexton, 1971, 237). For the Americans, the year ahead would
be the most dicult of the war.
A lack of manpower was a constant problem for commanders. As Linn (2000,
325) observes, \One of the rst and greatest problems was simply having insucient
forces for the job." Throughout the war, average U.S. troop strength was just 40,000,
peaking at 70,000 at the end of 1900. Of these, only about sixty percent were available
combat troops. By comparison, May (1983, 356) estimates the strength of Aguinaldo's
regular forces between 80,000 and 100,000 men, with tens of thousands more in militia
or auxiliary units in towns and villages.
The American troops quickly grew frustrated by the insurgent tactics that they
viewed as perdious. Describing typically vexing encounters, one ocer wrote,
It has occurred several times when a small force stops in a village to rest
the people all greet you with kindly expressions while the same men slip
away go out into bushes, get their ries and waylay you further down the
road. You rout them and scatter them they hide their guns and take back
to their houses and claim to be amigos.
Even ocials appointed by the Americans were unreliable; reports complained that
\The presidentes and town ocials acted openly in behalf of the Americans and se-
77cretly in behalf of the insurgents."10 Otis himself observed that \Wherever, through-
out the archipelago, there is a group of the insurgent army, it is a fact, beyond dispute,
that all contiguous towns contribute to the maintenance thereof. In other words, the
towns, regardless of the fact of American occupation and town organization, are the
actual bases for all insurgent military activities" (WD, 1900, I:5:61).
Given accurate information, American soldiers attested that they \never had
any diculty killing or capturing" the insurrectos, but such information was dicult
to come by.11 The troops discovered that Filipinos who accepted graciously the
benets of American civic works projects often continued to resist pacication and
provided aid to the guerillas.
Despite progress towards pacication in some areas, heavy ghting plagued
much of the archipelago as MacArthur took command from Otis in early May 1900.
Although MacArthur suspected that the Army's pacication policy was overly skewed
toward noncoercive civic action, he was committed to the policy of benevolent assim-
ilation, and his initial approach deviated little from Otis's playbook. But unabated
violence throughout the summer and fall forced a reconsideration of the strategy. In
September, a loosely coordinated guerilla oensive aimed at inuencing the presiden-
tial election demonstrated the continuing strength of the insurgency. The reelection
of McKinley in November dealt a setback to the revolutionaries' hopes, though resis-
tance continued.
The election may have also relieved MacArthur of a constraint on his military
policy based on \fear of what the newspapers may say and its possible eect upon
the election."12 The following month, MacArthur ordered the implementation of a
\new and more stringent policy" aimed at the \organized system by which supplies
10Quotes from Gates (1973, 167, 171-172).
11Quoted in Scott (1986, 96).
12Quoted in Linn (2000, 213).
78and information are sent to the [the guerillas] from the occupied towns." MacArthur
issued a proclamation of this policy to the Filipino people, detailing expectations for
their conduct under the laws of war, as specied by G.O. 100 of 1863. Supporting
the guerillas, it made clear, was a criminal deed. In particular, it noted that,
men who participate in hostilities without being part of a regularly-organized
force, and without sharing continuously in its operations, but who do so
with intermittent returns to their homes and avocations, divest them-
selves of the character of soldiers, and if captured are not entitled to the
privileges of prisoners of war.
Further, MacArthur specied that \all prominent families" that had not publicly
demonstrated loyalty to the Americans were assumed to be guilty of supporting the
insurgents, whether willingly or not (WD, 1901, I:4:93).
In the succeeding months, American counterinsurgency operations took on a
new intensity that continued a policy of benevolent assimilation, but permitted stern
and aggressive measures against remaining insurgents. In a series of regional cam-
paigns, U.S. units employed rened tactics and larger forces to ush guerillas from
formerly secure bases in the mountains and swamps. Prisoners were not released un-
less they provided information or induced the surrender of comrades; more executions
were meted out for those deemed guilty of war crimes. The army took troops from
larger bases in order to garrison as many towns as it could. There, troops worked on
local infrastructure and governance, but also focused on removing ocials suspected
of disloyalty and identifying and dismantling the insurgents' support network. Ocers
placed emphasis on giving Filipinos a larger role in local security by employing them
as native scouts, police, guides, and informants. In some areas, MacArthur condoned
operations that employed harsh methods, such as crop and property destruction, that
79aimed to choke o the insurgents' food supply and to punish sympathizers. In other
areas, the military imposed \concentration" of civilians into \protected zones."
The combination of these tactics proved eective. By the time MacArthur re-
linquished command to Major General Adna A. Chaee in July 1901, the guerillas
were forced to rely on terrorism against townspeople to compel their support, and
insurgent attacks were mostly limited to nighttime volleys of re into U.S.-garrisoned
towns. Aguinaldo had been captured in March, many of the most prominent rev-
olutionary leaders had surrendered, and signicant resistance only remained in the
province of Batangas, in southern Luzon, and on the island of Samar. Having relin-
quished military command to Chaee, MacArthur simultaneously turned over OMG
to Taft, who began to extend civilian control over the Islands, province-by-province.
The coda to the military action of the Philippine-American War commenced in
September. That month, Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell began an aggressive cam-
paign to pacify Batangas, and the \massacre" of an American garrison at Balangiga on
Samar provoked Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith's ruthless and counterproductive
attempt to turn that island into a \howling wilderness."13 These operations culmi-
nated as the last of the guerilla revolutionaries surrendered in the spring of 1902. On
July 4, President Theodore Roosevelt ocially declared an end to the \insurrection."
3.3 U.S. military pacication in practice
A broad overview of American pacication practice during the Philippine War con-
rms many of the preconditions and underlying assumptions of the theory of scal
strategies. First, scal strategies were widely adopted to compliment the use of force
and, in many cases, to compensate for a lack of available manpower or military re-
13It is due largely to these nal operations that the war is often associated with images of brutality
perpetrated by American troops.
80sources. Further, the approaches that were adopted span the full menu of scal
strategies discussed in Chapter Two. Second, commanders at the district level and
below had sucient autonomy to experiment with dierent strategies and adopt those
best suited to local conditions. Third, the strategies that were employed evolved over
time through trial and error and as knowledge accumulated as to the characteristics
particular to each locality. Usually|though not always|the decisions to embrace or
to discard a particular scal strategy were premised on military ecacy; the occu-
pying forces stuck with strategies that seemed to work in extending their territorial
control.
3.3.1 Use of scal strategies
Both politics and military necessity dictated that American forces would make ex-
tensive use of scal strategies in the Philippines. \For pacication to succeed," note
Millet and Maslowski (1984, 289-290), \the Army had not only to defeat Aguinaldo's
army but also to make the Filipinos want American rule or at least tolerate it peace-
fully. Yet the proper mix between coercion and benevolence was not easily discov-
ered." McKinley proclaimed that the intent of American occupation was to promote
\the well-being, the prosperity, and the happiness of the Philippine people," and he
saw to it that his uniformed and civilian subordinates in the Islands set their policies
accordingly (Senate Document 208, 1900, 82-83). Commanders embraced benevo-
lence from a more practical standpoint. To act otherwise, wrote MacArthur, would
be \to impede the policy of the United States and to defeat the very purpose which
the army is here to accomplish."14
Any humanitarian impulse that initially inspired benevolent pacication was
quickly subsumed by the enormous task of putting down an archipelago-wide insur-
14Quoted in Gates (1973, 83).
81rection. Insucient manpower was a constant problem; as a result, commanders came
to depend on scal strategies alongside military operations to control their areas of
operation. What looked like charity and goodwill had an instrumental edge to it.
Linn (2000, 204, 324) states that \army civic action was neither completely alruistic
nor democratic|nor free of coercion." Americans worked to overcome their numerical
disadvantages by oering \both the threat of punishment and a number of rewards,
including civil oce and business opportunities for the principales, and peace and
personal security for the peasantry." According to Gates (1973, 199), benevolent as-
similation amounted to \a policy calculated to attach the Filipinos to the American
cause through an appeal to their self-interest and gratitude." And in his own words,
MacArthur described the scal strategy he implemented as \an adjunct to military
operations, calculated to pacify the people and procure and expedite the restoration
of tranquility throughout the archipelago" (WD, 1901).
In practice, American pacication in the Philippine War encompassed a wide va-
riety of means and methods. \The army's approach to the problem was notable for its
diversity, including widespread civil aairs eorts, excellent propaganda, well-planned
and executed military operations, eective isolation of the guerrilla, protection of the
population, and the involvement of the inhabitants in programs designed for their
own protection and the eventual establishment of peace" (Gates, 1973, 290). The
variety of approaches mirrors the variety of scal strategies depicted in the theory.
The provision of public goods under the strategy of consensual rule was evident
in civic action projects such as sanitation, infrastructure, and public health. Com-
manders believed these projects advanced their military objectives, often in ways
that force alone could not. Ocers from one garrison, for instance, attested that the
money spent to employ local men to clean the streets did \as much if not more than
anything else in bringing about the comparatively good feeling that has ever since
82existed in the town."15 In another area, the commanding ocer ordered his doctors
to provide free treatment to sick Filipinos, with the belief that, \mere pills will be
more eective than bullets in undermining the insurgent leaders' authority."16
No public good was more esteemed by American commanders than education.
Otis declared, \The subject of education is so intimately associated with reconstruc-
tion, in its present progressive and remote consequences ...as for the present, at least,
it forms an important factor in the military situation." By August 1900, the army
had built more than 1,000 schools; commanders had detailed their soldiers to provide
instruction when local teachers were not available; and $104,251 had been spent on
books and various other school supplies (WD, 1900, I:10:26). From the Department
of Public Instruction, Captain Albert Todd wrote,
I am well aware that some of these recommendations imply the expendi-
ture of considerable sums of public money, but I can think of no expen-
diture which will have greater inuence in developing peace and progress
in these islands than public schools. Except the establishment of good
communications, either by rail or wagon roads, I know of no public works
so important (WD, 1900, I:10:222).
The revolutionaries worried over the eects of this spending. Even early in the war,
correspondence from guerilla leaders shows concern that the Americans' \policy of
attraction" threatened to undermine their cause (Birtle, 1998, 123).
But alongside the policy of attraction, the U.S. Army showed little reluctance
to employ what Major Henry T. Allen referred to as the \policy of chastisement,"
entailing the sterner approach of coercive rule (Birtle, 1998, 127). \You can't put
down a rebellion by throwing confetti and sprinkling perfumery," wrote Major Gen-
15Quoted in Gates (1967, 169).
16Quoted in Linn (1989, 128).
83eral Loyd Wheaton, expressing his skepticism of the military ecacy of public goods
provision.17 Many ocers, including MacArthur, who were generally sympathetic
to the ideals of benevolent pacication tolerated or encouraged operations that were
repressive or punitive. \Burning" became a tactic of choice. Put to the torch were en-
tire areas believed to be guerilla strongholds or inhabited by insurgent sympathizers.
Gates (1973, 188) writes that many such acts of violence were \calculated measures."
Reports from the eld suggest that commanders had two aims for these operations;
rst, their punitive nature would induce guerilla supporters to \reconsider their posi-
tion," and, second, the destruction would deprive the insurgents of food and shelter
in their areas of operation.
American forces also employed extensive measures to control the movement of
the population and the ow of commerce and supplies. The military imposed land
and sea blockades, food conscation and rationing, and limitations on the amount
of cash crops that peasants could bring into town for sale. Fleeing deprivation and
threats from both sides, refugees from the countryside sought security in American-
controlled towns. In some areas, commanders went a step further and experimented
with \concentration" of inhabitants into \protected zones" with the aim of isolating
the guerillas from their bases of support (Birtle, 1998, 129-130). These operations
required a great deal of manpower and thus could be conducted only in selective
areas, usually those in which other tactics had failed. Linn (2000, 215) concludes
that in many of the places they were employed, \harsh as these methods were, they
worked."
Distinct from the tactics of consensual rule and coercive rule were approaches
that oered material rewards to inhabitants contingent upon certain types of behav-
ior. Use of selective incentives under the divide-and-rule approach helped U.S. forces
17Quoted in Karnow (1989, 179).
84separate those willing to assist or accept American rule from the insurrectos and their
supporters. Commanders worked to identify and exploit the ssures along which the
interests of individuals and sub-groups deviated from those of the revolutionaries.
Early in the war, Otis anticipated that \at no very remote point the combined al-
truistic attitude of the town will be substituted by individual action, in pursuance of
personal convictions and self-interest" (WD, 1900, I:5:63{64). For the Americans, the
most valuable form of \individual action" from ordinary Filipinos was the identica-
tion of insurgents, their supporters, and their bases of operation. As early as winter
1899, local commanders established networks of informants (Birtle, 1998, 117). \[A]t
each staion commanding ocers were instructed to make as full a use as possible of a
secret service. They were to pay agents `liberally' and give them as much protection
as possible" (Gates, 1973, 209).
A range of other tactics were designed to reward cooperative Filipinos. These
included employment of native scouts and provincial constabularies; establishment of
the Federal Party, whose members worked to induce conciliation with the Americans
and were rewarded with positions in the civil administration; permission to harvest
the crops of known revolutionaries; and payment for surrendered weapons. Gates
(1973, 275) explains that these appeals to Filipino \opportunism" often succeeded:
many insurgents \succumbed to the American oer of money for the surrender of
weapons. Others joined the Federal party in hopes of securing appointment to civil
oce or political power. The relatively high wage paid by the Americans to civil
servants, scouts, and constabulary was a further temptation ..." Selective incentives,
coupled with selective punishment, also helped peel away from the revolutionaries the
crucial support of local elite leadership. As siding with the revolutionaries became a
growing risk to their fortunes, \more and more leaders found their personal and class
interests better served by the Americans" (Linn, 2000, 197).
85Powerful members of the Filipino elite were often recipients of targeted benets
intended to induce their cooperation or compliance as part of a strategy of indirect
rule. Where it could be accomplished, governing through existing informal sociopo-
litical structures was a practical alternative to imposing new institutions. Major
George T. Langhorne wrote that it was \generally recognized that we can only run
these people through their chiefs or leaders."18 In some communities, an alliance with
a single local leader brought the allegiance of hundreds of peasants. Seekins (1993,
31) explains,
The linchpins of the system created under U.S. tutelage were the village-
and province-level notables ...who garnered support by exchanging spe-
cic favors for votes. Reciprocal relations between inferior and superior
(most often tenants or sharecroppers with large landholders) usually in-
volved the concept of utang na loob (repayment of debts) or kinship ties,
and they formed the basis of support for village-level factions led by no-
tables.
Rewards and benets came in the form of cash payments, political autonomy, or
positions of power. Even many insurrecto leaders, including Juan Villamor, Mariano
Tr as, and Juan Cailles, were eventually co-opted with appointments in the American
civil government. For indirect rule to succeed in extending American control, not
only did rewards have to be suciently enticing, but the bargains struck had to be
enforceable or dicult to renege on. Where these conditions were met, Americans
forged alliances that brought key groups, entire villages, or even larger areas to heel
with minimal investment of military force.
18Quoted in Linn (1989, 21).
863.3.2 A local war
Attempts by historians to capture the Philippine War with a single, encompassing
narrative have inevitably fallen short. The war was a decentralized aair in the way it
was fought by Filipinos and Americans alike and in the way it was experienced by the
noncombatant population. On the American side, subordinate commanders|at the
district, province, and even village level|had wide latitude in selecting scal strate-
gies and conducting the war in their areas of operation as they saw t. Lieutenant
Samuel P. Lyon put it thus: \It is really a peculiar position in which the Commanding
Ocers of towns in these islands nd themselves these days. In this town and its out-
lying barrios for instance there are some 4000 people who must go when I say go and
come when I say come ...it is a big responsibility and sometimes it is awfully hard
to decide what is the right thing to do."19 Dual responsbilities for civil and military
action \extended down to the smallest detachment commander" (Linn, 2000, 199).
The autonomy that local commanders exercised stemmed from the character of the
insurgency, geographical necessity, and the command ethos of the turn-of-the-century
U.S. Army.
By design and by necessity, the revolutionaries' guerilla warfare campaign was
a patchwork of local and regional conicts, dierences among which recommended
against a uniform response from the Americans. With the decision to shift from
conventional to guerilla warfare, Aguinaldo devolved operational authority to his
provincial commanders who, in turn, relied upon a medley of local leaders with varying
interests and constituencies of their own. The reaction from American ocers varied
correspondingly. Surveying his command of the Department of Mindanao and Jolo,
Kobb e observed the \diversity of race, religion, and habitat" and concluded that it
was therefore \necessary to adopt a military and civil policy varying with the locality"
19Quoted in Linn (1989, 22).
87(WD, 1900, I:5:258). Neither the diversity Kobb e encountered nor his insistence on
locally tailored approaches was unusual. With the outbreak of guerilla war, Linn
(1987, 62-63) writes,
it fell to the ocers assigned to pacify each province to counter the enemy
threat. These ocers responded with pacication policies which were
structured to combat the diering conditions they found in their indi-
vidual provinces. Instead of following uniform District-wide pacication
methods, they adopted whatever policies proved eective. The result
was ...dierent pacication campaigns responding to ...dierent guer-
rilla wars.
Drawing on their experience in the Indian Wars, American ocers recognized
the need to disperse their forces, and this geographical distribution precluded central-
ized command. Presence in scattered garrisons extended protection to local inhabi-
tants while providing bases for rapid oensive operations. The number of garrisons
grew steadily from 53 in November 1899, to 413 in October 1900, to 639 by the end of
1901 (WD, 1901, I:4:97). But the benets of dispersal came with sacrices in commu-
nications and logistics. Beyond the obvious diculties of commanding forces spread
throughout an archipelago, poor roads, inclement weather, and vulnerable telegraph
lines left many garrisons cut o from both support and supervision. Gates (1973,
284) notes simply, \Conditions in the Philippines not only placed great responsibility
on individual commanders, but eectively prevented extensive management of any
large portion of the pacication campaign by headquarters in Manila." Local com-
manders were on their own to develop and implement scal strategies for their areas
of operation.
An additional factor that fostered the autonomy of subordinate ocers was the
prevailing sentiment among the army's leaders as to how to exercise their authority
88in pursuit of their military objectives|what one might loosely term the \command
ethos." While those at the top felt a natural inclination to impose their judgment,
their experiences equipped them to see the virtues of decentralized decision-making.
\From the frontier," Birtle (1998, 113) states, \the men who directed the operational
level of the Philippine War brought with them a mind-set that was accustomed to
conducting small-unit constabulary operations from dispersed posts and that encour-
aged adaptability, individual initiative, and aggressiveness." As Ramsey (2007, 121)
points out, \For eective commanders, guidance from the Division of the Philippines
was treated as guidance|not directive." With respect to the policies stemming from
the strategy of benevolent pacication|those regarding municipal government, use
of punitive tactics, disposition of prisoners, and treatment of civilian sympathizers,
for example|Otis and MacArthur set the theme, but permitted extensive improvi-
sation around it. \In practice, municipal government was seldom organized along
the lines Otis and the OMG envisioned.... [I]mprovisation and exibility, instead
of rigid adherence to OMG directives, characterized the U.S. Army-sponsored mu-
nicipal governments until late in the war" (Linn, 2000, 201-202). Flexibility was a
dening feature of scal strategy selection in the Philippines. The army never \set-
tled upon any set mix of `positive' and `negative' incentives, preferring to allow local
commanders to respond to situations as they saw t" (Gates, 1967, 135).
3.3.3 Learning and adaptation
The theory of scal strategies expects that strategy selection will evolve over time
through learning and adaptation. Changes result from learning in two broad ways.
First, as military decision makers acquire information about local conditions and
key actors, more nuanced approaches to attaining military objectives become possi-
ble. Second, commanders evaluate the eects of existing policies and adjust them
89accordingly|the process of trial and error. The U.S. Army in the Philippine War
learned and adapted in both of these ways. Characteristic was \its lack of adher-
ence to rigid doctrines or theories and the willingness of its ocers to experiment
with novel pacication schemes" (Linn, 1989, 169). With some notable exceptions,
the evolution of scal strategies throughout the islands was a rational adaptation in
response to learning.
Over time, Americans' knowledge and understanding of local conditions grew
in ways that enabled more eective strategy choice. Prior to arriving, most units
had little, if any, cultural preparation, language training, or information on their
areas of operation. Colonel Arthur L. Wagner later testied, \the island was prac-
tically in the possession of a blind giant; strong, but unable to see where to strike"
(Senate Document 331, 1902, III:2851). Overcoming this \blindness" took time and
experience.
Implementation of elements of the scal strategies of indirect rule and divide-
and-rule required an understanding of local power structures, interests, and incentives.
The willingness and ability to raise native scouts and auxiliaries is one example.
Questions with respect to accessing potential recruits, vetting loyalties, setting wages
and rewards, and anticipating eectiveness had to be answered before determining
whether to establish such a unit in a given area. Linn (2000, 260) observes that,
\in general, the longer an ocer was assigned to a particular town or province the
better his contacts with the local population and the more willing he was to raise
auxiliaries." As the troops built relationships, better understood local customs, and
began to grasp informal power structures, a broader array of counterinsurgency tactics
became options for them.
Adjustments resulting from evaluations of the eectiveness of existing policies
occurred at both the strategic and tactical levels of command. However, changes at
90the theater level usually lagged|and were often driven by|changes made by local
and provincial commanders. The most signicant strategic shift was MacArthur's
order, in December 1900, for a \more stringent policy" based on G.O. 100. The deci-
sion followed several months of vigorous debate at the division headquarters over how
to respond to persistent violence despite the ongoing implementation of benevolent
pacication. By the time MacArthur issued the new policy, he was in actuality only
validating the approach already adopted by many of his district, provincial, and local
commanders. Describing a \key to the Army's successful performance during the
war," Birtle (1998, 112) writes that, \At the junior ocer level, ocers demonstrated
a willingness to learn by trial and error that enabled them to adjust their methods
according to the situations that they faced." As they experimented with pacica-
tion techniques, subordinate leaders reported the results up the chain of command,
inuencing policy at successively higher levels.
The experience of Major Henry T. Allen on Samar and Leyte is illustrative of
tactical-level learning. Early on, Allen was a true believer in the prospects for benev-
olent pacication, sure that the inhabitants of Samar were \intelligent and naturally
peaceable people who would never have oerred any resistance had not the Tagalog
inuence been forced upon them."20 He worked to assure them of the Americans'
benign intentions, courting local leaders and working to promote trade. But a series
of attacks against his garrisons throughout the spring of 1900 convinced Allen of the
limitations of benevolence. \Doubtless there will continue to be Americans who think
that the milk and water policy is best, because that is the system we would like to
apply," he wrote, but he began to employ a \policy of chastisement" alongside the
conciliatory measures (Birtle, 1998, 128). A letter from a colleague on the island of
Panay indicates the diusion of Allen's ideas and practices: \[Y]our methods have
20Quoted in Linn (2000, 232).
91been watched from here and I nd that ...you handle the enemy without gloves and
that the result is very satisfactory ...due to your policy of treating the good man
very well indeed and the bad man very harshly."21 Although his approach on Samar
grew sterner with time, Allen's views on pacication did not evolve inexorably in the
direction of more coercion. Later as a subdistrict commander on Leyte, Allen devoted
extensive eort to improving civil government, while advocating better pay and train-
ing for teachers and police and the provision of free health care to the poor. Although
he was an exceptionally capable commander, Allen's adaptation in response to his
experiences was not dissimilar from that of other similarly situated ocers (Birtle,
1998, 126-128).
Also important for the theory of scal strategies is that, as pacication ap-
proaches change over time, they change in approximately rational ways. That is,
changes are implemented based on expectations of their eectiveness in extending
territorial control, rather than, say, in pursuit of revenge or in response to political
demands imposed externally. Unsurprisingly, the record from the Philippine War ad-
mits occasional deviations, and there is evidence that ocers' choices were sometimes
fueled by emotion or personal disposition. In all, however, key decisions driven by
emotion seem to have been aberrations|and even these were usually corrected as
their inecacy became apparent.22 However, any individual case warrants examina-
tion of this question.
21Quoted in Gates (1973, 200).
22The response to the Balangiga \massacre" on Samar represents the most infamous of such
decisions. Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith's ruthlessly brutal campaign made little progress toward
pacication until he was pressured by Chaee to temper his approach. Gates (1973, 256) asserts
that the campaign might have ended months earlier had a more balanced policy been enacted. Due
to his actions, Smith was court-martialed, along with ve other ocers, and retired from the army.
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The overview of the war presented in the preceding pages sets the stage for the
case studies that follow. In addition to providing a general background on the war,
this chapter demonstrated the variation in communal structure and local economic
security in communities across an archipelago beset by ethnic and cultural diversity
and economic upheaval. In their ght to put down rebellion throughout the islands,
the American military employed both coercion and conciliation in combinations that
varied from province to province and as the troops learned and adapted their practices
over time. The case studies the central claim of the theory of scal strategies|that
there is a systematic and predictable connection between the socioeconomic conditions
in a community and the scal strategy that combatants employ there.
Each of the four Philippine War case studies is presented in a separate chapter,
divided into three sections. The rst section details the social and economic conditions
prevailing in the selected district at the time of the war, establishing the values of
theory's independent variables. The second section provides a brief narrative of events
leading up to the guerilla phase of the war, noting the strategic context, the disposition
of American troops and Filipino guerilla forces, and the identities of key leaders on
both sides. The third section focuses on the American district commander's use of
available scal resources, noting whether and how his practice changed over time,
classifying the approach according to the typology, and so conrming or refuting the
theory's hypotheses.
93Chapter 4
Divide-and-Rule in Nueva Ecija
Self-interest is the foundation on which a people must
be expected to accept a foreign government.
- Major John A. Baldwin, 19001
Social fragmentation and economic resilience characterized the central Luzon province
of Nueva Ecija. A land rush in the nineteenth century brought wealth in the form
of rice production and an inux of population from neighboring provinces. The old
socioeconomic order was crumbling, but a new order had yet to consolidate. Among
the settlers, competition and conict emerged along ethnic lines. Further dividing
Nueva Ecijan society was an exploitative agricultural system overseen by absentee
landlords who inspired little of the loyalty that peasants elsewhere gave to their
1Quoted in Linn (1989, 84).
94patrons. The province's economy was neither dependent upon mediation by the
state nor vulnerable to disruption by the military. Rice production was not capital-
intensive, the crop was consumed domestically, and the network for its distribution
was robust.
Brigadier General Frederick Funston commanded U.S. troops in this roiling
province for most of the war. He faced enemy forces struggling to organize inter-
nally, but capable of waging a \nasty little war" and contesting vigorously American
control of the province. Funston was a pragmatic commander, uncommitted ideolog-
ically to any particular scal strategy. Unlike many other commanders throughout
the islands, Funston was never enamored with the gentle aspects of benevolent as-
similation, adopting instead a pragmatic approach to counterinsurgency from the
outset. Rhetorically, Funston endorsed a stern approach, but found his command
better served by a more conciliatory policy.
The narrative of scal strategy selection in the Fourth District is one of experi-
mentation with a variety of techniques, followed by renement of the approaches that
proved most fruitful. The result of Funston's experimentation was a scal strategy
of divide-and-rule. Eschewing the establishment of civil government and the provi-
sion of public goods through civic projects, he implemented a menu of tactics that
had the common characteristic of rewarding collaboration generously while crushing
resistance remorselessly. A shrewd use of money and material rewards in the form of
selective incentives helped him to exploit existing ethnic and class divisions and en-
tice the sympathetic or opportunistic. Those who responded to the incentives fed his
intelligence operation and formed the ranks of his native scouts. And while Funston
insisted on fair treatment of the local Filipino population, his forces were relentless
in operations against insurgents. Vengeance, however, was rarely a factor; lenient
surrender terms thinned rebel ranks and even induced collaboration from captured
95rebel leaders. Together these techniques succeeded in splitting the guerillas from
their sources of support, pursuing them into their sanctuaries, and nally forcing
their capitulation.
4.1 Nueva Ecijan society and economy
The province of Nueva Ecija sits in the geographic center of the fertile Central Plain
of Luzon. The provincial boundaries outline a landlocked, rectangular swath of land
bisected diagonally, from northeast to southwest, by the Pampanga River. Eastern
Nueva Ecija comprises a high plateau in the south, extending northward into the
Sierra Madre mountains. Much of the province's western border is swampland created
from the catchment area of of the Chico River. Between these mostly uninhabited
eastern and western areas lies a stretch of the great rice-producing crescent of land
that reaches from Manila Bay in the south to Lingayen Gulf in the north. Nueva
Ecija's portion of this fertile plain, still sparsely populated and heavily forested well
into the nineteenth century, was the location of most of the settlement and economic
activity in the province in the years preceding the American war.
Social fragmentation. Nueva Ecija was the last of the provinces of central Luzon
to be settled; as a result, both social and economic arrangements in the province were
in ux during the period of the Philippine-American War. By 1800, the littorals of
the Central Plain of Luzon were covered by permanent settlements, but because it
was relatively remote, Nueva Ecija would see another century pass before reaching
similar levels of habitation. Over the course of that century, virgin land disappeared
in the surrounding provinces of Bulacan, Pampanga and Pangasinan, and population
growth in these provinces squeezed the landless towards the sparsely populated and
thickly forested areas of Nueva Ecija and Tarlac. Clearing and cultivation of Nueva
96Ecija's fertile land proceeded swiftly, such that, \by 1900, [frontier areas] and much of
Nueva Ecija, mostly primary jungle in 1820, were well-populated agricultural regions"
(Larkin, 1982, 614). Wernstedt and Spencer (1967, 373) explain that by the time of
the revolution,
The population on the plain had reached one million persons, and most of
the land was occupied by some form of cultivation or other regular land
use. The prevalence of widespread tenancy and absentee ownership of
farmland was clearly evident. From this date onward the increases of the
cultivated area would not be sucient to match the rapidly expanding
population.
The nineteenth century in-migration brought together a volatile brew of an-
tagonistic ethnic groups in Nueva Ecija. From the south came the Tagalogs and
Pampangans, and from the north the Ilocanos and Pangasinans. The 1903 census
indicates that, from a total population of about 133,000, the majority were Tagalog
and over a third were Ilocano, with smaller populations of Pampangans and Pangasi-
nans accounting for the balance.2 Competition for scarce land and resources among
the groups of settlers undermined prospects for inter-ethnic concord and exacerbated
diering attitudes towards the Philippine Republic and the Americans.
In a struggle that would give rise to the economic structure of the province,
Ilocano subsistence farmers vied with Tagalog and Pampangan land speculators for
dominance. McLennan (1982, 70) observes that,
The conict inherent in a northward expansion of commercial cropping, as
exemplied by the hacienda, and a southward expansion of Ilocano sub-
sistence smallholders provides the dramatic element in the domestication
2The exact gures were 40,734 Ilocanos, 3,315 Pampangans, 1,620 Pangasinans, and 86,516 Taga-
logs (CB, 1905, II:372).
97of the land in Nueva Ecija. The conicts which arose were the outcome of
fundamentally dierent perceptions as to the appropriate use of the land.
Ilocano migration was typied by groups of families that moved together into the Cen-
tral Plain, each group under the leadership of headman, and established a settlement
that preserved communal labor practices and a social hierarchy based on kinship and
patron-client bonds. Colliding with this subsistence-oriented barangay system was the
commercially-oriented hacienda system in which the gentry acquired large estates for
commercial agricultural production. The hacenderos were typically Spanish or Chi-
nese mestizos residing in the Tagalog- or Pampangan-dominated provinces south of
Nueva Ecija (Wickberg, 1964, 76).
Due in part to the growth of the hacienda system, it was not ethnic divisions
alone that split the inhabitants of Nueva Ecija. Of equal, if not greater, signicance
was a growing animosity between economic classes that would plague the province well
into the twentieth century. The bonds tying tenant to landlord in Nueva Ecija were
thin due to the recency of settlement there, as well as the phenomenon of widespread
absentee landownership. The exploitative system of tenancy that emerged on the
haciendas strained these already tenuous bonds.
From 1890 onward, large haciendas swallowed up communal land and smallhold-
ings in Nueva Ecija, sometimes through legitimate acquisition and sometimes through
fraud or exploitation of smallholding peasants. Courts that favored the principalia, as
well as peasants' \[i]gnorance, illiteracy, and adherence to traditional concepts of land
rights," made many smallholders easy marks for acquisitive hacenderos (McLennan,
1982, 66-72). An example from nearby Pangasinan is illustrative:
When the barrio of Guiling had been cleared, clever Spanish mestizos ...appeared
to claim the land. How surprised the people were! They thought that the
land was theirs because they had cleared it. They protested against the
98injustice done to them. The Spanish rulers ...were inclined to favor the
rich. When the case was brought to court, the people lost and Guiling
became a hacienda ...The people were powerless and they could not do
anything to regain their land.3
Thus many of those who had originally cleared the land were forced into tenancy or
eviction. \Diligent farmers who originally aspired to become self-sustaining citizens
suddenly found themselves in the degrading position of share tenants" (Sturtevant,
1976, 176).
The central feature of the hacienda system was a set of mechanisms designed to
place the peasant in inescapable debt to the landlord. In this system of \rent capital-
ism," the gentry were less interested in maximizing crop yields than in expanding their
control of labor to extract rents and tie the peasantry to the land. As Takahashi (1969,
138) observes, \In this region where absentee landlords are predominant, family-type
benevolent elements do not play an important role in the landlord-tenant relations."
Gone was the sense of reciprocal obligation that characterized pre-commercial rela-
tions between cultivator and landowner. \While vestiges of paternalism remained
on many haciendas, the greater intervening distance between the hacendero and his
numerous tenants was conducive to more impersonal relations that worked only to
the economic advantage of the landowner" (McLennan, 1973, 360).
The contrast in landlord-tenant relations with neighboring Pampanga province
serves to underscore the friction in Nueva Ecija. Larkin (1972, 63) states that in
Pampanga,
[T]he tenant farmers, relatively unchanged by the innovations of the nine-
teenth century, continued in their role as suppliers of manual labor for
their landlords, who in turn continued to give the personal, social, and
3Quoted in Guerrero (1977, 145).
99economic leadership expected by their tenants. In the face of signicant
changes from outside, the persistence of this mutual dependency produced
rm bonds which held the classes together.
Without several centuries during which the personal, social, and economic basis for
landlord-tenant relations could be established, agricultural production in Nueva Ecija
took on its more abusive form. One Filipino observer wrote, \The Nueva Ecija peasant
knows that he is a peasant|paraluman. He does not regret that he is a paraluman,
[only] that he is a paraluman in Nueva Ecija." The writer goes on to detail the system
that keeps the paraluman landless, physically exhausted, uneducated, and inevitably
in hock to the hacendero. He concludes, \And so it comes about that the tenant's
life on the haciendas of Nueva Ecija is reduced to a state of perpetual dependence
and indebtedness."4
Economic resilience. Despite the social fragmentation it contributed to, rice pro-
duction became a source of great wealth for the province|a source of wealth resilient
to outside inuence over both production and distribution. The two primary inputs,
land and labor, were dicult to destroy, disrupt, or conscate without a massive force
dedicated to the task. And the Americans had little interest in stopping the ow of a
commodity on which the country as a whole was dependent for sustenance. Even had
the Americans attempted to interdict the ow of rice to market, they would have en-
countered a robust trade network that utilized the province's many roads, waterways,
and connections to adjacent regions.
Nueva Ecija's transition to a commercial economy would eventually make the
province's rice harvest the most bountiful in the Central Plain. In 1870, Nueva Ecija's
crops were oriented predominantly to local consumption. Within a decade, however,
4Quoted in Sturtevant (1976, 70-72).
100the province was an important supplier of rice to Manila and was sending half of its
harvest there by 1887.5 While other crops were also grown in Nueva Ecija, rice, or
palay, was the most important. In 1885, 27 of the province's pueblos were engaged
in palay production. By comparison, 18 grew tobacco|production of which ended
in 1894 following devastation by rinderpest and foot-and-mouth disease|and eight
produced sugar (McLennan, 1980, 247). Agriculture comprised almost the entirety
of Nueva Ecija's participation in Philippine commercial expansion during the closing
decades of the nineteenth century. \A few craft specialties and a smattering of light
industry also developed ...Nevertheless, processing and manufacturing activities re-
mained negligible in Nueva Ecija" (McLennan, 1980, 248).
All Philippine rice production was consumed domestically. Despite the vast
crop produced there, the Philippines as a whole was in 1902 still dependent upon
large quantities of imported rice from China. Domestic production was \far below
the actual food requirements of the population" (BIA, 1902, 72). The domestic
consumption of Nueva Ecija's harvest limited the vulnerability of the source of the
province's wealth to intervention by the Spanish colonial government or the Amer-
ican military. Rice was not subject to threat of export ban or easy interdiction on
trade routes, unlike sugar production on the island of Negros, discussed below. The
production and transport to market of Nueva Ecija's rice involved a comparatively
complex network that eluded the colonial government's attempts even to monitor
it. McLennan (1980, 241-242) describes \a constant ow of exports moving toward
Manila" and explains that, \With multitudes of small boats and carts moving freely
5Even faster growth in commercial production came in the decade following the war. By the
early 1920s Nueva Ecija would eclipse Pangasinan as the leading producer of rice in the islands.
101along the waterways and roads of the colony, colonial ocials admittedly were unable
to obtain accurate gures on commercial movements."6
In sum, Nueva Ecija was a province in the midst of social and economic upheaval
at the end of the nineteenth century. Settlers from rival ethnic groups poured in
from nearby provinces and competed to clear and settle new land. The form of
agricultural production that emerged added class animosity to the mix. Nevertheless,
rice production was a reliable and resilient source of wealth for the province.
4.2 The Fourth District, Department of Northern
Luzon
In the context of the Philippine nation and the Philippine-American War, descriptions
of Luzon are awash in superlatives. The island is the archipelago's largest, most
prosperous, and most diverse. In 1900, it was home to half of the country's population
and to Manila, the capital city and largest port. There was little doubt on either side
that the island would be the decisive terrain in the war; ultimately, victory or defeat
would be decided on Luzon. Accordingly, the vast majority of American military
resources|four out of every ve soldiers|was concentrated there, and operations on
the island were the paramount concern of U.S. headquarters.
The Americans divided military responsibility for Luzon into northern and
southern commands. Of these, the northern command was the more important and
received half of American military manpower in the Philippines, 25,000 U.S. troops.
That a force of merely 25,000 was available to the war's main eort in an area cov-
ering 30,000 square miles and almost 2 million inhabitants speaks to the scarcity of
6Although reliable data do not exist, various estimates put rice production near 1 million cavans
in 1885, 2 million in 1895, 4.5 million in 1910, and over 7 million by 1926. Records are not available
for the years of the war (McLennan, 1980, 246-251).
102military resources available to American commanders and the consequent reliance on
scal strategies to augment their operations (Linn, 2000, 255).
General Wheaton, the Northern Department's commander at the outset of the
war, placed priority on the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Districts, encompassing
the territory that stretched north from Manila through the Central Luzon Plain. The
Fourth District fell at the geographical center of this area, encompassing the provinces
of Nueva Ecija and Principe. The latter was mountainous, barely inhabited, and of
scant consequence to either side in the war. The Fourth District's war was fought in
Nueva Ecija.
The American appearance in Nueva Ecija, as in other Tagalog areas, interrupted
a tful uprising under way by then for several years. The province was one of eight to
respond to Bonifacio's call for revolt in August 1896. On September 3, Nueva Ecija's
Katapuneros attacked San Isidro, the provincial capital. Although the rebels were
put out by Spanish forces a few days later, the talented rebel leader Mariano Llanera
held the province's mountainous district and continued \stirring up the towns far
and wide whenever an opportunity presented itself" (LeRoy, 1914, I:91-92). Unrest
continued after the agreement that exiled Aguinaldo, and Nueva Ecija was one of
the provinces in which the rebellion remained active, if sporadic, leading up to the
American intervention in the Philippines (Corpuz, 1989, II:228-276).
Inspired by the Spanish defeat at Manila Bay and the return of Aguinaldo, rebel
leaders in Nueva Ecija reinvigorated their campaign against the colonial regime. On
July 7, 1898 the province was organized into four military zones. The Spanish, forced
to move most of their troops to defend Manila, surrendered San Isidro to forces under
Manuel Tinio on July 31 (Corpuz, 1989, II:287).
But having ushed the Spanish from the province and declared independence,
the Filipinos struggled to consolidate their gains. In the year between Nueva Ecija's
103independence and the American advance into the province, provincial leaders gave lit-
tle attention to building eective administration or a capable military organization.
Compared to other provinces, insurgent infrastructure in Nueva Ecija went under-
developed; absent were organized village militias, shadow governments, Katipunan
societies, and storehouses for supplies. Crucially, relations with local elites were also
uneven and sometimes neglected (Linn, 1989, 68).
Several factors disrupted preparations for the defense of the Philippine Republic
in Nueva Ecija: poor leadership, ethnic discord, and class conict. Many of those
who could have assumed key roles in the guerilla leadership structure were elsewhere;
those who remained were less capable and were disposed toward internecine conict.
Several of the province's most prominent leaders took on roles in the struggle for
the Republic that played out beyond Nueva Ecija's borders in 1898 and 1899. Many
fought in the battles around Manila, including Brigadier General Urbano Lacuna,
who would later return to revive Nueva Ecija's insurgency. Major General Panteleon
Garc a, a capable strategist but ineective combat leader, commanded the \Center
of Luzon" area. He spent much of the war before his capture in 1900 \ill and in
hiding" (Funston, [1912] 2009, 318, 337). His subordinate, Colonel Pablo Padilla,
was in charge of forces in central and southern Nueva Ecija. Padilla failed in the
basic task of imposing discipline on his forces and their behavior stoked resentment
in the villages. In the north, Colonel Teodoro Sandico \admitted that he was a colonel
without troops. He spent much of his time in quarrels with other commanders and
complained bitterly to Aguinaldo that nobody accepted his authority" (Linn, 1989,
68).
The fundamental source, however, of the Republic's weak organization of Nueva
Ecija after independence was its inability to overcome the internal divisions of ethnic-
ity and class. The Tagalogs, Ilocanos, and Pampangans who had been competing for
104a decade over scarce land on the central Luzon frontier were not inclined to cooperate
for the cause of the Republic. The Ilocano immigrants had less animosity toward the
Americans and less sympathy for the Tagalog-led revolution (Funston, [1912] 2009,
319). The already fractious interethnic relationship bent further under the strain of
the events of June 5, 1899. That day Antonio Luna, the Republic's top general and an
ethnic Ilocano, was murdered at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija. The assassination, car-
ried out by Aguinaldo's Tagalog bodyguard, left Luna's fellow Ilocanos \universally
indignant" (Sexton, 1971, 167). The Pampangans, for their part, remained oppor-
tunistically neutral and, like those in their home province, \reacted to each phase
of the revolution according to their own self-interest and need for survival" (Larkin,
1972, 119-128).
Festering socioeconomic strife in the province meant that support for the revo-
lution was far from unied even among the majority Tagalogs. Nueva Ecija's peasants
were reluctant to support a cause seemed to reinforce, rather than undermine, the
existing socioeconomic order. Guerrero (1977, 146) explains that,
[T]he republican period was hardly a time during which the demands of
the peasants might be met or an equitable land policy formulated. It
is signicant to note that the Malolos Congress, dominated as it was by
auent and educated Filipinos, did not even once engage in any serious
debate about the country's economic future, much less address itself to
the manifest agrarian discontent in Luzon.
Thus, an \overwhelming majority of the peasants were essentially indierent to the
conict" and attempted to avoid involvement and stay on good terms with both
sides (May, 1983, 365-366). In other provinces, peasants mobilized in support of the
Republic out of obligations of utang na loob that they felt toward their landlords, who
either supported the cause or commanded guerilla units themselves. The patron-client
105bonds in Nueva Ecija were weak at best; further, widespread absentee landownership
meant that most patrons were not even present. Many peasants turned instead to
millenarian movements that often espoused anti-Republican sentiments (Guerrero,
1977, 140-149; May, 1983, 365-367).
The Americans invaded Nueva Ecija in May 1899 in pursuit of Aguinaldo. Ma-
jor General Henry Lawton's forces swept away the organized Filipino resistance and
captured the temporary Republican capital of San Isidro on May 17. However, this
initial thrust fell short of its other aims; Lawton did not capture the rebel leaders
and soon had to withdraw his exhausted and sick troops, leaving the province back
in Republican hands (Gleeck, 1981, 4). But he returned in the fall, dispensing easily
with Padilla's ineectual defenses. Lawton occupied the towns of Nueva Ecija, en-
countering little resistance and a surprisingly cordial reception from the population
(WD, 1899, I:4:119-21). In the subsequent months, however, Nueva Ecija's rebels
followed the lead of their counterparts elsewhere, turning toward guerilla tactics that
reinforced their advantages and mitigated their organizational weaknesses.
In December 1899, Brigadier General Frederick Funston assumed command of
what would be designated the Fourth District, Department of Northern Luzon. Fun-
ston was among the war's most famous ocers, a hero of the Cuban insurrection
whose exploits in the Philippines had already earned him the Medal of Honor in
April 1899. He was an outspoken public gure and an experienced practitioner of
counterinsurgency. \Despite his experience, or perhaps because of it," Linn (1989,
70) writes, \Funston was guided far more by pragmatism than any carefully developed
counterinsurgency theory. He was willing to use whatever means were necessary, and
if his solutions were often theatrical, they were also eective." Free of the constraints
of doctrine or preconceived theory, Funston's employment of force and scal resources
would be driven by his assessments of their eectiveness.
106Despite the early disorganization of the rebels in his area of operations, Funston
recognized the advantages they maintained over his troops. Describing the counterin-
surgent's dilemma, he later wrote of his enemy that, \their knowledge of the country,
their mobility, their control over the population either through sympathy or fear,
and, above all, their habit of passing from the status of guerilla soldiers to that of
non-combatants really gave them an advantage ..." (Funston, 2009, 314). Like other
district commanders, Funston quickly found himself undermanned for the require-
ments of guerilla warfare. While beating back insurrecto harassment, he set about
organizing his thinly-spread and poorly-supplied forces for the ght ahead.
4.3 Fiscal strategy choice
Throughout the course of the war, Funston and his troops demonstrated an invalu-
able ability to learn from their successes and failures, making adjustments accordingly.
Funston's missives contain frequent references to \experiments" and \trials," the re-
sults of which led to rapid changes of policies and the creation of new initiatives.7
Moreover, adapting to local conditions required getting to know local actors and un-
derstanding their positions, relationships, and interests. Funston wrote that, "the
eciency of a company depends largely on [its] knowledge of the people in the vicin-
ity, and the country itself, which can be acquired only after some time."8 Adapting
and adjusting as they went, the Americans' eectiveness grew as the ghting wore
on.
Early incidents thus reveal little of the nesse that would eventually characterize
American counterinsurgency in Nueva Ecija. Initially preoccupied with consolidating
7Funston's use of native police and constabulary provides a clear example. See correspondence
of 4 October 1900, 8 November 1900, and 1 January 1901 in NARA (2262:1), 26 December 1900 in
NARA (2263:3), and 1 May 1901 in NARA (2263:2).
8Quoted in Linn (1989, 22).
107his command of scattered elements from six dierent regiments, Funston showed scant
patience for or creativity in addressing the sniping and small-scale attacks conducted
by the recovering rebels. When one of his soldiers was killed in an attack, Funston's
order was to \Round up all the people who live within one hundred yards of where
the sergeant was boloed, making a special eort to get the men, and if they do not aid
you in catching the guilty ones and furnish proof to convict them, burn their houses"
(NARA, 15 Mar 1900, 2263:1). Responding to a cut telegraph wire, he commanded
a \sucient number of houses be burned to give the people in the vicinity a severe
lesson" (NARA, 5 Feb 1900, 2263:1). Yet with time he concluded that punitive and
indiscriminate measures were counterproductive. A year later, he wrote, \I cannot
see the expediency of burning the barrios in the vicinity where a wire has been cut as
the damage is almost invariably done by people from elsewhere. I think the unarmed
and defenseless people in the barrios could not prevent wire cutting if they were so
disposed."9
Alongside his initially harsh operational posture, Funston was simultaneously
cultivating sources of information on enemy movements. Events would quickly con-
vince him of the value of alternatives to coercive treatment of the civilian population.
Possibly sensing an opportunity in the Americans' disorganization in the early
months of 1900, Garc a and Padilla plotted a large-scale coordinated attack on the
town of Pe~ naranda. But the American patrols caught wind of the concentration
of Filipino forces based on \information of several natives ...well corroborated by
accumulated information of last 2 months." A captured rebel even oered to serve as
a guide for the patrol \for his liberty and some money" (NARA, 24 Feb 1900, 2263:1).
For several weeks, patrols pursued the guerilla leaders, gathering information as they
proceeded. On March 18, American troops caught up with an estimated force of
9Quoted in Linn (1989, 78).
108700 guerillas mobilizing at the village of Mauiluilui. Though it inicted only modest
casualties, a spoiling attack scattered the rebel forces and gave the initiative to the
Americans (WD, 1900, I:7:365{67).
In the subsequent weeks, Funston kept up pressure on the guerillas by patrolling
heavily throughout their stronghold in the province's northeastern highlands. On May
6, information \learned through spies" led troops under Captain Erneste Smith to
Garc a. Ten days after capturing the overall rebel commander in central Luzon, the
Americans also caught key provincial leaders Padilla and Casmirio Tinio (Funston,
[1912] 2009, 347{348).
While the eects of these early victories would not prove as decisive as Funston
hoped, he took from them crucial lessons regarding the value of intelligence and the
means for collecting it. Money served as an important inducement. To \the men
from whom Captain Smith obtained the information that made possible the capture
of General Garcia," he gave 200 pesos, a generous sum in a place where ordinary
laborers earned one or two pesos a week (NARA, 8 May 1900, 2262:1). Around the
same time, Funston paid 150 pesos to a guide who aided in the capture of important
rebel documents. Fifty peso payments for guides and informants seem to have been
commonplace, and successful attacks were regularly credited to \information received
from friendly Ilocanos."10
Brigadier General Urbano Lacuna arrived in Nueva Ecija in April, just before
the capture of the province's key leaders seemed to push the rebel cause toward ex-
tinction. Lacuna, a native of Nueva Ecija who fought near Manila in the opening
year of the war, was a capable guerilla leader whose skill and conduct earned Fun-
ston's praise (Funston, [1912] 2009, 337, 357). Lacuna's activity over the spring and
summer of 1900 resurrected the province's insurgency from near annihilation. He con-
10See correspondence of 29 April, 9 May, 10 May, and 11 May 1900, all in NARA (2263:1).
109solidated command of Nueva Ecija's guerilla forces and worked, with varying success,
to build an infrastructure for protection, communication, and supply. But with the
Republican cause already reeling, Lacuna could not build the shadow governments,
underground societies, or village networks that gave the insurgency such versatility in
other provinces. (Linn, 1989, 71{73, 85{86). Nonetheless, under Lacuna, the guerillas
reconstituted their capacity to contest American control of Nueva Ecija.
With the insurgency revived, the year ahead presented the Americans with the
classic ingredients|and dilemmas|of guerilla warfare: an elusive enemy, dicult
to identify and to x in decisive battle; attrition through ambush and disease; a
population caught between the threats and inducements of the two sides; and ever-
present peril amidst apparent tranquillity. In his memoirs, (Funston, [1912] 2009,
314{315) recounted,
The condition of the country seemed perfectly normal, the towns being
full of people and the usual work going on in the elds. There was not a
sign of the war to be seen, though there had been some brisk campaigning
through this region. In fact, this condition existed through the whole of
central Luzon during the period of a year and a half of guerilla warfare ...If
any one imagines that this was a desolated country, with the inhabitants
eeing to the woods and mountains for shelter, he is entitled to imagine
again. The tendency of the people was to ock to the garrisoned towns for
shelter from their own ruthless countrymen, they having not the slightest
fear of the troops. I have no doubt that in the year 1900 Nueva Ecija raised
as much rice as it ever did; at least all suitable land was in cultivation.
And yet there was a nasty little war going on all of the time. It certainly
was an odd state of aairs.
110Funston arrayed a variety of weapons to wield in this war. Building on their
success in the spring, his ocers used generous rewards to assemble one of the Di-
vision's most robust intelligence networks. Above all else, the successful cultivation
and shrewd use of information about his enemy would give Funston the decisive ad-
vantage in the contest for control of Nueva Ecija. In his own words, Funston had
\a secret service that it would be hard to beat under any circumstances" (Funston,
[1912] 2009, 373).
To this end, Funston and his men cultivated friendly relations with the locals.
\If there was any one thing understood by our soldiers during this period of the war,
it was that they were not allowed to take anything from the inhabitants without
payment" (Funston, [1912] 2009, 368). Even this principle, however, involved some
learning: an early telegram requesting money to pay rent for commandeered buildings
noted obtusely, \The people seem to regard it as a great injustice that their houses
are taken from them without any compensation" (NARA, 5 Apr 1900, 2262:1). Over
time, the Americans adopted a policy of fair compensation for rent, employment,
and transport.11 Ocers came to view considerate and compassionate treatment
of Filipino civilians as valuable in winning consent and cooperation for American
operations. When, for instance, a re damaged the town of Candaba, the garrison
there sought to help the inhabitants recover. The district adjutant telegrammed
higher headquarters, writing, \Fire inicts great injury on the poor. I recommend
that 20,000 pesos be sent to the Comdg Or Candaba to be used at his discretion in
aiding and providing for temporary subsistence and accomodations for the poor and
in rebuilding school houses" (NARA, 21 Jun 1900, 2262:1).
Occasional acts of community assistance notwithstanding, Funston showed little
interest in public works or municipal governance. Unlike commanders elsewhere, he
11See, e.g., correspondence of 27 March, 7 May, and 16 May 1900, all in NARA (2263:1).
111did not establish an oce dedicated to civil aairs and spent little on schools, sanita-
tion, or public health. G.O. 40 and 43 directed the establishment of civil government,
but Funston seems to have complied only half-heartedly. He delayed implementation
of the orders, waiting until October 1900 to hold elections. Even then, only ten towns
cast ballots, with turnout that ranged from 140 votes in one town to just 14 in an-
other (NARA, 4 Oct 1900, 2262:1). Nor was Funston eager to establish local security
forces. He acknowledged that he was \opposed to giving the municipal authorities
much powers in the matter of police" (NARA, 1 Jan 1901, 2262:1). Linn (1989, 83{
84) concludes, \Funston's lack of attention to civil government, native police, and
schools indicates that he felt these measures were irrelevant to the pacication of the
district."
In early summer, Lacuna struck out with a new aggressiveness. He made deft
use of his limited but growing strength to harass American troops and the towns they
controlled. And as he struggled to rebuild guerilla support in the villages, he sought
an opportunity to deliver a serious blow to the counterinsurgents (Linn, 1989, 72{73).
An opening seemed to appear in June, when nearly a quarter of Funston's
manpower was ordered to the Fifth District to assist in an urgent search for American
soldiers captured there, \almost entirely denuding of men many of the posts" in Nueva
Ecija (NARA, 8 Jun 1900, 2263:2). Additionally, much of Funston's remaining force
was in the mountains on an operation targeting a rebel supply center. Seizing the
opportunity created by the dearth of American soldiers available for contingencies,
Lacuna plotted another assault on Pe~ naranda, planning to attack and burn the town
on the night of June 14. But spies alerted the commander of the garrison there of
the impending attack, and, as earlier at Mauiluilui, the Americans pre-empted rebel
designs. The ght, according to Funston, was \about the most successful that we had
in the Fourth District" (Funston, [1912] 2009, 359{362).
112Sti ghting continued over the summer months and inicted heavy losses on
the guerillas. On July 4, Lacuna and the aggressive Colonel Pablo Tecson organized
a coordinated attack on three garrisoned towns, but the rebels were badly defeated.
An American counteroensive throughout July and August pursued Lacuna's forces
throughout their formerly secure mountain sanctuaries (WD, 1900, I:7:370{376).
As the ghting wore on, Funston made increasing use|to great eect|of native
scouts.12 In their organization and employment, we again see Funston's willingness
to experiment, adapt, and adjust. Early in 1900, Funston, together with Thirty-
Fourth Infantry commander Colonel Lyman W.V. Kennon, proposed raising a unit
of native scouts to make up for the district's manpower shortages (Linn, 1989, 81).
They faced opposition from higher headquarters, but after repeated petitions the
department commander authorized the organization of a detachment of 50 native
scouts. Each would receive 15-and-a-half pesos in monthly pay, plus three pesos a
month for clothing (NARA, 29 May 1900, 2263:1).13 The experiment proved success-
ful beyond expectations, and soon ocers throughout the district were clamoring for
detachments of their own. As new native forces stood up, talented U.S. ocers were
carefully selected to lead the units, and commanders sent scouts on the highest pri-
ority missions because they \know that country and ought to accomplish something
denite" (NARA, 11 Oct and 19 Oct 1900, 2263:3). By the end of the year, Funston
proposed to increase the Fourth District's force of native scouts to 420, with plans to
expand by half again. During their service, he attested, \not one of them has proven
unfaithful nor have they lost a rie. They have killed more insurgents and captured
more arms than all other troops in the District combined" (NARA, 30 Dec 1900,
2263:3).
12Not to be confused with the native police, of whose use Funston was skeptical, detachments of
native scouts were commanded by American ocers and fully integrated into U.S. operations.
13See also correspondence of 24 April, 18 May, 21 May, and 26 May 1900, all in NARA (2263:1).
113Both in raising native forces and in gathering intelligence, Funston shrewdly
exploited Nueva Ecija's ethnic divisions. Most scouts and informants were Ilocanos,
members of the province's second-largest ethnic group increasingly alienated by the
Tagalog majority. Against the backdrop of competition with the Tagalogs for scarce
land, provincial Ilocano leader Francisco Madrid was murdered for his work with
the Americans in early 1900. As a result of the killing, Colonel Kennon saw an
opportunity that, \with proper management ...the Ilocanos may be made assured
friends of the United States." Thus commanders emphasized to their troops that, \it
is desired to win and retain the friendship of every Ilocano."14 Although they were
concentrated in the north, Ilocano inhabitants could be found in towns and villages
throughout Nueva Ecija. Many proved willing to share information with U.S. forces
in exchange for small rewards.
But Funston's network of collaborators was not composed of Ilocanos alone. Un-
grudging treatment of prisoners and, especially, generous terms of surrender brought
many Tagalogs to the American side, as well. Funston recognized that captured
guerillas could provide valuable service to the Americans and believed that coopera-
tion would be more easily enticed than compelled. Thus he frequently restored rebel
leaders to positions of civic prominence upon swearing an oath of allegiance. In the
town of Aliaga, the treatment of two captured guerilla ocers named Medina and
Cajucon is illustrative of Funston's approach:
Medina was captured and held in guardhouse until June 13 when on tak-
ing oath allegiance was released. In July he was appointed provisional
President Aliaga pending election. Since taking oath he has been under
close surveillance and has apparently worked loyally in interests of peace.
No trace of connection with insurgents or ladrones since that time ....
14Quotes from Linn (1989, 81{82).
114No overt act has been committed by [Cajucon] so far as known. Both of
above men are very inuential in Aliaga. With Casimiro Tinio they have
controlled that town so far as natives are concerned. Lately it is believed
their inuence has been for us (NARA, 11 Aug 1900, 2263:2).
Funston had similar success with others. Following his capture, Manuel Tinio, rebel
leader in northwestern Luzon, held oce in his home village of Licab. Despite rebel
threats to his life, he became an informer and even killed three rebels who tried to
hide in the village. Likewise, Padilla and Lieutenant Colonel Joaquin Natividad were
released and went on to organize the Federal Party in Nueva Ecija (Linn, 1989, 80).
Beginning in the summer, Funston issued repeated proclamations of amnesty,
promising that \most liberal treatment will be accorded to all who may present
themselves" (NARA, 27 Jun 1900, 2262:1). To further sweeten the deal for those
considering surrender, the Americans oered the payment of 30 pesos for each rie
turned in. (The same reward went to scouts, guides, and informants who aided in
capturing guerillas.) When Major Antonio Mendoza surrendered with his soldiers,
Funston wired the local garrison commander, \Congratulations on surrender of Men-
doza. Until I can hear from Dept. Hdqs. allow him and his men liberty about town
and treat them well. Did you agree to pay for ries?" (NARA, 30 Dec 1900, 2263:3).
This leniency eected hundreds of surrenders. One request sent to higher headquar-
ters begged \reconsideration of order to send [list of names] by wire in view of great
length of the telegram required" (NARA, 23 Sep 1900, 2263:3).15
The war, from Funston's point of view, \went merrily on" through the fall and
winter and into 1901. \It was a sort of process of attrition," he explained, \by which
we hoped in time to wear the insurgent bands down to nothing. Our losses were
not great, and every rie captured from the enemy lessened his power just so much,
15For other incidents of mass surrender, see correspondence of 2 August in NARA (2263:2), 4
September in NARA (2262:1), and 23 September 1900 in NARA (2263:3).
115for while men could be gathered up from the elds and forced to ght, the weapons
lost to us could not be replaced" (Funston, [1912] 2009, 375). The army maintained
pressure on Lacuna's reeling insurgent bands. Against those who refused his generous
terms of surrender, Funston was unmerciful. Funston ordered pursuit of one guerilla
leader \until his outt has been destroyed or chased o the earth" (NARA, 11 Oct
1900, 2263:3). In desperation, the rebels resorted to terrorizing the population of
uncooperative towns. They threatened retaliation against principales who denied
them support. They red indiscriminately into the towns at night. Lacuna ordered
the village of Jaen burnt to the ground. And some 200 homes in San Isidro were put
to the torch (Linn, 1989, 74). In the end, these acts served mostly to drive civilians
toward the Americans. In January 1901, Funston assessed, \There is now here a good
public sentiment in favor of American authorities, a fact which has been manifested
in numerous ways. The people are tired of disturbance and want the country pacied.
The rebels in arms no longer have the support of the general public" (NARA, 1 Jan
1901, 2262:1).
The revolutionary cause in Nueva Ecija spiraled into defeat in early 1901. Amer-
ican patrols threatened, civilians turned their backs, supplies dried up, and morale
evaporated. Most of the remaining guerilla leaders surrendered with their troops
or were captured, and any semblance of oensive operations ceased outright. La-
cuna himself was virtually the lone holdout when he nally relinquished the ght on
May 19.
As the insurgency crumbled in the Fourth District, Funston gathered together
the tools he had honed over 14 months of ghting in Nueva Ecija for a mission that
would be the most renowned and most dramatic of the war. Through shrewd manip-
ulation of incentives and exploitation of divided loyalties, he had built a sophisticated
intelligence network, a capable and loyal force of indigenous scouts, and the collab-
116oration of guerilla defectors. Together, these assets made possible an operation of
remarkable audacity.
In February 1901, a courier for the elusive Aguinaldo arrived in the northern
town of Pantabangan carrying correspondence meant for Lacuna. The presidente
of Pantabangan was formerly an insurgent supporter, now working in cooperation
with the Americans. The courier, Cecilio Segismundo, approached the presidente,
who encouraged him to surrender to the local garrison commander. After much
negotiation, the commander managed to secure Segismundo's surrender and sent him,
along with the captured correspondence, to Funston in San Isidro. There, Funston's
secret service deciphered the letters which conrmed Segismundo's story and revealed
a request from Aguinaldo for a detachment of 400 soldiers.
With this information, Funston devised a plan to inltrate Aguinaldo's well-
guarded stronghold in the coastal province of Isabella and capture the revolutionary
chief. Segismundo, along with three Tagalog former insurgent ocers, would lead a
group of eighty native scouts posing as the reinforcements; Funston and four other
ocers would go with the patrol, acting as its prisoners. Funston ([1912] 2009, 398{
399) recounts assembling the players, \I sent for [the three former insurgents], and told
them that we were going after their old chieftain, and they would be expected to play
their part, as they had all of them without compulsion taken the oath of allegiance to
the United States. If they were faithful they would be well rewarded ..." To complete
the ruse, Funston sent ahead of the patrol forged letters based on correspondence
previously captured from Lacuna.
The patrol went ashore some sixty miles from the remote village of Palanan
and made a harrowing trek toward Aguinaldo's hide-out there. On March 23, the
rebel leader warmly received the impostors into his camp. Caught completely by
surprise, his guards were barely able to resist when Funston's men turned on them.
117The president of the Philippine Republic was captured unharmed. Sent to Manila
for negotiations with MacArthur, Aguinaldo issued a proclamation to his followers
on April 19, asking them to lay down their arms and accept American authority in
Philippines (Bain, 1984; Funston, 2009, 384-426; Linn, 2000, 275).
With the insurgency already in tatters, the strategic signicance of Aguinaldo's
capture is debatable. Unquestionably, though, the operation highlights the success
Funston found in using selective incentives to build an eective intelligence network,
induce collaboration from civilians and former combatants, and assemble a formidable
force of native auxiliaries.
...
Resilient in its agricultural wealth, but riven with ethnic and class conict, Nueva
Ecija proved to be fertile soil for divide-and-rule, consistent with the theory of scal
strategies. Funston experimented with a variety of coercive and conciliatory ap-
proaches and found an edge on the insurgency by exploiting the province's ethnic
and social ssures. With oers of selective incentives, he incrementally peeled away
support for the insurgency. The cooperation of relatively few willing collaborators
enabled military operations that neutralized guerilla supporters in the villages and
pursued aggressively the insurgents themselves.
With little leverage over their economic well-being, Funston couldn't hope to
oer sucient enticement to bring the majority of Nueva Ecija's stakeholders willingly
over to the American side. Elsewhere, however, American commanders found success
through the provision of public goods under a strategy of consensual rule. The island
of Negros, the setting for the next chapter, was one such place.
118Chapter 5
Consensual Rule in Negros
They are mostly on our side of the fence in Negros,
but they like the top rail proximately convenient.
- Brigadier General Robert P. Hughes1
The forces shaping late-nineteenth century Negros rendered it socially fragmented
and economically vulnerable. In Negrense society, we see parallels to the story of
Nueva Ecija related in the previous chapter. In both places, commercial agricul-
ture precipitated a population explosion fueled by multi-ethnic immigration and a
prosperity enjoyed unevenly across increasingly antagonistic socioeconomic classes.
Unlike Nueva Ecija, however, Negros produced a capital-intensive export crop and
was utterly reliant on access to the sea for its distribution. These factors made the
Negrense economy vulnerable to disruption by the American military.
1WD (1900, I:10:255).
119Seven months passed following the Spanish defeat at Manila Bay before an
American soldier set foot on the island of Negros. In the interim, the Negrense
cast o Spanish rule themselves, then wrangled incessantly over the path for their
political future. Most were loath to return to subjection under a colonial power, but
nor were many eager for a ght. When a small contingent of Americans did arrive
under the command of Brigadier General James F. Smith, they faced a struggle to
win acquiescence from the island's inhabitants, to quell festering social unrest, and
to confront a recalcitrant resistance faction.
Smith pursued a scal strategy of consensual rule in Negros, pairing military op-
erations with the provision of public goods. Honest governance, security, civic works,
public education, and social services brought material benets to broad segments of
the island's population. Alternatives to American rule became comparatively less
attractive as a result, especially to the poor and middle classes. The planters and
merchants, for their part, were content that their wealth would be secure under Amer-
ican rule. They conceded their aspirations for independence at the thought of the
devastation to the island's sugar economy that would be the likely result of conict.
5.1 Negrense society and economy
The nineteenth century economic transformation sweeping the Philippine Islands both
enlarged and splintered the population of Negros, while creating a prosperous but
vulnerable economy. As in the central Luzon province of Nueva Ecija, outsiders
poured into the Visayan island of Negros in search of work or prot in the burgeon-
ing agriculture industry. Social fragmentation grew as ethnic groups collided and
peasants came to resent their distant and unsympathetic landlords. Unlike Neuva
Ecija, however, wealth on Negros depended on the production and export of sugar
120from the island province. Nearly all of the commodity was destined for international
export, and Negros's island geography made commerce dependent on access to the
sea. As Linn (2000, 73) observes, sugar made Negros \one of the richest islands in
the archipelago|and among the most vulnerable to any disruption of trade."
Negros is the second-largest island in the Visayas, the island group that com-
poses the middle stretch of the Philippine archipelago, between Luzon and Mindanao.
Northwest of Negros is the island of Panay, home to the vital port of Iloilo, about
27 miles by sea from the town of Bacolod on Negros. To the east, across the narrow
Tanon Strait lies the island of Cebu. A nearly unbroken mountain range runs down
the elongated north-south axis of Negros, dividing it into two provinces. Wide coastal
lowlands give Negros Occidental much more space suitable for sugar cane cultivation
than Negros Oriental, where rugged hills extend close to the shore. Thinly settled
and undeveloped through the mid-1800s, Negros transformed utterly in the decades
immediately preceding the Philippine-American War.
The mid-1850s saw the birth of modern Negros, with the opening of the port
of Iloilo on Panay and the enthusiasm of that town's British Vice Consul, Nicholas
Loney. Foreseeing the potential of the sugar industry on the unexploited plains of
Negros, Loney arranged cheap credit for landlords, spurred migration from Panay,
and introduced steam-driven reneries (Seekins, 1993, 11). Growers could use existing
land more eciently, while pioneers cleared forests and brought vast new tracts under
cultivation. The important haciendas began to appear in late 1850s and 1860s. In
1866, the rst year for which data are available, Negros produced about four metric
tons of sugar. By 1876, production reached 24 metric tons, a gure that tripled again
in the subsequent decade. Once commercially insignicant, Negros was the leading
exporter in the Philippines by 1892. That year, sugar from the island comprised
twenty percent of the total value of the colony's exports (Cuesta, 1980, 170, 377).
121Tremendous population growth accompanied the sugar boom on Negros. Esti-
mates of the population at mid-century range widely, from 30,000 to about 100,000
(Cullamar, 1986, 8). By 1897, Negros had over 450,000 inhabitants. Illustrative
of the island's growth were towns like Ma-ao: \In 1884 Ma-ao was an insignicant
village which was a meeting place for vagrants. In 1895 it was a barrio of 10,000
inhabitants crisscrossed by tramcars and navigable rivers wherein twenty ve hacien-
das with seven hydraulic mills, four steam mills and ve animal operated mills were
found" (Cuesta, 1980, 394-395). The population of Ma-ao and communities like it
swelled from an inux of immigrants from elsewhere in the Visayas.
Immigrants were both pulled and pushed toward Negros. The growing sugar
industry meant a constant demand for manpower. Landowners were always in search
of laborers to work their land or clear more of it. Meanwhile, overcrowded farmlands
in Panay, Cebu, Bohol, Capiz, and Antique oered few opportunities, and so natives of
these islands as well as ethnic Chinese \swarmed to Negros as entrepreneurs, laborers,
small businessmen and peddlers" (Aldecoa-Rodriguez, 1983, 46). To the immigrants,
\Negros became their `El Dorado' or promised land ...be they rich merchants who
wanted to invest their money ...or laborers out to better their economic condition"
(Cullamar, 1986, 8-9). Just as Nueva Ecija attracted migrants from the periphery of
the Central Luzon Plain, Negros drew settlers from throughout the Visayas.
Social fragmentation. Although the antagonism that existed between Nueva Ecija's
Tagalogs and Ilocanos was largely absent among the immigrants in Negros, several
factors undermined solidarity of the communities they built. First, their uniform
classication by the census as ethnically \Visayan" masks substantial cultural dier-
ences between, for instance, Hiligaynon speakers from Panay, and those from Bohol
who spoke a dialect of Cebuano. Like their languages, their cultural practices, while
122often mutually intelligible, seemed foreign nonetheless. Second, and more important,
was simply the recency of settlement. At the end of the nineteenth century, most
of the population of Negros had come from somewhere else. Negrense society lacked
the generations of shared experience that contributed to stable and legitimate social
institutions in long-settled areas of the archipelago. Third, during the peak agricul-
tural season, many of the island's inhabitants were temporary laborers who had been
\imported" to work in the elds. Because of their transience, the seasonal workers
were without an established place in their communities (Cullamar, 1986, 13). In sum,
cultural distinctions, together with the recency of settlement or its impermanence,
kept the Negrense peasantry from coalescing in the years prior to 1900.
Fissures within the social strata, however, were trivial in comparison to the
rifts between economic classes. Again, the comparison to Nueva Ecija is apt. Like
the economic elite of that province, the \sugar barons" of Negros showed few scruples
accumulating massive landholdings on which peasants labored in debt peonage. Huge
plantations grew from lands once inhabited by native tribes or cleared by yeoman pi-
oneers. Aldecoa-Rodriguez (1983, 48) writes that, \Great stands of hardwood forests
vanished to make way for farms. The [natives] inhabiting the area either submitted to
become [the landlord's] eld hands or moved to the interior and attacked his hacienda
at times. This pattern of transformation was true all over the island ..." Meanwhile,
many smallholders who carved out their own tracts lost their land through pactos
de retroventa. Because credit was unavailable to them, small cultivators in need of
loans turned to hacenderos, who insisted instead that the peasants sell their land with
the option to buy it back. Of course, \Few small cultivators were able to take up
the option ...and so remained in debt from year to year to the money-lender turned
hacendero" (de la Costa, 1965, 147).
123Landowners in Negros neither felt nor displayed the sense of obligation to the
well-being of their tenants that undergirded patron-client relations elsewhere. Ab-
sentee landlordism, the norm in Negros, exacerbated the tension between classes.2
Cullamar (1986, 13) explains,
In the early days when the hacendero lived among his people, he, more of-
ten than not, maintained a paternalistic attitude towards his dependents
or workers. He came to their assistance in times of need and intimately
knew his tenant families. However, when the landlord started living away
from his hacienda and hired an overseer to supervise the work, the sym-
biotic relationship between the hacendero and his tenants or workers was
eroded. The social chasm widened and became harder to bridge as the
years rolled on.
Labor regulations, a vagrancy law, and taxation requirements further provoked the
peasants. Such rules \were exclusively designed to protect the interests of the hacen-
deros and were fundamentally police measures" (Cuesta, 1980, 414).
A sense of injustice accompanied the inequality from which the jornalero work-
ing class suered. Ordinary laborers were entitled to a meager salary of one peso per
week, on which they depended to buy rice (Cullamar, 1986, 12). Sickness, injury,
or late payment from the hacendero left laborers not only destitute, but increas-
ingly desperate. Occasionally|but with growing frequency throughout the 1890s|
desperation led to robbery, kidnapping, murder, and the burning of haciendas. The
modus vivendi that kept the peace between economic classes grew ever more tenuous.
U.S. Army Captain John R. White observed,
2Mestizos in the port towns of Cebu and Iloilo were the primary landholders in Negros. \Since
their interests were somewhat broad and their tastes citied, they tended to cluster in port towns
rather than in farming regions, and relatives and foremen actually supervised the plantations"
(Larkin, 1982, 618-619).
124Conditions in Negros approximate more closely those which have brought
bloody revolution to Mexico and Central American countries for so many
years, for the land has been alienated from the peasants and is held in
large parcels. This has brought about speedy development of the province
and apparent prosperity; but it has resulted in a social structure much less
solid and safe than that of other provinces in the islands (White, 1928,
117{118).
Social friction, both between and within the stratied classes, left Negrense society
fragmented.
Economic vulnerability. Negros and Nueva Ecija, so similar in social characteris-
tics, contrast starkly with respect to economic security. And because their economies
were alike in many other respects, the comparison serves to illustrate clearly the con-
cept of economic vulnerability. Both places experienced breakneck growth, driven by
commercial agriculture, that generated considerable wealth in late 1800s. But the
production and distribution of sugar from the island province of Negros diered cru-
cially from the rice-growing economy of land-locked Nueva Ecija. These dierences
made the economy of Negros far more vulnerable to outside inuence.
The capital-intensive nature of sugar production made it susceptible to disrup-
tion by military force. Unlike rice production, in which the vast majority of a planter's
expenses went to labor, sugar production required extensive capital investment.3 As
the industry grew, hacenderos bought steam plows, modern ovens, tramcars, and
hydraulic or steam-driven mills (Cuesta, 1980, 406). The 1903 census reported,
The sugar industry in these islands is considered as the most costly among
all those derived from the Philippine soil. To-day it is not possible to con-
3For a concise description of rice and sugar production in the turn-of-the-century Philippines, see
CB (1905, IV:25{32, 86{97).
125sider the establishment of a plantation ...without going to great expense
in the purchase of land, work cattle, and agricultural implements, and
the construction of buildings, installation of the machinery plant, repair
shops, and the providing of means of transportation, as well as other ac-
cessories necessary for an undertaking of this character ...[T]he number
of native agricultural laborers is relatively small ...(CB, 1905, IV:29).
In 1894, haciendas on Negros were investing nearly a million pesos a year in machinery
for sugar production. In 1895, the island had around 300 steam mills (Cuesta, 1980,
393). Capital holdings such as these|unlike labor or land|present obvious and easy
targets for a military intent on compelling cooperation.
Also unlike rice, all of which was consumed domestically, nearly all sugar pro-
duction was destined for foreign export and was thus susceptible to interdiction (BIA,
1902, 75). The Philippine population, as a whole, was dependent upon rice for
survival; disrupting its production would cause (and did cause, in some instances)
widespread and indiscriminate harm. By contrast, interference in sugar production
would be felt disproportionately by the areas dependent that industry. Thus the sugar
economy was a viable target even for an occupying force that preferred restraint.
Finally, because Negros is an island, the transport of sugar to market depended
on access to the sea. From warehouses in coastal towns, traders loaded sugar onto
steamers or small boats bound for the deepwater port of Iloilo, from where it was
shipped to Europe and the United States. On either leg of the journey, distribution
could be interdicted, or at least curtailed, by a capable navy. Not lacking sea power,
the American military could block sugar exports from Negros with relative ease and
at low cost. The Americans possessed superior naval technology, uncontested by
the guerillas at any point in the war. Even without much destruction or a sizable
126commitment of manpower, the occupying power could credibly threaten the island's
source of wealth.
In the Negrense sugar industry, the interplay of the factors that contribute to
economic vulnerability is evident. Production was capital-intensive, and distributors
had no choice but to go by sea. The product was a viable military target, and the
occupying force had technology well-suited to disrupting production or, especially,
blocking distribution. Unable to blunt this technology or provide alternatives, the
insurgents could oer little to bolster the economic resilience of Negros. And so the
island's inhabitants were in a weak position when it came to bargaining with the
Americans|lacking solidarity and vulnerable to threats against their wealth.
5.2 The Third District, Department of the Visayas
Revolt against Spain came late on Negros. The anti-colonial rebellions that shook
many corners of the Philippines in 1896 went mostly unnoticed there. The social
movements that propelled the uprisings|the Liga Filipina, the Freemasons, and the
Katipunan|did not reach the masses on Negros. At the time, a homegrown resistance
to Spanish oppression was emerging, but still disorganized. Among the upper-class
planters, their travels and education abroad introduced them to the notion of inde-
pendence and self-determination. But many had ties to the Spanish through family,
friendship, or business interests, and so remained loyal.
By November 1898, however, Spanish rule throughout the islands was clearly
waning and revolution on Negros ensued. Some accounts portray a collective uprising
of \landlords and tenants, ilustrados and unlettered," but the aair was mostly engi-
neered by the island's hacendero elite (Aldecoa-Rodriguez, 1983, 367; Cullamar, 1986,
427). With some coordination between them, Juan Araneta in Negros Occidental and
127Diego de la Vi~ na in Negros Oriental mobilized small militias and led marches on their
respective capitals, Bacolod and Dumaguete. Aware that their hold on power was
crumbling, the Spanish evacuated at the site of the mobs, avoiding bloodshed.
The question of what or who should replace the Spanish government sowed con-
tention among the Negrense. The Philippine Republic claimed Negros, as did the
rival Federal State of the Visayas. Eventually, Oriental and Occidental Negros each
declared their status as independent cantons, but knew their autonomy would be
dicult to sustain. On Negros Occidental, Araneta convened a meeting of provincial
leaders to determine how to proceed. The most divisive issue they confronted was
whether to cooperate with the Americans. \They had overcome the Spaniards, dier-
ences as to the policy proper to be pursued had made their appearance, and already
two parties had arisen, the `ins' and the `outs'" (WD, 1900, I:10:252).
For many of the elite, the security of their property rights and commercial in-
terests took priority over aspirations for political independence. \Recognizing that
their proclamation of independence rendered them open to retaliation, and desperate
to restore trade, the peace party in the Bacolod assembly determined to nd powerful
allies" (Linn, 2000, 75). Although others insisted that their long-awaited self-rule be
defended, most ilustrados considered how much they had to lose and balked at con-
frontation. They concluded that \this was too high a price to pay for the `madness' of
resistance. They could not aord to sacrice needlessly so many lives and properties"
(Cullamar, 1986, 42). In the end, despite \strong opposition in the assembly from
high ranking ocials of the government and army," they resolved to submit to U.S.
sovereignty (Aldecoa-Rodriguez, 1983, 135-137).
When the U.S. military occupied Iloilo on February 11, the government of Ne-
gros Occidental sent a delegation to meet the American commander, who sent them
on to Manila to meet with General Otis. In discussions with Otis, they oered to
128place their province under an American protectorate. Agreeing immediately, Otis
named Brigadier General Smith military governor of Negros and dispatched him to
the island with the mere 400 men of a single battalion.
Smith arrived in Bacolod on March 4, 1899 to ocial honors, but a tepid re-
ception from the people (Cuesta, 1980, 460). It became evident that Otis had over-
estimated the authority of the \representatives" from Negros Occidental. Not only
was agreement among the elite tenuous, but the leadership of Negros Oriental had
not been consulted, and the lower classes were altogether unaware of the decision.
Linn (2000, 76) notes that Otis \should have been far more suspicious of wealthy
merchants who claimed to speak for the inhabitants, and even more wary of promises
that just a few companies would guarantee peace and security." The people were
taken by surprise when the ilustrado-led government of Negros Occidental ordered
the American ag raised throughout the province, and a number of towns rose up
against the decision. In Negros Oriental, de la Vi~ na was incredulous and prepared for
war with the Americans, while President Demetrio Larena reminded the townspeo-
ple of their patriotic duty. He rallied the local presidentes, writing, \Americans are
powerful on sea because they have navies, but we are more powerful on land because
of our sharp bolos and lances."4
But the heart of anti-American resistance on Negros emerged from a peasant
protest movement that had grown out of the abuses of the past. Babaylanism, as the
movement was known, was a response by peasants to decades of neglect at the hands
of the Spanish and exploitation by the landed elite. Brigandage and banditry, peren-
nial problems on Negros, began to assume political overtones in the mid-1880s, driven
by a growing social unrest. During the subsequent decade, this lawlessness fused with
the practices of the messianic Babaylan religious sect. Negros Occidental governor
4Quoted in Aldecoa-Rodriguez (1983, 138).
129Aniceto Locsin derisively, though not inaccurately, described the movement as \a con-
fused admixture of socialistic principles, anarchistic instincts, and a strong aberration
of religious and fanatical notions."5 Its ideological confusion aside, Babaylanism was
\the most important form of peasant protest against the existing social, economic
and political conditions in the Island of Negros for nearly a generation" (Cullamar,
1986, vii). Under the leadership of their shaman, Papa Isio (Dionisio Sigobela), the
Babaylanes demanded division of the large estates for redistribution to the peasants
and the protection of laborers from abuse by the planters. The element of religious
fanaticism within the movement inspired tremendous courage as well as ruthlessness
in followers who torched haciendas and murdered landowners and merchants.
Isio assumed leadership of the revolutionary cause after the Bacolod govern-
ment's decision to cooperate with the Americans. Declaring that it was \now high
time to inundate this Island with blood," Isio vowed that the Babaylanes would wage
war on the collaborators and invaders alike.6 Aguinaldo, who initially allied him-
self with the hacendero-ilustrado elite, now relied on the Babaylanes to tie down the
American forces on Negros. Having consolidated his control of areas in the island's
central mountains over the preceding years, Isio was well-situated to disrupt nascent
American rule.
As he attempted to lay the foundations for governance of the island, Smith en-
countered deep-seated mistrust of American intentions. \Fence-sitting" would become
the metaphor popular among American ocers in Negros to describe the Filipinos'
ambivalence. The people, Smith wrote, \have not wholly committed themselves to
our policy and are prepared at a moment's notice to place themselves astride of the
hard top rail preferring its unquestioned discomforts to a comfortable severance of
all connection with it. This state of feeling ...results ...from the hundred fears that
5Quoted in Cullamar (1986, 72).
6Quoted in Linn (2000, 78).
130disturb their guilt and render them uneasy even in their convictions" (NARA, 14
Sep 1899, 2616:2). Their fears would be recognizable to civilians caught between the
sides in any civil war. Among these fears were concerns that the Americans would
soon withdraw, leaving them to face the Tagalog government they were betraying;
that American benevolence was a ruse and would soon be replaced by the repression
they had come to expect from the Spanish; and that cooperation with the Ameri-
cans would subject them to punishment at the hands of the Babaylanes or guerillas
from Aguinaldo's \Hongkong junta." In some sense, each of Smith's campaigns and
initiatives on Negros would go to addressing one or another of these fears.
5.3 Fiscal strategy choice
Smith was determined to make Negros an exemplar of the American program of
benevolent assimilation. He had served on Otis's sta and shared the commanding
general's embrace of McKinley's policy. Smith wrote that his forces \had come to
the island with the desire of aiding the people to establish, if possible, local self-
government, and to protect all citizens and residents in their lives, property, and
homes" (WD, 1899, I:5:339). In need of troops elsewhere in the Department of the
Visayas, Hughes was hopeful that Negros could be pacied by Smith's small contin-
gent. But should consensual rule fail, Hughes was prepared to dictate more coercive
measures|as he already had elsewhere in his command.
The disunity among the island's local leaders frustrated Smith's rst task of
organizing civil administration. As noted above, Smith expected to nd a concilia-
tory and cooperative body among the Negrense elite. But it required a month of
wooing and cajoling the \disaected element" for Smith and his ally Araneta merely
to convene a meeting to discuss governance (WD, 1899, I:5:339; Aldecoa-Rodriguez,
1311983, 139{143). And \[w]hen Smith set the assembly the task of drawing up a con-
stitution, it exploded in factional battles. Feuds and rivalries were also common in
the countryside, where local ocials persecuted their opponents" (Linn, 2000, 76).
Nor were many of the factions prepared to accept the Americans as arbiters of their
disputes. J.F. McLeod, an American present at the constitutional assembly, observed
that the Negrense \have got an awful want of condence in a white face, because the
Spaniard has squeezed them terribly during the last ten years ...and they have been
told by the priest and by Spaniards that the Americans will do the same" (PC, 1900,
II:1).
Circumventing the proceedings of the fractious assembly, Smith reorganized
the government on July 22, 1899. G.O. 30, the order establishing the provisional
government for Negros, promised that the people would enjoy \the largest measure of
civil liberty compatible with prevailing conditions." Under the arrangement, a native
council promulgated the laws, but the military governor retained veto power and most
of the de facto authority in his own hands. Nevertheless, Smith exercised scrupulous
restraint and was careful not to intervene in local aairs unless necessary. He warned
that,
[A]ny radical diminution of the privileges now enjoyed by the people of
the island without the substitution of something more or less soothing to
their amour propre might be misconstrued and might create impressions
injurious to our good faith, especially as the agents of insurrection have
persistently prophesied that local self-government, when it had served our
purpose, would swiftly disappear to reappear no more forever in any form
(WD, 1900, I:10:259).
If American sovereignty were to prevail through means other than an iron grip, Smith
believed, the government must be perceived as legitimate. Especially in the eyes
132of the elite who feared arbitrary conscation of their property, legitimacy meant
self-rule. Anything less, Smith wrote, \will serve to wound the proper pride of the
people ...make them lose condence and create suspicions detrimental alike to their
best interests and our good faith" (NARA, 23 Apr 1900, 2616:3).
Keenly aware of how tenuous was the consent of Negros's people for the Amer-
ican presence|and how necessary that consent was to smothering the insurgency|
Smith took exceptional measures to regulate the conduct of his troops. He issued
a ve-point policy that directed the protection of private property, the use of mini-
mal force, strict adherence to due process, kind treatment, and \illimitable patience"
toward the locals. \In a word," the order concluded, \treat these people as an Amer-
ican would be treated under the same circumstances" (NARA, 20 Jan 1900, 2616:2).7
Smith himself took care to see that his troops behaved well, ordering investigations
upon receiving complaints of property damage, theft, or misconduct.8 He fretted that,
\A slight change of policy, an arbitrary act by an ocial, an unwitting exercise by
the military of powers given to the civil authorities, and from the vapor of suspicion
is evolved the certainty of intended wrong" (WD, 1900, I:10:254).
Particularly in the early days of the occupation, the troops' conduct allayed the
inhabitants' worse fears and suspicions regarding American rule|suspicions stoked
by insurgent propaganda. Aldecoa-Rodriguez (1983, 155, 157) relates that, \From
the mouths of women who are still living today, are praises of the good behavior
of the Americans.... [T]he ugly rumors about the Americans before their arrival
were quickly forgotten when they showed the people how friendly and well-behaved
they were." Likewise, Jose Luis de Luzuriaga, a Bacolod native and leader of the
7The correspondence of 20 January 1900 \again repeats the policy," suggesting it had been in
place for some time.
8See, e.g., correspondence of 8 July, 4 August, 13 November 1899, and 20 January 1900, all in
NARA (2616:2). Smith even intervened personally when a Private Rohe refused to pay his $8.75
tab at a local eating house and used abusive language toward the proprietor (NARA, 15 July 1899,
2616:2).
133revolt against Spain, testied that, \In the rst place, when we accepted American
sovereignty, some people were not agreeable to this, but afterwards, when they came
in contact with the Americans and came to know them, they changed their views."9
Fair treatment and disciplined behavior may have also given pause to those inclined
to support the insurgency. As Smith noted, the Filipinos naturally \have a certain
amount of sympathy for a true insurgent.... Although they realized that the insurrec-
tion is a mistake, they have the human sympathy which all have for their own blood
battling in a wrong cause."10 Bringing the people to the Americans' side of the fence,
he believed, meant rst keeping them from slipping o the rail to the insurgents' side.
But no amount of good behavior alone would suce to crush the insurgency
or to win enduring support from people who saw their property destroyed and faced
threats to their lives. The tasks of protecting haciendas dispersed throughout the
countryside, maintaining a protective presence in the towns, and confronting the
roiling insurgency overwhelmed the tiny American force that came to the island in
March. By late May, that force had tripled and Smith requested still more (Linn,
2000, 76).
Throughout the spring and summer of 1899, uprisings and attacks unsettled
the island. The towns of Silay, Bais, and Tanjay saw anti-American agitation that
brought up to 1,500 armed men into the streets. The Americans had no diculty
quelling unrest in the towns|their presence was usually all that was required|but
found control of the countryside elusive. The Babaylanes found common cause with
republican Libertadores and bandits known as Tulisanes. Together, they intensi-
ed attacks on the haciendas of \the class that cooperated with the American" and
threatened to burn any town that ew the American ag. In July, they began to
make good on their threat, looting and burning the towns of Bayawan, Tolong, and
9Quoted in PC (1900, II:356).
10Quoted in Gates (1973, 174).
134Siaton (Aldecoa-Rodriguez, 1983, 120, 142, 157). The insurrectos devastated dozens
of haciendas, especially in northwestern Negros. Smith chastised one of his comman-
ders there, \Your entire district has been practically burned out and you seem to have
no information of what is going on in your vicinity" (NARA, 8 July 1899, 2616:2).
Steps by republican leaders on Panay and Luzon to reinforce Negros's guerillas
compounded American troubles. Smith reported that Aguinaldo's revolutionaries
were \furious beyond measure at the action of Negros, and sought by every available
means to bring about a rupture of relations between the United States and the people
of the island." The extent of their support is unclear, but reports suggest that they
sent weapons and advisors, funded rewards for killing members of the provincial
government, and organized a rebel propaganda bureau.11 \There is no question,"
Smith wrote, \but that the work of the Panay and Luzon agents ...did grave harm,
exciting as it did vigorous suspicions of our good faith among the laboring classes,
causing the uneducated to bite their thumbs as us and producing a decided neutrality
among many of the property holders and responsibles" (WD, 1900, I:10:251).
To supplement the capacity of his own troops to secure the towns, Smith had
been building a native police force since his arrival. These local police were outtted,
equipped, fed, and paid with American funds.12 As they stood up, the native police
protected towns and haciendas from Babaylan raids and served as guides for army
expeditions. Smith reported, \The native police have, up to this time, rendered sub-
stantial service, and though many inducements have been oered to them to desert,
the pay received and the ration given have been sucient to keep them steadfast in
the service of the United States." So impressed was he by the eciency and loyalty
11See WD (1900, I:5:242, I:10:251), CDPMG (1900, 209), and NARA (3 January 1900, 2616:2).
12For more on arming and sustaining the native police, see correspondence of 31 August, 6, 7, and
9 September 1899, all in NARA (2616:2).
135of the police, Smith speculated that they would \probably prove the most eective
means of suppressing the outlaws of the mountains" (WD, 1899, I:5:342).
With governance taking root and the troops and native police working to con-
tain the insurrection, Smith turned toward addressing the root causes of popular
dissent. He recognized explicitly the divergent demands of Negros's socioeconomic
classes. While self-rule and security were the primary concerns of \the intelligent
and educated class and the property-holding class, who have something at stake in
the islands," the cooperation of the elite alone would not deprive the rebellion of its
needed support (WD, 1899, I:5:338). The wealthy Negrense commanded little alle-
giance from the jornaleros and shared few of their interests. The rebellion's appeal to
Negros's peasants is evident from events such as those surrounding a Babaylan attack
in July, 1899:
Babaylanes came down to the outlying haciendas and by specious rep-
resentation that the lands could be partitioned among the people, that
machinery would be no longer permitted in the island, and that nothing
but `palay' would thenceforth be planted, succeeded in persuading the
ignorant laborers of about fty Haciendas to join them and to destroy by
force the places which had given them employment (NARA, 31 Jul 1899,
2616:2).
Smith had little sympathy for the lower classes, whom he referred to as \irrespon-
sibles," \idlers," and \shiftless people who live from hand to mouth" (WD, 1899,
I:5:338). But he recognized that unless the Americans oered better conditions to
the island's disenfranchised, the army could expect little cooperation from them. Few
peasants would consent to return to the deprivation and exploitation suered under
the Spanish.
136Condent that he could impress upon jornalero and ilustrado alike the benets
of American sovereignty, Smith initiated a series of programs aimed at improving
education, public health, infrastructure, and agriculture. To Smith, these public
initiatives were as much tools of pacication as they were foundations for long-term
development. In part, he hoped they would \silence the misrepresentations and lying
reports that make for disquiet and perturbation" (WD, 1900, I:10:254). The Spanish
had left the island in a very low level of development, and so improvements made
under the Americans had a rapid and demonstrable impact.
Primary education was a centerpiece of Smith's civic initiatives. He believed
that proper schooling was \a potent factor in bringing the lower classes, by means
of the children, into more cordial relations with Americans."13 Schools, however, had
been badly neglected in the years prior to the war. Where they existed, they \lacked
even paper and were directed by completely inept teachers who had no knowledge of
Spanish and received the miserable salary of one peso and a sack of palay every month"
(Cuesta, 1980, 313). Literacy in Negros hovered around 30 percent, compared to a
national average of about 45 percent (CB, 1905, II:77{81).14 Smith invested heavily in
education by building schools and stang them, if necessary, with American soldiers
serving as instructors. In the middle of 1900, he reported that public schools had
been established in every pueblo, appropriations had been made for their supplies,
and qualied teachers were being identied and screened (WD, 1900, I:10:253).
The army also worked to allay the island's most acute suering from hunger and
illness. Hunger crises had struck in 10 of previous 45 years (Cuesta, 1980, 258). When
drought loomed again in 1899, the American commanders anticipated the \hunger
13Quoted in Gates (1973, 139).
14The 1903 census denes the literacy rate as the proportion of the population over the age of 10
with ability to read in any language. Census gures are provided separately for male and female
populations. The national averages were 47% and 42%, respectively. In Negros Occidental, the
gures were 33% and 37%; in Negros Oriental, the gure was 23% for both males and females.
137problem" and stockpiled imported rice. The army distributed it free to the poor
and saw that the \aged, the sick, and incapable will be taken care of by ladies'
committees in the various pueblos" (WD, 1900, I:10:255{256). Disease was also a
perennial scourge of poor Filipinos. The military directed public sanitation measures
that reduced the incidence of diseases such as cholera and tuberculosis. Soldiers served
as health personnel, and a compulsory vaccination campaign nearly eliminated what
had been a yearly epidemic of smallpox (Aldecoa-Rodriguez, 1983, 159).
To strengthen the core of Negros's economy, the Americans introduced modern
agricultural practices to improve the productivity of the island's farms. Drought and
insects threatened crops and contributed to the volatility of agricultural yields from
one year to the next. Smith established a Department of Agriculture to implement
best practices and coordinate the battle against the \plague" of grasshoppers and
rinderpest. A model farm demonstrated modern innovations and instructed farmers
on how implement the new techniques (NARA, 13 Feb 1900, 2616:3).
Smith saw infrastructure improvements as both a boon to commerce and a large
scale employment program. The island's roads were a shambles. Negros lacked \a
single kilometer of road that is in passable condition," and farmers paid almost half
as much to transport their produce from hacienda to pier as it cost for its subsequent
shipment from Iloilo to New York (Cuesta, 1980, 306, 415). So to provide \both work
and food for the deserving" and to build \condence in the future, so necessary to
business success," Smith ordered a major construction campaign. Soon, hundreds of
workers were building bridges, improving existing thoroughfares, and laying miles of
new roads throughout the island (WD, 1900, I:10:254{255).
Gradually, Smith's consensual rule approach began to win support for the Amer-
icans. He reported in September that, \daily some are so letting go the rail and
wedding himself to our side of the fence for better or for worse." Smith understood
138that his Filipino supporters were not enthusiastic about becoming colonial subjects
of the Americans, but were making a pragmatic decision. \They have reasoned the
whole matter all out," he wrote, and concluded that an alliance with the Americans
oered the best chance to \avoid partition, to obtain a voice in their own aairs, to
evade civil war, to secure safety of property and personal rights and to make good
government." Once taken by a few, Smith observed, their decision became \conta-
gious" and prompted \men `with one hand on the fence' to let go and trust actively
to the protection of the Americans" (NARA, 14 Sep 1899, 2616:2).
Growing cooperation from the noncombatant population kept the Americans
apprised of insurrecto plans and able to bring their superior military to bear against
the rebels.15 The Babaylanes maintained, at least through the end of the year, the
ability to mass hundreds of men for attacks, but they faced increasing pressure and
found less and less success. With information from local sources, Captain Bernard A.
Byrne launched a daring attack against a Babaylan hideout on July 19. Gradual rebel
attrition followed as U.S. Army and native police patrols scoured the mountains and
countryside. On August 31, Byrne's patrol captured and destroyed a key insurgent
stronghold (NARA, 2 Sep 1899, 2616:2). Pressed, the rebels turned to terrorizing
americanistas with new enthusiasm, committing \the foulest atrocities" and warning
in November \that it behooved the people of Negros to get out of the American pro-
cession and ride in the band wagon if they wished their heads to maintain a speaking
acquaintance with the other corporeal hereditaments." The rebels paid special visits
to ocials of the provisional government and issued threats against their families.
For the most part, these tactics appear to have backred and prompted civil ocials
15For examples of information provided to the Americans, see WD (1899, I:5:340; 1900, I:5:242)
and correspondence of 29 July, 18 August, 14 September, 11 December 1899, and 3 January 1900,
all in NARA (2616:2).
139and others to provide \valuable information" to the Americans (NARA, 3 Jan 1900,
2616:2).
As 1899 drew to a close, the insurgency reeled from the loss of popular support
and the pressure of American and Filipino patrols. General Ignacio Lopez, a leading
insurgent chief, surrendered with 64 armed men on September 24. In November, the
main rebel leader in the north also surrendered without asking conditions. An island-
wide uprising planned for mid-December zzled in all but ve small towns (CDPMG,
1900, 209; NARA, 3 Jan 1900, 2616:2). The insurrection on Negros ended with more
whimper than bang. The Babaylanes limped along and remained capable of conduct-
ing coordinated operations until a crippling defeat in 1902, and Papa Isio himself
did not surrender until 1907. But by mid-1900, what was for a time a threatening
insurgency became merely criminal lawlessness that the native police, with limited
assistance from the U.S. Army, were capable of containing (Cullamar, 1986, 63{65).
Part cause and part eect of the insurgency's decline, productive activity on the
island began to return toward the end of 1899. Smith noted that \towns and barrios
deserted through fear were re-populated and the resumption of their ordinary pursuits
rendered possible to the inhabitants." Another report noted that, \The people assured
of security, were apparently cheerful and hopeful, and recommenced in earnest their
agricultural and other pursuits. More planting was being done and more sugar mills
were in operation than at any period since the inauguration of the revolt against
Spain" (CDPMG, 1900, 209). Though not to the extent that Otis had hoped, the
example of Negros reverberated elsewhere. Hughes reported the \desire of many
inuential Visayans to follow the lead of Negros." And on Panay, the insurgents
petitioned to know what conditions would be promised for their surrender, a request
that \seemed to indicate a desire to receive the consideration which has been extended
to Negros" (CDPMG, 1900, 208{209).
140According to Gates (1973, 140), \Negros was denitive proof that peace could
be maintained through benevolence and humanitarian action in the eld of civil af-
fairs." Although underlying social problems remained unaddressed, Smith expressed
condence that if the American emphasis on governance, education, health, and pub-
lic works continued, security and consent for American sovereignty on Negros would
persist.
...
The preconditions for the establishment of consensual rule|economic vulnerability
and social fragmentation|were dening traits of an island reliant on exports and
divided internally by ethnic and economic rivalry as well as class animus. Pursuing
a national policy of benevolent assimilation|and short of troops for duty outside of
Luzon|the Americans hoped that consensual rule could secure Negros. Despite some
residual pockets of resistance and lawlessness, an approach to pacication entailing the
provision of public goods and the establishment of lawful governance proved eective
and enduring.
Known for his \humanitarianism and his interest in political issues, as opposed
to strictly military matters," Smith's own disposition, as well as Otis's ocial policy,
inclined him toward benevolent assimilation from the outset (Linn, 2000, 76). On
Negros, this approach proved eective in extending American control over the island.
As the next chapter describes, however, similarly-minded ocers elsewhere attempted
to implement consensual rule only to nd it ill-suited to the conditions in their sectors.
141Chapter 6
Coercion in the Ilocos
...clear up that situation even if you have to kill o a large
part of the malcontents; do some terrorizing yourself.
- Colonel Robert L. Howze, August 16, 19001
The Ilocos region of northwestern Luzon was an area of social solidarity and eco-
nomic resilience. In the northern and interior parts of the Ilocos, communal cohesion
stemmed from the region's ethnic homogeneity and deeply-rooted kinship bonds, so-
cial stratication that coincided with political authority, and the strength of patron-
client obligations. Social solidarity was not uniform across the region, however, and
in some areas|towns along the coast and settlements closer to the adjacent provinces
of north-central Luzon|the social structure exhibited signicant rifts. Economically,
external actors posed little threat to local sources of wealth. Land for subsistence
1Quoted in Scott (1986, 29).
142agriculture was the primary asset of the dominant class, and scant trade penetrated
the secluded region. Further, the state had almost no reach into the governance of
local Ilocano communities.
Fixated on the predominantly Tagalog rebellion in central and southern Luzon,
the Americans initially perceived little threat or consequence from activity in the
Ilocano provinces of the island's northwestern reaches. At the time, however, repub-
lican leader Manuel Tinio was building an extensive network of support throughout
the region's towns and villages. As the Americans under Brigadier General Samuel
B.M. Young occupied and asserted control of the Ilocos, Tinio's rebels resisted, clash-
ing with the invaders. Later, Major General MacArthur, as commander of all Amer-
ican forces in the Philippines, would describe the Ilocos region as \for many months
the worst in Luzon."2
Fiscal strategies in the Ilocos evolved drastically as the war there proceeded.
Young, his successor Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell, and their province-level com-
manders adjusted their practices as they accumulated understanding of the popula-
tion in the areas in which they operated and insights from the successes and failures
of their policies. At the outset of the occupation, the seemingly friendly reception
they received and their limited manpower inclined the Americans toward a scal
strategy of consensual rule. But the powerful Ilocano leaders were unimpressed and
disinclined to cooperate|and their economic resilience made them dicult to sway.
When consensual rule failed to prevent wholesale support for the guerillas, American
scal strategy changed drastically. In the most socially solidary and economically
resilient areas, particularly the remote provinces of Abra and Ilocos Norte, comman-
ders abandoned conciliatory approaches altogether and adopted a singularly coercive
policy. However, a counterpoint to coercive rule emerged in the coastal and southern
2Quoted in Linn (1989, 30).
143areas where cross-cutting ethnic, religious, and economic interests undermined social
solidarity. There, American scal strategy resembled that employed in Nueva Ecija,
as the military incorporated elements of a divide-and-rule approach.
6.1 Ilocano society and economy
The provinces of Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, and Abra together make up
the Ilocos region of northwestern Luzon. The former three provinces encompass the
narrow lowland coastal strip running from the Lingayen Gulf to the northern tip of
Luzon as well as the western foothills of the Cordillera range. The latter province,
the mountainous inland territory of Abra, is the most remote, accessible at the time
of the war only by the Abra River. Inhabitants of the furthest reaches of the Ilocos
belonged to an ethnically homogeneous, solidary society in which the prerogative of
a small, landed elite went virtually unquestioned. Social cohesion was most apparent
in Abra and Ilocos Norte, becoming less pronounced toward the coast and toward
central Luzon. With a modest subsistence economy, the Ilocos was self-sucient in
its geographic and economic isolation. Economic activity was limited primarily to
agriculture for local consumption, and rice-growing land was the dominant source of
wealth.
Social solidarity. The Ilocos region faced little of the inter-ethnic strife that char-
acterized both Nueva Ecija and Negros. The vast majority of the 530,000 people who
inhabited the region at the time of the American invasion were of Ilocano ethnicity.
Only on the mountainous eastern borders were Ilocanos in contact with the \wild"
tribes of the Apayos, Tinguians and Igorots who had remained outside of Spanish
authority. No study of the region as a whole fails to note the ethnic, linguistic and
cultural uniformity of the Ilocos. Wernstedt and Spencer (1967, 332), for example,
144call the area \one of the most homogeneous ethnolinguistic populations of any Philip-
pine region."3 An 1899 count listed Chinese communities totalling 50 people in Abra,
320 in Ilocos Sur, and 150 in La Union (Ramsey, 2007, 34). The 1877 Spanish census
found just 15 \Chinese and mestizos" living in Ilocos Norte, though there were sev-
eral thousand in the town of Vigan in Ilocos Sur, the economic capital of the region
(Scott, 1986, 6).
Distinguishing the Iloco region's social structure from that of other Philippine
regions is the extent to which the political system reinforced the authority of those
at the top of individual communities' social ladders. The reach of the provincial
government was weak, if felt at all, and the preponderance of political power resided
at the local level. Within the towns and villages, the principalia|and only the
principalia|elected the gobernadorcillo, the town mayor, in a system that ensured
the perpetuation of a tiny elite. The oce bestowed the trappings of power, such as
the honoric Capitan, tasseled gold-headed canes, and the best seats at ocial and
religious ceremonies. That the mayors retained these symbols and privileges after
leaving oce \implied that political power was as much about the person as the
oce" (Go, 2008, 96).
The concentration of political authority shaped the exercise of power. The
mayors' ocial salaries were paltry, as they were expected to supplement them by
granting favors obliging reciprocation, taking commissions on contracts and using
public labor for private projects. The tax scheme further fortied patron-client bonds;
levies were based not on residence, but on barangay|a dependence upon a particular
patron (Ramsey, 2007, 36). The cabezas de barangay, together with an assortment of
local ocials that included the police force, formed a retinue of followers who were
3Scott (1986, 5) calls the Ilocos \culturally and linguistically one of the most homogeneous
regions in the colony." Ramsey (2007, 34) says, \The Ilocos constituted an ethnically, linguistically,
and culturally homogeneous region."
145\more or less personal servants-cum-clients who owed their loyalty to the ocial"
(Go, 2008, 96). Ilocano communities were mostly small, self-contained oligarchies.
The cornerstones of the principalia edice were its constituent families. Like
European dynasties, power passed from one generation to the next and alliances
coalesced around strategic marriages. A roster of nineteenth century gobernadorcillos
of the town of Candon in Ilocos Sur provides a representative example: more than a
third bore the same family name. Family connections would serve as the glue for unity
during the war with the Americans. One Ilocano family alliance, \whose members
occupy so much space in a Vigan list of `names of natives connected with the insurgent
government' in June 1900, was based on the marriage of two Reyes brothers with two
Florentino sisters, and illustrates the sort of family solidarity which supported men
in the eld" (Scott, 1986, 10, 74).
Rather than stoking resentment|as it did in Nueva Ecija and Negros|the
social and political position of the principalia was generally accepted among the sub-
ordinate classes. Tenants used words such as \benefactor" or \protector" in reference
to their landlords and held the reciprocal patron-client obligations of utang na loob
as a nearly sacred bond. One American ocer observed, \They were, from secular
custom, in the hands of headmen, whom they obeyed unquestioningly" (Taylor, 1971,
II:28). Ethnographers suggest that the cohesive and cooperative nature of Ilocano
society may be partly attributable to the requirements of obtaining subsistence from
a region of unfavorable terrain. Early twentieth century studies in Ilocos Norte, for
instance, document the province's unique zangjera irrigation societies and daklis co-
operative shing groups, collective responses to the scarcity of arable land.4 The
Cordillera mountains limited cultivation to a narrow band along the coast|seldom
wider than six miles|and to the oodplains of northwestern Luzon's two main rivers,
4On the zangjera, see Blair and Robertson (1909), Christie (1914) and Lewis (1980). On daklis
shing, see Scheans (1964).
146the Laong and the Abra. The six months of monsoon rains that followed the six
months of draught each year washed gravel into the already thin soil of the alluvial
plains. By 1900, slash-and-burn agriculture had stripped the hillsides of vegetation
and contributed to extensive soil erosion, leaving the land of \only moderate fertility
at best" (Wernstedt and Spencer, 1967, 330-339).
Nearly all aspects of traditional Ilocano life reinforced the status and authority
of the gentry. Ramsey (2007, 36) notes that, \When a principale required something
to be done, the natural, socially-, economically-, and culturally-driven response was
to do it. For poor Ilocanos, not to do so was unthinkable. Ilocano society was
hierarchical, stable, and accepted."
But where the forces of outside world penetrated the otherwise isolated region,
some degree of social cohesion was lost, resulting in varying communal structures
within the Ilocos itself. In his ethnography of the area, Eggan (1941, 13{15) describes
that, \As one goes from the interior down to the coast...a regular series of changes
takes place in social, political, economic, and religious institutions, a series of changes
which has a denite direction." Social and political arrangements grew in complexity
and both wealth and inequality increased.
The most remote and sparsely populated provinces under examination here,
Abra and, to a lesser extent, Ilocos Norte represent the \purest" expression of the local
solidarity described above. Moving west from Abra towards the coast, settlements get
larger and more diverse. Moving south towards the Central Luzon Valley, a degree of
ethnic diversity emerges, most notably the sizeable Pangasinan minority in La Union
province (Ramsey, 2007, 35). Social, political, economic and religious forces become
cross-cutting, undermining local solidarity with the proliferation of opposing factions
and interests.
147The clearest example of the collision of all of these forces is from the town of
Vigan, Ilocos Sur. Vigan was the most prosperous and most cosmopolitan of the
Ilocano coastal settlements. It stood apart from the \`one-street villages' controlled
by a few landholding families," a characterization of most inland Ilocano settlements.
Traders and merchants, many of them Chinese mestizos, amassed wealth that sur-
passed the traditional aristocracy. Rather than challenge the established order, earlier
generations of the successful merchant class chose to relocate abroad. The present
generation, however, \found sucient scope for its talents in politicking and plot-
ting at home." The Church in Vigan added even more to the mix: the friars were
Augustinians, but the bishop was not; uniquely in the Ilocos, the parish priest was
a Filipino; and the secular clergy included both Filipinos and Spaniards. Together,
all of the competing ethnic, economic, and religious factions \presented an unusual
variety of interest groups for creative political alignment" (Scott, 1986, 12{13).
Further south, the coastal settlements of La Union province were also splintered.
Unity among the elite was fragile, and a \lethal split" opened in the powerful Mina
family just before the war (Scott, 1986, 74). Even more signicant was an absence
of the acquiescence that existed elsewhere among the peasantry to the economic and
social dominance of the principalia. This discord found an outlet in a religious fra-
ternity known as the Guardia de Honor. Originally an orthodox Catholic society, the
Guardia developed a millenarian doctrine, and a \rejection of all external authority
supplanted passive acceptance of traditional control systems" (Sturtevant, 1976, 96).
The heartland of the movement was in Pangasinan, but it spilled into bordering La
Union province, further muddling the social structure of the southern reaches of the
Ilocos region.
148Economic resilience. The main crop in the Ilocos was rice, and growing it was the
principal occupation in the region. \Economic organization [in northwestern Luzon]
centers around land|particularly rice land.... Wealth|measured in rice lands|is
the key to social status" (Eggan, 1941, 14). Major landowners presided over scattered
holdings rather than large landed estates; the former had usually been accumulated
through strategic marriages or foreclosures. The seasonal rains necessitated large-
scale irrigation, but still only one crop a year could be produced in all but a single
area. Production primarily fed local inhabitants and, while food was not a problem in
the Ilocos, little remained for the gentry to export. Farmers also grew corn, vegetables
and a few cash crops or raised livestock, an important source of wealth in the lowland
villages.
Although a few of its products were valued outside of the region, the Ilocos
was not destined to become a hub for domestic or international commerce. Maritime
trade was limited by heavily-reefed coasts and the lack of any all-season harbors. Nor
were there any ports that could host seafaring vessels at a wharf. So exporters from
Laoag, for instance, were forced to use carabao (water bualo) to cart their products
to the town of Currimao|a journey of two or three days|where the cargo could be
transferred by lighters to ships anchored o-shore (Scott, 1986, 3). Despite being a
coastal region, limited access to the sea kept Ilocanos from much maritime activity
other than local trade and small-scale shing.
The result of the Ilocano geography was a self-contained, modest regional econ-
omy. Although its natural blessings were scant, Scott (1986, 7) states,
On the other hand, the Ilocos was literally self-sucient in all local needs
except iron. The ordinary Ilocano dressed in home-spun, ate food he or his
townmates grew, seasoned with salt from the nearest beach and sili-pepper
from the backyard, lived in a house he and his neighbors constructed,
149cooked in pots and slept in a bed|if he had one|made locally, and
worked with tools, plows, farm implements, carts, sledges and sugarcane
mills manufactured in the province.
In most of the Ilocos, there was little wealth, but there was also little want. The
economy supplied few luxuries, but met Ilocano communities' needs.
Principale wealth and working-class livelihood in the Ilocos were neither depen-
dent upon the state, nor obviously vulnerable to external intervention. Agricultural
land was the primary asset of the Ilocano elite, and labor-intensive rice cultivation
was the primary form of production; disrupting either was a dicult and costly un-
dertaking. Further, the need for the distribution of goods or produce was minimal in
an isolated region where most households were self-sucient. Economic activity thus
provided little opportunity for the military to inuence the willingness of Ilocanos to
cooperate with American forces during the war.
In sum, the Ilocos region was characterized by an \adhesive principle" of social
organization and an economy not easily susceptible to outside inuence (LeRoy, 1914,
II:202). Solidarity was most pronounced in the provinces of Abra and Ilocos Norte.
The social cohesion of the northern and inland reaches of the Ilocos was brought into
relief by a breakdown of this trait further south and among coastal towns of greater
diversity and more exposure to the forces of modernity sweeping the archipelago.
Economically, labor-intensive rice farming and minimal trade beyond the region itself
shielded inhabitants from threats to their economic well-being.
1506.2 The First District, Department of Northern
Luzon
The geography of northern Luzon splits the region into northwestern, northeastern,
and central pockets. American commanders organized their forces accordingly and
gave precedence to the densely populated and fertile Central Luzon Valley. This focus
left the Ilocano-populated northwestern area|designated the First District, Depart-
ment of Northern Luzon|in comparative neglect. The lower priority given to the
First District reected the view of Major General Otis, the overall commander in
the islands at the beginning of the war, that the rebellion was only a Tagalog phe-
nomenon. His condence in Ilocano allegiance stemmed from their past relationship
with the Spanish colonial government.
Under their rule, the Spanish considered the Ilocanos among their most loyal
subjects. Not only did the Ilocanos sit out the 1896 Katipunan revolt, but Ilocano
troops assisted the Spanish forces in putting down the Tagalog rebels. But although
the Spanish governors and friars in the Ilocos reported that their provinces had re-
mained tranquil throughout uprising, they used the revolt as a pretence for purging
threatening gures in the community. Among those targeted for arrest and torture
were illustrado members of the Ilocano Masonry and Filipino clergy. In response to
what they perceived as an unwarranted crackdown, an underground resistance began
to take shape (Ramsey, 2007, 38; Scott, 1986, 13{17).
In June 1898, the month after Commodore Dewey sank the entire Spanish eet
in Manila Bay, Manuel Tinio returned from exile in Hong Kong to Luzon to raise an
insurrecto force to liberate the Ilocos from Spanish rule. Tinio, a Tagalog veteran
of the Katipunan revolt, began in July with a victory over Spanish forces in San
Fernando, La Union. From there, Tinio marched swiftly up the coast, overrunning
151Spanish defenses and capturing over 3,000 prisoners. On August 13, as the Americans
launched their assault on Manila, Tinio took Vigan and soon after won control of the
remaining stretch of the Ilocos, ending 325 years of Spanish rule in northwestern
Luzon (Ochosa, 1989, 19{27).
In the wake of liberation, changes in governance and social relations were mostly
symbolic. Gobernadorcillos, for example, were now called presidentes, but their pow-
ers and the means by which they were chosen remained the same. Other public
ocials remained in place and continued their accustomed duties. The aristocracy
saw little threat to their possessions or their positions. The ascension of the Filipino
clergy to ll the vacancies left by the Spanish friars constituted the most signicant
change. Noteworthy was the rise of Father Gregorio Aglipay who garnered concur-
rently the titles of Ecclesiastical Governor in the Ilocos and Vicar General of the
Army of Liberation. Rivalry and personality conict would mark the relationship
between Tinio and the ambitious Aglipay throughout the war (Scott, 1986, 18{19).
Anticipating an American invasion, Tinio spent the 15 months after his cam-
paign preparing defenses, recruiting soldiers and auxiliaries, and organizing his forces.
By the fall of 1899, the \Tinio Brigade" consisted of roughly two thousand troops
organized into four battalions, one drawn from each of the Ilocano provinces (Ochosa,
1989, 34). William B. Wilcox, a U.S. Navy paymaster, visited the area before the
ghting began and found it led by men \of intelligent appearance and conversation."
The ocers, he noted, were \chosen from the richer classes; and the political and
military power of the provinces is in the hands of that element." He also remarked
on the establishment of a militia or a local defense force in nearly every town and
barrio with \little or no friction between the civil and military classes." The rebels'
minimal training notwithstanding, these observations suggest impressive organization
and popular support (Wilcox, 1901, 193{198).
152Americans arrived in the Ilocos in November 1899 in the culmination of an oen-
sive that sent the remnants of Aguinaldo's army on headlong retreat north, but would
prove indecisive in shattering the notion of the Philippine Republic. Aguinaldo man-
aged to escape Brigadier General Loyd Wheaton's attempt to encircle him in the Cen-
tral Luzon Plain. Brigadier General Young's rapid but confused pursuit of Aguinaldo
into the Ilocos failed in capturing its mark. In the process, however, Young's forces
destroyed the Tinio Brigade and overran the Ilocos provinces in less than a month.
The resistance from Tinio's organized forces notwithstanding, the Americans met
a generally friendly reception from the Ilocano townspeople. In Vigan, Lieutenant
Colonel James Parker even recalled being greeted with crowds shouting \Vivan los
americanos! Mueren los tagalos!" (Parker, 2003, 278). The apparent acquiescence
to the invading forces encouraged hopes for the \benevolent assimilation" of the re-
gion. A harbinger of the diculties ahead, however, units in La Union province soon
reported cut telegraph wires, snipings, and robberies, incidents they attributed to
Tagalogs and ladrones, or bandits.
Following the campaign, Otis recognized the importance of consolidating con-
trol of the Ilocos and ordered the reorganization of the American elements scattered
throughout the region. On December 29, he appointed Young commander of the
newly created District of North-Western Luzon and directed him to establish civil
government in the district. Young divided his 3,600 or so troops into four province-
level commands that in turn were divided into garrisons of one or two companies in
the key towns and villages. Young granted his subordinates considerable autonomy
based on \his recognition that the guerrilla war was a local war. He steadfastly sup-
153ported his provincial commanders against his superiors and allowed them to develop
their own counterinsurgency methods" (Linn, 1987, 64).5
American control over the Ilocos in early months of 1900 was mostly illusory.
Although Tinio's conventional military arm proved no match for the well-trained and
well-equipped Americans, his strength lay in his organization at the village level and
the bonds that linked villagers to the revolutionaries. The Philippine Republic held
sway in the Ilocos for nearly a year before the American arrival and was thus well-
established. Communities that had provided recruits, organized militias and collected
taxes later sheltered Tinio's eeing forces during the American drive. And after the
demise of the Tinio Brigade their sympathies often remained, ready to be tapped by
the growing guerrilla bands. To be sure, coercion played a role in maintaining the
loyalty of municipal ocials in the face of American pressure|particularly as hostil-
ities ground on|but the preponderance of evidence suggests that \most municipal
governments initially supported the guerrillas for either patriotic or social reasons"
(Linn, 1989, 38).
Given the solidary structure of many Ilocano communities at the time, the most
important factor in the popular support for the guerrillas was the composition of the
forces themselves. \Most of the company and detachment commanders were members
of the Ilocano land-owning class who shared strong family and economic ties and who
enjoyed the support of extended Ilocano families. Few had previous military experi-
ence, but all commanded because of their local knowledge and inuence" (Ramsey,
2007, 42).
The revolutionary commander in Abra, Juan Villamor, exemplies this descrip-
tion. A wealthy landlord, he later described himself as \a native of Abra where he had
5The organization of Young's command|as well as his decentralized approach|remained un-
changed following an administrative shue that re-agged it as the First District, Department of
Northern Luzon.
154vested economic interests and aections, eective spur to his disposition to awaken
sleeping enthusiasms when called for."6 His cousin, Blas Villamor was also a guerrilla
leader, operating on the border of Abra and Ilocos Sur. \The Villamors had strong
local support, in part because their family was both very large and related to many of
the most prominent families in the area" (Linn, 1989, 39). LeRoy (1914, II:206) states
that the bands they led \could do not great damage in themselves, but [they] repre-
sented a virtual consolidation of the Ilokan principalia in a number of towns around
Bigan [Vigan] and in Abra." Many of those who followed or supported the Villamors
did so in accordance with the traditional deference given to the social and economic
elite in Abra. Generalizing their motivations, Scott (1986, 48{49) describes them as
\men willing to follow accustomed leadership ...responsive to social dynamics like
peer pressure, family honor or local loyalty, and the dictates of utang na loob."
Eventually, revolutionary organization of the villages would reach a level of
sophistication described by Major E.Z. Steever of the Third Cavalry:
The insurrectos have a regularly organized government throughout these
districts, with a Jefe principal and assistants for each pueblo and corre-
sponding ocials for adjacent barrios. In each \centro" is an irregular
force, usually a platoon of guerrillas, who keep their arms hidden but
ready to turn out at a moment's notice, either to join the regular troops
of the insurgents or attack small bodies of Americans whenever a favor-
able opportunity exists. In addition, there are hundreds of men|so-called
\hermanos" (brothers)|armed with ghting (not working) bolos.7
Like elsewhere in Luzon, the part-time militia living in the villages played a vital role
in providing intelligence and supplies to the regular forces.
6Quoted in Scott (1986, 64).
7Ibid., 48.
155Thus the Americans confronted a well-organized and well-supported adversary
in the Ilocos. Defeating the insurgency and establishing American primacy required
breaking the link between the guerillas and their bases of support in the towns and
villages. Experience would help the Americans choose the scal strategy best suited
to this task.
6.3 Fiscal strategy choice
Commanders in the Ilocos and throughout the Philippine theater held the belief that
Tagalogs alone were resistant to American rule and that the Ilocanos had little incli-
nation to join the insurrection. The initially amicable relations with certain Ilocanos,
attributable in retrospect to expediency on their part, seemed to conrm this view.
Even as late as August 1900, Wheaton, now commanding the Department of Northern
Luzon, maintained, \The natives, other than the Tagolos, are generally well disposed
toward the American occupation, and if protected will aid in the establishing of such
form of self-government as they may be able to understand" (WD, 1900, I:5:197).
The Ilocos thus oered an opportunity to demonstrate the rewards of benevolent as-
similation and, in President McKinley's words, to \win the condence, respect and
aection of the inhabitants of the Philippines."8
Young pursued a consensual scal strategy from the day the military district
was formally created. He embarked on an ambitious program of public development
in the form of municipal governments, schools, roads and sanitation. With an order
to his provincial-level commanders to establish civil government under G.O. 43, he
implored them to \use your best endeavors to facilitate tranquility and the return of
the people to their peaceful avocations" (NARA, 20 Dec 1899, 2148).
8Quoted in Gates (1973, 36).
156Under the supervision of Captain John G. Ballance, Young's subordinates set
about establishing civil administration in the Ilocano towns and villages. Each pueblo
would have a presidente and a town council and would provide for its own security.
Young instructed his commanders to \Impress on the President and Council and
leading people the necessity of a strong, well-organized Police Force, upon which they
must mainly rely for protection" (NARA, 20 Dec 1899, 2148). By the end of March
1900, the ocers and men of the district had organized 63 municipal governments
(Linn, 1989, 35).
Young and his commanders held that projects of public benet would redound
to the security interests of the United States in both the short term and long term.
Ocers expected \a quieting eect" from spending on public infrastructure and pub-
lic health projects such as markets and roads, sanitation and vaccine distribution.
Expenditures such as the $12,000 used to construct a road from Laoag to Batac kept
Ilocanos employed while also signaling the permanence of the occupation (NARA,
30 Aug 1900, 4046). Throughout the district, the occupying forces constructed over
1,000 miles of road by August 1900. While one purpose of road construction was its
military utility in providing for the rapid movement of troops and supplies, ocers
also recognized its value as part of a scal strategy. Roads, they believed, were critical
to the economic vitalization they hoped to foster: \productive to the civilization of
the country," in the words of one ocer. According to another, they also served to
\increase [Filipino] interest in civil aairs, especially the better class."9
Following Smith's example on Negros, Young's attempt at consensual rule pri-
oritized public eduction. He shared the belief of Smith and others in \school work
as a tool of pacication as well as evidence of American benevolence" Gates (1973,
139). Young ordered that \at least two well constructed airy school buildings should
9Quoted in Linn (2000, 258).
157be built in each town at once." By June, the First District could boast of establishing
203 schools, with plans for an additional 192. Each was to be staed by \native male
teachers of the rst class" at the generous salary of 35 pesos per month (NARA, 28
Jun 1900, 2167:1). Post commanders made frequent requisitions for school books,
desks, maps, slates, pencils and other supplies. Young also requested that soldiers
receive a bonus for volunteering to teach English, expressing his belief that \the ben-
et to the government from the knowledge of English that would be acquired by the
natives would more than pay the expense" (NARA, 16 Apr 1900, 2167:1).
There is evidence that many Ilocanos were happy to accept American largesse,
but far less evidence that the eorts and expenditures paid dividends in the form of
meaningful support of American authority, especially among local leaders. While the
Americans worked to establish civic administration in the pueblos, insurgent orga-
nizers were simultaneously building shadow governments|often with the very same
individuals|while cementing local loyalty and collecting funds for their cause. Mean-
while, guerilla bands began conducting ambushes and harassing attacks on American
patrols and outposts (Scott, 1986, 26{27).
But in their initial reports, American ocers gave upbeat assessments of their
public works projects and the salutary eects on local security. The assumption
persisted that the Ilocanos were cooperative and welcoming of American authority|
despite accumulating evidence to the contrary in the form of attacks on patrols,
the disruption of supplies and communications, and the assassinations of friendly
Filipinos. Linn (1989, 37) concludes,
[I]t is clear that many ocers overestimated the eectiveness of these
benevolent measures. Garrison commanders may have been guilty of tai-
loring their reports to what they believed their superiors wished to hear
or uncritically accepting the attering assertions of presidentes and amer-
158icanistas.... Other ocers mistook their achievement in a particular
town as indicative of the popularity of American occupation throughout
the district. Unfamiliar with the language and lacking accurate sources of
information, some ocers accepted the visible functioning of government,
schools, and sanitation projects as evidence of actual pacication.
Holding to his belief in the generally pacic inclinations of the Ilocanos, Young at-
tributed the sporadic violence of the rst months of the year to \murderers, thieves
and robbers."10 But events would soon overturn the Americans' inability or reluc-
tance to recognize the growing insurgency in the district, prompting a drastic change
in scal strategy.
With resistance escalating, Americans made an important leap toward under-
standing the organization of the insurgency and its popular base of support. The leap
came in the form of Lieutenant William T. Johnston's \Investigation into the Meth-
ods Adopted by the Insurgents for Organizing and Maintaining a Guerrilla Force."
The report of May 21, 1900, constructed with the aid of a Filipino collaborator,
detailed the extent to which \the local `presidentes' and `cabezas' were engaged in
treasonable acts against the United States" in nine pueblos in La Union province.
Rather than assisting in the consolidation of American control over the province,
American-appointed ocials were actively aiding the insurgency. Representative of
Johnston's ndings was the town of San Juan in which he identied \not one of the
pueblo ocials who had not given every assistance to the Insurrectos." His report
detailed the forms of that assistance: using municipal funds to meet a \monthly al-
lotment" for the guerrillas and soliciting donations from wealthy residents; supplying
10Even later, Young was still unable to diagnose accurately the causes of the uprising he faced:
\After Aguinaldo's army had been dispersed," he wrote, \a number of Tagalog ocers and soldiers
driven north from the lower provinces, remained in the mountains and later came into the towns
and with the assistance of certain priests inamed the people with a stronger spirit of rebellion than
they ever had" (NARA, 4 September 1900, 2148).
159recruits for the regular guerrilla forces and organizing local militia support; sheltering
guerrilla leadership and insurgent camps within the town limits or in nearby barrios;
and coordinating early warning of American patrols (WD, 1900, I:7:257{265).
Johnston's report shattered any notion that the destruction of the Tinio Brigade
meant the end of resistance in the Ilocos or that the residual violence could be at-
tributed to unorganized bands of ladrones. As the report was ocially led, ocers
throughout the provinces independently reached similar conclusions. The commander
in Ilocos Norte, Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Howze, reported in May that \every
pueblo to my certain knowledge had its insurrecto municipal government, many of
their ocials being the same as those put in by us" (NARA, 20 May 1900, 4043:1). In
Abra, Lieutenant Colonel Peyton C. March fumed that \civil government throughout
this Province is more or less a farce."11
A scal strategy of consensual rule failed to generate popular support or con-
sent for American rule in the Ilocos; in response, local commanders changed their
approaches and \a new roughness began to appear throughout the First District"
(Ramsey, 2007, 51). But as commanders dialed back the provision of public goods,
the scal strategies they settled on varied according to the degree of social solidarity
in each province. Abra and La Union provinces featured the sharpest distinctions.
Initially the quietest of the four provinces, Abra burst into violence as a guerilla
oensive marked the end of the summer rainy season. By September 7, the scale of the
unrest impelled Young to petition for more troops, contending that \the insurrection
has assumed such proportions in Abra that I do not consider it advisable to send
out a detachment with less than one hundred ries" (NARA, 7 Sep 1900, 2152:2).
Violence continued to crescendo throughout the fall. \The fact of importance at the
moment confronting the Americans," LeRoy (1914, II:205) recounted, \was that here
11Quoted in Ramsey (2007, 52).
160in Ilokan territory, too, they were opposed by practically a united population, hostile
either openly or secretly." By November, Young's troop strength increased by over
fty percent to 5,866 and provincial commander Lieutenant Colonel Richard Comba
received two additional battalions for operations in Abra.
Interest in civil aairs disappeared in Abra, and Young ordered Comba to adopt
\the most severe measures known to the law of war" in executing his campaign with
\the utmost rigor."12 As resistance continued, \Military operations in Abra reached an
intensity not experienced in the other Ilocano provinces," focusing on the destruction
of crops and foodstus, in addition to buildings and entire barrios in areas of insurgent
activity (Ramsey, 2007, 60).
The army's coercive approach towards the population reached its full-throated
intensity as Brigadier General Bell took command of the First District from Young.
He spent March 21 to April 7, 1901 personally inspecting the campaign in Abra
and corresponding directly with the Villamors in a failed attempt to negotiate their
surrender. He subsequently concluded,
The guerrilla warfare is continued by the substantial aid and comfort given
to the insurrectos by the same people whom we are protecting and who are
enjoying a certain amount of prosperity due to our magnanimity. They
have never felt the full hardship of War and their professions of a desire
for peace are merely words and do not come from a full realization of the
discomforts and horror of a war that is waged in earnest and with full
vigor. It is condently believed that if the people realize what war is,
they will exert themselves to stop the system of aid and contributions to
the insurgents by the non-combatants and thus bring hostilities to a close.
12Quoted in Linn (1989, 59). On the status of civil aairs and civic administration in Abra, see
correspondence of 4 February 1901 in NARA (2167:3) and that of 13 March and 16 March 1901 in
NARA (2167:2).
161It is believed that the time has now come to adopt such measures with
those so-called \Amigos" as to cause them to feel the absolute necessity
of using their active inuences in suppressing the insurrection as well as
to stop all possible sources of aid.13
Bell reinforced Abra with a battalion and ve additional companies (Ramsey, 2007,
60). He then placed an interdiction on all travel to and trade with the province and
increased the use of population reconcentration, ordering residents from the outlying
barrios to move \into the town with all their supplies and not return to them without
written permission from the military authorities.14 On April 14, Bell ordered the
evacuation of Villavieja, threatening to burn it to the ground.
The most succinct portrayal of the Abra campaign comes from Major William
C.H. Bowen, the commander of the province during the harshest period of operations
there:
During the insurrection the province suered severely; every man was
either an active insurrector or sympathizer, the consequence being that
property had been destroyed right and left; whole villages had been burned,
the storehouses and crops had been destroyed, and the entire province was
as devoid of food products as was the valley of the Shenandoah after Sheri-
dan's raid during the civil war. The jurisdictions or comprehensions of
Pilar and Villavieja had been depopulated and this portion of the province
had been absolutely destroyed.15
Amidst the destruction, negotiations with the Villamors point to the enduring
solidarity of the Abra communities. Having received an impassioned peace oer via
13Quoted in Scott (1986, 143).
14Loc. cit.
15Quoted in Linn (1989, 60).
162the Federal Party in Pangasinan province, Juan Villamor convened a secret meeting of
22 elders from the barrios of Bangued, Abra's provincial capital, on March 14. They
voted unanimously to reject any oer \which does not give us true freedom to live our
lives."16 There are few accounts of individual defections in Abra, and it is noteworthy
that the only community to \ip" to the American side did so en masse. In December
1900, a principalia delegation from the town of Bucay presented themselves to the
American garrison commander and pledged their support. In the weeks that followed,
the town battled with the guerrillas and turned solidly to the side of the Americans.
With similar solidarity in late March 1901, the people of Abra \in a body" appealed
to Blas Villamor to end the war as the destruction mounted beyond the point that
the civilians could bear (NARA, 31 Mar 1901, 2167:2).
Within a month of this united appeal, Juan Villamor surrendered and, like the
other key revolutionary leaders in the Ilocos, accepted a position in the American
civil administration of the Philippine Islands. As unied in peace as in war, Abra
proved thoroughly pacied, without a single reported engagement between American
and insurrecto forces after May 1 (Linn, 1989, 60).
In La Union province, worsening conditions and vigorous resistance also prompted
a marked rise in the use of force in the latter half of 1900. But there, military might
was part of a divide-and-rule scal strategy that exploited the ssures of the province's
civil society. Like their counterparts in Nueva Ecija, American commanders in the
La Union used nancial incentives in the form of cash payments and conscated
property for those who were willing to provide information about the insurgents or
actively assist in their capture. Defectors came from aggrieved peasants, religious
and ethnic minorities, and from \businessmen whose patriotic urges may have been
less compelling than their love of prot" (Scott, 1986, 68).
16Quoted in Scott (1986, 169).
163As noted above, the Guardia de Honor was a manifestation of the socioeconomic
strife simmering in La Union. In an attempt to rid his town of a leader in the
Guardia, the presidente of Bauang turned in a man named Crispulo Patajo to the
American forces, identifying him as a suspected brigand. In an unanticipated turn,
Patajo revealed to the Americans the area's entire network of insurrectos and their
supporters. His claims veried, Patajo began accompanying American patrols, during
which he identied guerrillas hiding among the civilian population and their supply
caches.
Acting on the report's ndings, Colonel William P. Duvall, the commander in La
Union, devised a plan to destroy the guerilla infrastructure by enticing the cooperation
of those who understood it best. Citing his \most loyal and excellent service during
the past month," Duvall appointed Patajo \Chief of Detectives" and authorized him
to recruit a Filipino force to assist him (NARA, 29 Mar 1900, 2148). Between 400
and 500 volunteers, many from the Guardia, answered his call. In creating this
force, Duvall deed Department policy forbidding cooperation with groups such as the
Guardia. Their success was his defense; Patajo's forces, in cooperation with American
units, inicted devastating casualties on the guerilla network. In the mountains, they
pursued the insurrecto forces and their leadership. In the towns and barrios, they held
rallies encouraging villagers to denounce the insurgency and to embrace the Guardia
and American rule (Linn, 1989, 42{44). Reporting on a successful mission, Johnston
declared, \This puts nishing touches on good work done lately. Too much can't be
said for [Patajo] in all, as nothing could or would have been done ...without him.
He has been in the eld ever since [the] second day he reported to me" (NARA, 24
Apr 1900, 2152:3).
The Guardia units were not paid a regular wage, but nancial incentives were
a vital spur to recruitment and motivation. As they hunted down guerilla units, each
164rie they turned in earned a 30 dollar reward; the capture of guerilla majors and
above was also worth 30 dollars, while captains and below were worth 20 dollars.
(Scott, 1986, 172). These rewards represented substantial sums at a time when an
agricultural worker earned but a dollar or two a week (May, 1991, 9). Prompt payment
was a high priority. \If you have not money enough," Bell wired his subordinate after
one successful operation, \it will be sent at the rst opportunity" (NARA, 24 Apr
1901, 2152:3). Bell also insisted on payments to the widows and heirs of scouts killed
in action (NARA, 11 Feb 01, 2152:1). It is noteworthy that at the same time Bell
was commanding a singularly coercive campaign in Abra, he was also funding the
selective incentives for divide-and-rule in La Union.
The rewards oered for weapons had an impact beyond the Guardia forces
alone, exploiting some of the ethnic divides in La Union. \After General Bell oered
[30 dollars] for every captured rie in April, 300 Tinguian tribesmen joined forces
with Scout Lieutenant Patajo and his American commander to take Aniceto Angeles
[a guerilla commander] together with the surviving captain, four lieutenants and 38
soldiers of Guerrilla Unit One" (Scott, 1986, 172). In a similar event, a group of
Igorot tribesmen dealt a major blow to the rebels. Bell recounted,
I oered a reward for the capture of [Colonel Juan] Gutierrez, the leader of
all the insurgents in the southern half of Ilocos Sur and Union. On April
15, some of these same Igorrotes not accompanied by troops found Gutier-
rez, three Lieutenants and ve soldiers, with only two guns, seized the
guns, overpowered the entire party, bound and delivered them to Amer-
ican troops and got their reward....Now that all Igorrotes are against
them, no insurgent dare go in that part of the country (NARA, 25 Apr
1901, 2152:3).
165Thus the capture of a key guerilla leader cost the Americans a mere 400 dollars
(NARA, 16 Apr 1901, 2152:3).
Civilians could also expect compensation for providing information on guerilla
forces. Funds for intelligence activities were maintained by the Quartermaster, and,
unfortunately for historians, almost no records were kept of the transactions, in order
to protect the identity of the informers.17 Available evidence, though, suggests that
Duvall established a capable intelligence service in La Union. So productive was the
program that Bell had to request additional funds: \success has been so remarkable
that I have used up every cent of secret service money that I had and am a trie
in debt ...I do not want to stop the plan and will need the secret service funds I
asked for very badly" (NARA, 25 Apr 1900, 2152:3). Shrewd use of informants and
evidence from operations allowed units to \pick up insurrectos like chickens o a
roost."18 Former guerrillas also provided critical tips. Once captured, they could earn
their freedom by cooperating with U.S. forces; the public nature of their defection
was sucient to ensure their continued loyalty.
Operations throughout La Union successfully played o individual greed and
social and economic discord. Scott (1986, 88{89) points out those in La Union \who
hoped to do business under a foreign regime, or simple sycophants and opportunists
seeking their own ends." In coastal towns, the merchant class, who were indepen-
dent of the traditional social structure, provided a fruitful source of collaborators.
In the countryside, when a Guardia force secured a town, it ejected disloyal ocials,
seized the property of wealthy insurgent sympathizers and \gave control to loyal vigi-
lantes.... Peasants replaced the principales" (Ramsey, 2007, 49; Scott, 1986, 71, 77).
Tinio's guerrilla's rst battled, then attempted to conciliate, Guardia supporters with
equal lack of success. Tinio even oered a reward of his own for the \traitor and ter-
17Brian M. Linn, 15 June 2011, correspondence with the author.
18Quoted in Linn (1989, 43).
166rible Americanista" Patajo: \the sum of one hundred fty pesos for the presentation
of his severed head" (Scott, 1986, 103).
As rebels were pushed out of the towns, the army lled municipal oces with
supporters and established loyal police forces. With the towns secure, Duvall was able
to go on the oensive. Alongside native irregulars, his troops conducted extensive
sweeps through the mountains and rural villages. The Filipino guerillas, increasingly
isolated from their sources of support, gradually capitulated. Within months, the
U.S. Army had pacied La Union province.
...
Throughout the Ilocos, the Americans faced a determined and well-organized resis-
tance. The unied towns and villages in Abra and elsewhere in the north yielded
few defectors enticed by the promise of material rewards. Sources of wealth in these
autonomous, self-sucient communities did not depend upon cooperation with the
military or the state, and so American commanders had little bargaining power to
secure local support. They concluded that force alone could deny rebels the support
of the towns. Turning to a coercive scal strategy, the Americans added manpower
and conducted increasingly aggressive operations until the Filipino communities suc-
cumbed. Although rebel forces were no less robust in La Union province and elsewhere
in the south, socially fragmented communities there provided a pool of prospective
collaborators. To some of these individuals, rewards were suciently enticing to coop-
erate with the Americans in identifying and eliminating rebel ghters and supporters.
The contrast between Abra and La Union provinces underscores the signicance
of communal solidarity to the negotiation between a commander and a local commu-
nity and its eect on scal strategy selection. Just as cohesive as the villages of Abra
were the islands of the Sulu Archipelago, the setting for the nal Philippine War case
study, presented in the next chapter.
167Chapter 7
Indirect Rule in the Sulu
Archipelago
...so far as we govern the tribes within his jurisdiction,
we govern them through the Sultan.
- Jacob Gould Schurman, 19021
The Sulu islands host an ethnically homogeneous population with a strong and perva-
sive social hierarchy based on the \datu system." The prosperity of the island chain,
though waning by the end of the nineteenth century, stemmed from its central po-
sition astride maritime trade routes through the Eastern Malaysian seas. The ports
at Jolo and Siassi were key nodes on the trade routes and gave the Sulu islands a
stake in the vast commerce between China and the West. Reliance on these ports
1Schurman (1902, 23).
168made the economic well-being of the Sulu elite directly dependent upon cooperative
relations with the governing power that, under both the Spanish and the Americans,
possessed superior naval capabilities.
In today's military jargon, the role of the Department of Mindanao and Jolo
would be described as an \economy of force" mission; plainly speaking, it was a
backwater in a war focused in Luzon and the western Visayas. Though the largest
department by area, it was the smallest in manpower. As such, its commanders,
Brigadier Generals John C. Bates and William A. Kobb e, faced acute challenges in
extending American control across this historically recalcitrant corner of the Philip-
pines. They confronted, with particular severity, the limited availability of manpower
and military resources that constrains all wartime commanders.
Under these circumstances, the cohesive society that they met in the Sulu
archipelago presented either a threat or an opportunity. Should the U.S. choose a
coercive approach, the Americans could expect to meet solidary resistance of the sort
that thwarted Spanish domination of the islands for centuries|conict that would
drain scarce military resources. Indirect rule, if practicable, oered a solution|albeit
imperfect|to controlling Sulu in the short term while freeing up manpower for use
where it was more urgently needed.
The willingness of the sultan and the datu aristocracy to assent to some form of
indirect rule by the Americans turned on the vulnerability they perceived to their eco-
nomic interests, bound almost entirely to seafaring trade. They understood that, were
the Americans to adopt a coercive approach towards Sulu, U.S. naval superiority|
which easily outclassed even the daunting Spanish eet|would blockade Sulu ports
and destroy its trade. A bargaining space emerged in which was forged the Bates
Agreement, a model of indirect rule that would govern American relations with the
Sulu Sultanate from 1899 until 1903.
1697.1 Sulu society and economy
The Sulu Archipelago is a chain of islands that marks the Philippines' southwestern
frontier, stretching from Mindanao's Zamboanga peninsula approximately 200 miles
to Borneo. Long more geopolitically and economically signicant than its diminutive
geography would suggest, \the Sulu Archipelago bridged two worlds and lay at a most
strategic point for the maritime trade of the 19th Century" (Warren, 1979, 226). The
Sultan of Sulu, whose wealth depended upon that trade, sat at the top of a stratied,
hierarchical social structure in which the traditional authority of the aristocracy was
augmented by the centralizing force of Islam.
Social solidarity. Muslim and non-Muslim Filipinos alike use the term \Moro" to
refer to members of the nine cultural-linguistic groups in the southern Philippines
that adhere, in varying degrees, to the faith and practices of Islam. To some extent,
this single term masks the micro-cultural heterogeneity of the Moro people (Mednick,
1965). From a larger perspective, however, the nineteenth century Moros were a
uniquely cohesive community. The solidary nature of Moro society resulted, according
to Gowing (1968, 65), from their \common retention of the ancient `datu system'
which, being touched by the unifying eects of Islam, has provided a cohesiveness in
the face of threats to their way of life that simply did not exist among non-Muslim
groups in the Philippines."
At the foundation of Moro society and interpersonal relations was the datu-
sakop relationship. The datu held a position of both social and political status,
roughly equivalent to that of a feudal lord. A report prepared for Sir Stamford
Raes, the Lieutenant-Governor of Java, made just this comparison: \the power
and weight of the chiefs arise solely from their wealth, or like the Barons of old
170amongst us, from the number of ambas (slaves) or retainers each entertain."2 As
the observation suggests, control of territory was secondary to a datu's ability to
command the allegiance of followers whom he could mobilize when needed. The basis
for this loyalty derived variously from \the datu's personal charisma, descent and
lineage, courage and prowess in war, wealth and knowledge of local lore" (Jocano,
1998, 161). Once attained, power within the traditional political system was sweeping.
It included \(1) rights to perform legal functions; (2) rights to appoint and regulate
religious ocials; (3) rights to control over territory; (4) rights to control over subject
people; (5) rights to wage external warfare; (6) rights to tribute and legal fees; (7)
rights to control over markets; and (8) rights to mediate private warfare and feud"
(Warren, 2007, xlv).
The term sakop, understood alternatively as kinsfolk, servant, or slave, denoted
a loyal follower and entailed an obligation of obedience, payment of tribute, and, when
required, labor and military service. \The salient characteristics of a commoner were
his dependence upon the aristocracy and the invaluable obligations that he performed
as a retainer" (Warren, 2007, xlv). Loyalty was a prized virtue, and a Moro's primary
allegiance was to his datu and to the sultan. A datu's followers \regarded him as the
personication of their worth as members of the group. They worked and fought for
him. If he was insulted, belittled or injured, so were they. They would not rest until
he was avenged" (Gowing, 1968, 102).
Pre-dating the Islamization of the Sulu islands, the datu system persisted, at
least in part, due to the mutually benecial nature of this patron-client relationship.
\A form of mutual obligation developed between the datu, who had authority, social
status, wealth, and the sakop, who gained a sense of security from his datu's protection
and sustenance. In exchange for his sakops' loyalty and service, the datu's primary
2Quoted in Warren (2007, xliv).
171interest was their economic welfare" (Oliveros, 2005, 59-60). Reinforcing this sense
of mutual obligation was the fact that the commoners had some degree of latitude
in choosing their datu; in addition to his personal wealth, the number of followers a
datu could claim was a signal measure of his strength (Gowing, 1968, 100-101).
The coming of Islam to the Sulu archipelago in the fourteenth and fteenth
centuries not only preserved the pre-existing social structure, but augmented the au-
thority and status of datuship. Conversion was both politically and economically
advantageous to the traditional elite. The datuship became a position of sacred, as
well as secular, authority. \As in Islam generally, these two roles were interrelated
and little distinction was made between the datu's religious and political activities"
(Gowing, 1968, 102). As God's vicegerent on earth, the datu's word was God's will
and loyalty to him thus a divine mandate. His person was \sacred," according to
a contemporary chronicler who advised the Americans that \Islam should be en-
couraged by colonial authorities because it is what binds the Muslim populace most
indelibly to their leaders" (Saleeby, 1913).
Further, Islam fostered a centralization of political power in what became the
Sulu Sultanate. \Islam had raised the status of the sultan, the leading datu of all
datus, to the level of God's deputy who was worthy of submission" (Oliveros, 2005,
60). Thus, where elaborate norms and rituals had once served to bond villages and
dampen rivalry among the Sulu Moros, Islam provided a new basis for a common
community, presided over by the sultan (Larousse, 2001, 34).
As the highest political authority in the islands, the sultan had, in theory,
jurisdiction over the entire territory and was the nal arbiter of shari'a law. Public
rites, symbols and adornments underscored his preeminence. The loyalty of sakop
to datu, though, was never quite matched by that of datu to sultan. Datus gave up
a measure of power to the sultan, but jealously guarded their traditional autonomy
172in the context of intra-Moro politics. In governing, the sultan also shared a degree
of authority with a small number of the most powerful and wealthiest datus who
made up an advisory council called the Ruma Bichara. U.S. Navy Captain Charles
Wilkes, in 1842, described the concentration of power within the council: \[T]he more
powerful, and those who have the largest numerical force of slaves, still rule over its
deliberations. The whole power, within the last thirty years, has been usurped by one
or two datus ..." Datus competed with one another for positions on Ruma Bichara
and even with the sultan for autonomy over their own territories. The broader picture
that emerges, though, is one of highly solidary communities connected to one another
and organized under the leadership of the sultan. The strength of that leadership
varied according to the strengths of the man holding the title, but formally|and
in relation to outsiders|the Sulu Sultanate was a unied and centralized political
system.
Economic vulnerability. Although Sulu's Moros engaged in a variety of economic
activity, the predominant sources of wealth had long been tied to maritime trade and
seafaring. Foremost, the Sulu islands were a vital hub of European commerce with
east Asia. Secondarily, slave-raiding fed the islands' economic productivity and the
power of the reigning datus. Wealth was thus highly dependent upon unhindered
access to the sea.
Geographical good fortune placed the Sulu islands along arterial trade routes
that linked the Asian mainland with Mindanao, Borneo, and the Celebes. The lat-
ter decades of the eighteenth century witnessed Sulu's rapid ascent to commercial
prominence.
By 1800, regional redistribution had become the dominant pattern of the
economy of the Sulu Sultanate. The advent of this expansive pattern,
173predicated on ever increasing international demand, inter-insular slave
raiding, and the littoral-procurement trade, enabled Sulu within the short
span of several decades to establish itself as a pre-eminent market centre
and regional power (Warren, 2007, 3).
Driving the expansion in trade was Europe's voracious demand for Chinese tea. By
1820, consumption reached 30 million pounds in Britain alone. To acquire this com-
modity from Chinese traders, European merchants found it more protable to ex-
change goods from southeast Asia (Oliveros, 2005, 74).
The Sulu Sultanate became the hub for European acquisition of the products
desired by the Chinese and thus the third corner of a vast and protable commer-
cial triangle. At the time, the Sulu ports were pre-eminent within the Philippine
archipelago. Jolo was a major international port at a time when Manila and Iloilo
were still isolated villages. In 1899, three of the Philippines' six international ports
of entry were in the Sulu zone (BIA, 1902, 105).3
Demand for the produce of Sulu and surrounding islands fueled another compo-
nent of the Sultanate's economy and social structure|slavery. \The [Sulu] aristocracy
depended for its prosperity on the labour of slaves and sea raiders, who shed for tri-
pang, secured pearls and manned the eet" (Warren, 1979, 228). And because land
was relatively abundant and labor scarce, slave-holding was a principal measure of a
datu's wealth and power.
Slavery formed an institutionalized part of the Sulu economy as early as the
sixteenth century. A Spanish observer in 1609 noted that \slaves constitute the main
capital and wealth of the natives of these islands, since they are both very useful and
necessary for the workers of the farms. They are sold, exchanged and traded, just like
other articles of merchandise, from village to village, from province to province, and
3The three ports were Jolo and Siassi in the Sulu archipelago and Zamboanga on Mindanao's
western peninsula.
174indeed from island to island" (Oliveros, 2005, 77) Sulu raiders preyed upon settlements
on the coasts of Java, New Guinea, as well as the lowland coastal villages of southern
Luzon and the Visayan islands.
Slavery and slave-raiding reached its apex in the years 1800{1848 as slaves pro-
vided the much-needed labor for the islands' contribution to the Sino-Sulu-European
trade arrangements. \Trade demands kept forcing the Sultanate to incorporate more
people, rewarding those datus who provided the most produce and forcing them to
acquire more wealth-producing persons if they wanted to stay on top of their rivals."
Estimates for the hundred years preceding 1870 place the number of slaves imported
between 201,350 and 302,575 (Warren, 1979, 229).4
With accurate concision, historian James Warren summarizes the nineteenth
century Sulu economy: \trade, raid, slave." Common to each of the three elements was
the sea, a fact that underscores the dependence of Moro wealth on maritime access.
The character of Sulu communal structure might also be captured by three words:
\sultan, datu, sakop." Traditional social patterns and Islam combined to create a
hierarchical society that was cohesive in its interactions with external powers.
7.2 The Third District, Department of Mindanao
and Jolo
Spain's colonial experience in Moroland set the context for the American military's
challenges. The arrival of the Spanish in the Philippines under Miguel L opez de
Legazpi in 1565 set in motion over three hundred years of warfare in the Sulu
archipelago. In a letter written in 1578, the governor of the early Spanish conquests
in the Philippines set out the crown's goals for Sulu and Mindanao in a policy that
4By comparison, the United States imported approximately 325,000 slaves during the same period
(Miller and Smith, 1997, 678).
175persisted for the duration of Spain's tenure in the islands.5 The letter articulated
four aims: Moro acknowledgement of Spanish sovereignty and payment of tribute;
promotion of trade and exploitation of natural resources; an end to piracy and slave-
raiding together with an emasculation of Moro naval capabilities; and Hispanization
and conversion to Christianity of the islands' inhabitants.
Two-and-a-half centuries of blood-drenched pursuit of these aims accomplished
none of them. \Nothing the Spaniards tried|including naval campaigns, diplomacy,
and intrigue at the courts of Moro rulers|seemed to have any permanent eects"
(Gowing, 1968, 143). Until the mid-1800's Spain's Moro policy amounted to little
more than costly and inconclusive warfare. Among the explanations for the policy's
failure, Gowing (1968, 177-178) cites \the surprising cohesiveness of Moro culture
and society.... There was no central government for the Moros but in times of crisis
the sultanate served as a unifying factor.... In addition, they embraced a religion to
which they were almost fanatically devoted and which provided a powerful impetus
to unity."
But in the decades preceding the American invasion, technological advances in
western naval power coupled with an inux of Spanish military resources into the
region made the sources of Sulu prosperity newly vulnerable and retaliation more
dicult. Larousse (2001, 82) marks 1848 as the beginning of a new and nal phase
of Spain's Moro wars. That year saw the rst purchase of steam-powered vessels by
the Spanish colonial government. During this phase of the wars, \Steamboats and
superior repower brought about Spanish ascendancy." In 1861, Spain purchased an
additional 18 British-made steam vessels. Saleeby (1908, 221) records,
The mobility and speed of steam war vessels put to disadvantage all Moro
sailing and rowing craft. Pirates were chased on the sea and hunted in
5\Letter from Francisco de Sande to Captain Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa," reprinted in full
in Saleeby (1908, 165-167).
176their lairs. The fear which steamboats struck in the hearts of Moros made
them run away from their homes and settlements and hide.... The vessels
purchased in 1861 increased the eciency of the navy to such a degree as
to make it possible to carry war into Sulu territory, attack many remote
islands and settlements and blockade the port of Jolo....
With the decisive advantage conferred by steam power and modernized guns, the
Spanish established dominance of the seas in the Sulu zone.
In the years that followed, Spanish naval superiority severely curtailed Sulu
maritime trade and slave raiding, formerly the mainstays of the datus' wealth. With
their economic interests suddenly vulnerable, the Sulu slowly capitulated to a series
of concessions that signalled a willingness to negotiate a new modus vivendi with the
Spanish. The back-and-forth culminated with the Treaty of 1878 which recognized
Spanish sovereignty, but guaranteed Sulu commercial interests, freedom from inter-
ference in Sulu internal aairs, and cash payments to the sultan and prominent datus.
The agreement was never fully implemented and both sides disputed its terms, but
the 1878 treaty presaged the scal strategy to be adopted by the United States in
Sulu.
The American arrival in the Philippines two decades after the treaty found the
Spanish clinging to a series of forts and outposts in the Sulu chain. The terms that
ended the Spanish-American War obligated Spain to continue temporarily its gover-
nance of islands not occupied by American forces or taken by Filipino revolutionaries;
a class that included Mindanao and Sulu. After being relieved by American troops at
the Visayan port of Iloilo in December 1898, General Diego de los Rios, commander of
the Spanish forces, withdrew to Zamboanga. From this perch in western Mindanao,
he could oversee his garrisons on that island and in the adjacent Sulu chain while
awaiting relief. But the opening months of 1899 brought devastation to the remain-
177ing Spanish garrisons in the south as rebels and hostile Moros set upon them. Sulu
Moros slaughtered the entire post at Tataan on Tawi Tawi, and the Spanish aban-
doned forts at Bongao, Siassi, and Cotabato for fear of the same. In May, Madrid
instructed Rios to withdraw his remaining forces and return to Spain.
Meanwhile, General Otis, commanding all American forces in the Philippines,
could scarcely spare any troops from the north. However, the violence against the
Spanish garrisons, together with reports that the Moros were procuring large stores
of arms and ammunition, raised fears of a conagration in the southern islands if
steps were not taken to stem the spreading disorder. Indeed, Aguinaldo had opened
correspondence with Sultan of Sulu seeking an alliance against the Americans based
on \the bonds of fraternal unity demanded by our mutual interests."6 In May, Otis
sent two battalions to relieve the Spanish at Jolo, the Sulu capital and economic
center. On the large island of Mindanao, Spanish withdrawal from the key towns of
Zamboanga and Cotabato left anarchy as Moros, Filipino revolutionaries, members
of the Filipino upper class, and mestizos fought for primacy and spoils.
The territory that would later be designated the Department of Mindanao and
Jolo encompassed 36,540 square miles that included Mindanao (the First and Second
Districts) and the 160 inhabited islands of the Sulu archipelago (the Third District).
Throughout the war, there were never more than 2,700 troops to hold the entire
territory. Fundamental to establishing control over the southern Philippines in the
absence of abundant military resources was the shrewd use of scal strategies. The
implementation of indirect rule in the Sulu archipelago oers vivid illustration of
scal strategy selection driven by local social and economic conditions.
6See Philippine Insurgent Records, cited in Worcester (1914, 227-230).
1787.3 Fiscal strategy choice
Following the withdrawal of the Spanish, American aims in Sulu were straightforward,
but would clearly require a deft hand in attaining. The military was to establish the
sovereignty of the United States in the islands without prompting revolt or risking a
Moro alliance with the Filipino revolutionaries|both possibilities of which American
authorities were increasingly apprehensive. (Amoroso, 2003, 133).
Ocers of the contingent sent to Jolo in May 1899, sensitive to the delicate
demands of their task, made eorts to court the Sulu aristocracy and appear concil-
iatory. They also renounced any pursuit of conversion to Christianity, a break from
the practices of the Spanish. \Expediency as well as principle dictated that the U.S.
Army would not interfere with Muslim religious practice; it was the easiest way to
avoid conict with Moros" (Amoroso, 2003, 125). Initial Moro reaction to the foreign
troops on Jolo was reticent, if not amicable. Some datus even responded with pledges
of friendship and loyalty. In a message to his subjects, Sultan Muhammad Jamal al
Kiram II oered at least tepid support: \The Americans have come here in exchange
for the Spaniards, they are a dierent people from the Spaniards, and it will not be
good to juramentado [wage jihad] against them. They did not come to take our lands,
religion or customs."7
In June 1899, shortly after the initial American landing, Jacob Gould Schur-
man, President of the First Philippine Commission, visited Kiram with the intent of
broaching an agreement that recognized the sovereignty of the United States over the
islands. Schurman (1902, 16-17) recounts that, after attempting to negotiate a more
favorable deal, \the Sultan nally said that if he could not secure any better terms,
he would be willing to acknowledge American sovereignty in the terms of the agree-
ment he had made with Spain." The 1878 treaty had been ambiguous and scarcely
7Quoted in Gowing (1968, 233).
179enforced, so it is unlikely that the sultan placed much weight on this verbal agree-
ment. Nonetheless, Schurman's visit provides a link between the nal Spanish treaty
and the Bates Agreement that would follow.
Finding a model in British indirect rule over the Federated Malay States, Schur-
man went on to advocate for a protectorate in Sulu, short of the direct U.S. sovereignty
he viewed as necessary elsewhere the Philippines. His reasoning in pursuing a pro-
tectorate warrants quoting at length:
[T]his is a policy which presupposes monarchs or chieftains. It can be ap-
plied only to peoples who render obedience to monarch-like rulers, whether
they be called princes, khedives, sultans, datos, or rajahs. The position
is generally hereditary, and this is the case with the Sultanate of Sulu....
Through such a single and permanent executive or hereditary ruler it be-
comes possible for the protecting power to have xed relations with the
protected community. A State whose supreme power is divided among
executives and uctuates from time to time, would wait long in the mar-
ket before nding a protector. A protectorate presupposes a denite and
permanent ruler to protect ...(Schurman, 1902, 24).
In short, the communal solidarity found in the Sulu islands suggested to the Americans
the possibility of indirect rule|if the Sultanate aristocracy were, in fact, willing to
accept the terms.
Brigadier General Bates arrived in Jolo in mid-July with clear instructions to
win an agreement with Kiram recognizing U.S. sovereignty, and he was prepared to
pay for it. Otis wrote to him,
It is greatly desired by the United States ...for the welfare of both the
United States and Moros, that mutual friendly and well-dened relations
180be established.... The United States will accept the obligations of Spain
under the agreement of 1878 in the matter of money annuities, and in
proof of sincerity, you will oer as a present to the Sultan and datos ten
thousand dollars, Mexican, with which you will be supplied.8
Winning the sultan's approval of an agreement proved more dicult for Bates
than Schurman's earlier meeting had suggested. A common understanding of the
notion of sovereignty was (and would remain) elusive, and the sultan seemed to hes-
itate in the face of this uncertainty.9 After delaying negotiations for more than a
month, the sultan relented. \[T]he discipline of well-armed soldiers, the sight of mod-
ern naval vessels and the tact and sincere earnestness of General Bates eventually
won out" (Gowing, 1968, 240). The sultan proposed an agreement under which he
pledged to take steps to prevent piracy, y the American ag with that of the Sul-
tanate, return runaway Americans, and other gestures. For their part, Americans
would make monthly payments to him and his datus; forswear interference in Sulu
commerce, law and religion; and occupy Sulu territory only with permission. This
proposal resembled those made between the British and various Malay sultanates and
may have been acceptable to ocials such as Schurman.
The American negotiators, though, insisted on explicit recognition of United
States sovereignty. After further wrangling, the sultan acquiesced to an agreement
signed on August 20, 1899.10 The Bates-Kiram agreement \declared and acknowl-
edged" American sovereignty over the islands, while pledging that the \rights and
dignities of the Sultan and his Datus shall be respected." The sultan further promised
to \heartily cooperate" to suppress piracy.
8Quoted in Gowing (1968, 238).
9This ambiguity, according to some historians, was a deliberate attempt to deceive the Sulus into
ceding their sovereignty, but the evidence is mostly circumstantial. See Oliveros (2005) and Salman
(2001) for a discussion.
10For the full text of the agreement, see Oliveros (2005).
181To garner acknowledgement of U.S. sovereignty and cooperation against piracy|
and to head o revolt or alliance with the Filipino insurgency|the Americans made
a number of key economic concessions. First, all Sulu trade would be \free, unlimited
and undutiable," thus protecting a crucial source of income for the elite. Second, the
institution of slavery in the islands was implicitly condoned, preserving a mainstay
of elite wealth.11 Finally, the United States would pay a monthly allotment of 250
Mexican dollars to the sultan and sums ranging from 75 dollars to 15 dollars a month
to nine of his followers, designated by name. These targeted payments together with
concessions designed for the economic benet of specic members of Sulu society are
evidence of a scal approach of indirect rule as envisioned by the theory of scal
strategies.
The marriage of interests represented by the Bates Agreement was not always
amicable; inevitably, frictions arose as the Moros and Americans learned to live to-
gether. The datus chafed as American \sovereignty" proved more assertive than the
Spanish version they were accustomed to. With the imposition of sovereignty came
the perception of threats to Sulu religion, custom, and culture. And the Americans,
the Moros believed, were too quick to interfere in aairs and disputes that should be
regarded as strictly internal issues.
For their part, the Americans found themselves in dilemmas typical of indirect
rule. Their frustrations came from two quarters. First, the agreement forced ocers
to remain \uncomfortably neutral in the face of local practices they found grossly
oensive|slavery, blood feuds, polygamy, and draconian punishments for trivial of-
fenses" (Linn, 2000, 226). Second, American ocers complained that the sultan was
not living up to his obligations. At times, Americans discovered that the sultan's
11Article X states, \Any slave in the Archipelago of Sulu shall have the right to purchase freedom
by paying to the master the usual market price." This provision doomed the attempt for Senate
ratication, and thus the pact remained an \agreement" rather than a treaty.
182authority over his datus was not absolute, and he was unable to fulll his promises.
At other times, when he was able to cooperate, \he not unnaturally expected a lit-
tle quid pro quo. Thus the American military ocers complained that the Sultan
and his principal datus had no desire or intention of working in harmony with the
United States ...unless they derived some pecuniary benet from such cooperation"
(Gowing, 1968, 329).
But despite its rocky patches, the marriage held through the duration of the
Philippine-American War. The Americans accommodated themselves to the workings
of indirect rule. At the local level, a subordinate of Kobb e reported that, \We deal
with [the Moros] through the datos and uphold the authority of the latter in their
respective districts, and these begin to regard themselves as representing the United
States."12 A similar relationship prevailed with Kiram, whom the Americans formally
recognized \as the `king and shepherd of his people,'" but who governed, the Ameri-
cans believed, as their surrogate (Schurman, 1902, 23). Regardless of whether these
statements correctly perceive the power dynamic between the Americans and Sulu
islanders, they indicate a functioning relationship under the terms of the agreement.
Indirect rule succeeded in keeping the peace; the months between May 1899 and
July 1903 passed without a major military incident in Sulu. \Attacks on United States
troops|always isolated incidents|were promptly punished, usually with cooperation
of friendly Moros" (Gowing, 1968, 326). Major Owen Sweet, the commander of
the Sulu district declared that his area of operations was \outside of the zone of
disturbances from insurgents."13 Bored, uncomfortable and frequently sick, soldiers
had few responsibilities beyond basic policing in accord with the agreement. Shortly
after the agreement took eect, army authorities concluded that troop strength in
Sulu could be reduced.
12Quoted in Amoroso (2003, 134).
13Quoted in Linn (2000, 226).
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As a postscript, it is important to note that the accord between the Americans and
the Sulu islanders did not long survive the cessation of hostilities in the northern
Philippines. With troops no longer scarce, the United States turned to a more direct
imposition of its sovereignty in Moroland and ignited a conict that would persist for
years. The evidence is that the Bates Agreement was never meant to be anything
more than a provisional measure under severe force constraints. Bates himself stated
that, \the agreement was merely a temporary expedient to buy time until the northern
forces were defeated. The agreement was made at a time when nearly all the state
volunteers had been sent home and other troops had not arrived to take their places.
It was a critical time, as all the troops were needed in Luzon."14 Thus as the operative
constraints changed, so did the choice of scal strategy perceived as optimal.
While it was in eect, however, the Bates Agreement was a paradigmatic ex-
ample of the scal strategy of indirect rule. The sultan and his datus sat at the
top of a hierarchical and solidary society. They were amenable to compromise, as
the sources of their economic well-being were dependent upon cooperative relations
with the American occupying forces. Direct payments and targeted economic bene-
ts cemented an agreement that left Sulu communities autonomous of the Americans,
conditional on the preservation of security and a rejection of revolt or alliance with
the insurgency.
14Quoted in Oliveros (2005, 106).
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Beyond the Philippines to the
Modern Battleeld
This is a massive eort to buy people o so they won't ght us.
- unnamed U.S. development ocer, 20101
While the case studies from the Philippines provide a validation of the theory's intu-
ition in single war, the question of its broader applicability remains. This dissertation
will not answer that question denitively, but the present chapter is meant to serve
as a starting point for considering the theory's insights into irregular warfare in the
twenty-rst century. The chapter looks at America's two most recent wars, in Iraq
and Afghanistan, and applies the theory to a moment of particular signicance in
the course of each of those wars. These events highlight how the theory's key vari-
1Quoted in Chandrasekaran (2010a).
185ables play into scal strategy choice. In Iraq's \Anbar Awakening," we see the eects
of a change in economic vulnerability; in the campaign for control of Afghanistan's
Helmand province, we see the eects of diering communal structures.
In late 2006 and early 2007|after three-and-a-half years of ghting|the Sunni
tribes of western Iraq ipped en masse from cooperation with Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)
to cooperation with the Americans in opposition to AQI. Before the switch, the co-
hesive tribal groups enjoyed a seemingly resilient source of wealth in their control of
lucrative smuggling routes through the western desert. During this period, the tribes
had little incentive to bargain with the Americans, and the American approach in
Anbar was coercive, as the theory would predict. Conditions for the transformation of
that approach emerged when the tribes' source of wealth became suddenly vulnerable
as AQI began to expropriate revenues from the smuggling operations. Cooperation
with the Americans oered an alternative under which this source of wealth could
be preserved. Seizing the opportunity these circumstances presented, the Americans
reacted by switching to a strategy of indirect rule, again corresponding to the predic-
tions of the theory. In exchange for cooperation against AQI, the Americans ceded
extensive autonomy to the tribes, empowered tribal leaders, and allowed them to reap
the prots from smuggling.
At nearly the same time that Anbar's tribes were ipping to the American side
in Iraq, the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan was seizing and consolidating its con-
trol of the poppy-producing districts of the southern province of Helmand. In late
2009, American-led forces began a major campaign to dislodge the Taliban and estab-
lish Afghan government control of the province. The Americans dedicated extensive
military and scal resources to the campaign, which was waged in districts of starkly
diering communal structures. In the solidary district of Nawa, Americans channelled
scal resources through established leaders in the community who, in return, part-
186nered with American forces to drive out the Taliban. In the fragmented district of
Marja, there were few authoritative local leaders who could provide crucial assistance
to the military in exchange for control over the distribution of aid. The result was a
somewhat scattershot scal strategy that combined public goods and selective incen-
tives provided directly by the Americans. Factors of economic security complicate the
picture in Helmand somewhat. Because local wealth depended upon the cultivation
of poppy|an illicit crop and a source of funding for the insurgency|the Americans
had diculty, especially at rst, in linking American control to economic well-being.
This aspect of the Helmand case gives an interesting twist to the theory of scal
strategies.
With these snapshots of events from two modern wars, we see the continuing rel-
evance of scal resources to military success and the centrality of local socioeconomic
conditions to scal strategy choice.
8.1 Iraq's \Anbar Awakening"
Iraq's vast western province of Anbar was, from the war's early days in 2003, the heart
of the Sunni insurgency and the most violently contested area of the country. In an
arrangement often described as a \marriage of convenience," Sunni opponents of the
Shi'a-dominated regime allied themselves with a core of Sunni foreign ghters under
the banner of Al Qaeda in Iraq to ght the American-led occupation. Heavy combat
at great loss failed to extend the control of the American military beyond the handful
of bases it occupied in the province. Elsewhere, AQI ruled. A U.S. Marine Corps
intelligence report written in August 2006 declared that U.S. and Iraqi forces were
\no longer capable of militarily defeating the insurgency."2 Yet by mid-2007, AQI
was reeling, never to recover, and Anbar became one of the least violent parts of Iraq.
2Quoted in Curtis (2007).
187Responsible for the sudden reversal was the wholesale defection from AQI of Anbar's
tribal leaders. Stark demonstrations of their economic vulnerability convinced the
sheikhs to negotiate with the Americans, who, in turn, were willing to embrace a
scal strategy of indirect rule.
Hierarchical kinship networks form the basis of Anbari social and political life.3
Identity and allegiance extend from houses to clans to the basic unit of the tribe|and
sometimes beyond, to extensive tribal confederations. The largest of these, like the
Dulaym confederation in Anbar province, \operate as `dynastic states,' levying taxes,
providing social goods, and generally acting as a political entity with religious and
ethnic overtones" (McCary, 2009, 46). In general, the political signicance of tribes
in the Middle East is often related inversely to the strength of the state. The power
of Iraq's tribes waxed and waned throughout the modern history of the country and
was at a high at the end of the 1990s after the war with Iran, the Gulf War, and the
subsequent Shi'a uprising. In the wake of these devastating conicts, Iraqi dictator
Saddam Hussein relied ever more on the tribes to assist his internal security apparatus,
granting them vast autonomy and privileges in exchange (Long, 2008, 73{75).
The power of tribal sheikhs among their people derived in part from a spoils
system, revenues for which came from their control of centuries-old smuggling net-
works to and from Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Throughout the 1990s, the tribal
leaders tightened their grip on these networks, reaping the benets of \a burgeoning
black market, growing steadily in power, inuence, and, above all, riches" (Woods,
2005, 52). Comparing Anbar's tribes to the maa, U.S. Army General David Pe-
traeus said, \Every tribe is like some organizations in Northeast America ...It's an
import/export business."4 Smuggling was vital as a source of wealth for Anbari tribes
3I use the term \kinship" to refer both to consanguineous relationships and to those based on a
\myth of a common ancestry." For a more detailed discussion of tribalism in Iraq and elsewhere in
the Middle East, see Jabar and Dawod (2001) and Khoury and Kostiner (1990).
4Quoted in Fadel (2007).
188and as a source of power for tribal leaders. Rosen (2004) provides an example in his
description of one of Anbar's two main cities. \Fallujah," he writes, \is a center for
cross-border smuggling in Iraq and apart from the patronage it received from Sad-
dam, smuggling was the primary revenue earner. As long as Fallujah's businessmen
are permitted to continue their smuggling activities, the town will remain quiescent."
The American project in Iraq seemed to threaten tribal autonomy, power, and
wealth in Anbar. In the rst years of the war, American troops entered the province
and attempted to assert control; an unsympathetic Shi'a-led government replaced the
placatory Sunni Ba'athist regime; and democracy and \rule of law" was to supersede
tribal prerogative and the authority of the sheikhs. Tribal leaders thus found common
cause with other constituencies opposing the Americans that included former senior
Ba'athists, Sunni nationalists, and, most notably, the foreign-led AQI. Thus unied,
Anbar was beyond the control of the American military and the edgling Iraqi gov-
ernment. AQI lled the vacuum and, by 2006, was \nearly unstoppable as both a
political and tactical force in the region" (McCary, 2009, 44).
Through the years of nearly united opposition, the American military relied on
a strategy of coercive rule in Anbar. Emblematic of this approach were operations
in the city of Fallujah, which became synonymous with destructive violence following
two major battles there in 2004. The second battle returned the city to American
control, but only after displacing all but 90,000 of the city's 250,000 residents and
damaging more than half of the 39,000 homes. In the aftermath, control required
a strict seven p.m. curfew, check points that meant hours in line for those trying
to enter or leave the city, and other security restrictions that choked economic and
civic life (Tyson, 2005). But the massive manpower necessary to implement these
measures was lacking elsewhere in Anbar, and U.S. troops struggled to contain violent
resistance in places like Tal Afar, Haditha, and Husaybah, to name a few. In Ramadi,
189an American brigade commander described how AQI \dominated nearly all of the
city's key structures ...Their freedom of movement allowed them to emplace complex
subsurface [landmine] belts, which rendered much of the city no-go terrain for U.S.
and Iraqi Army forces" (Smith and MacFarland, 2008, 42). By mid-2006, American
ocers|and even ocial reports|were suggesting that the United States had \lost
in Anbar" (Ricks, 2006).
During this same period, however, fractures emerged in the pragmatic alliance
between AQI and the tribes, largely the result of the insurgent group's expropriation
of the tribes' smuggling revenues.5 Consistent with al Qaeda's usual tactics, AQI
sought out local income to support their operations and found it in the tribes' illicit
operations. \In al Anbar, the easiest sources of revenue were illegal activities, such
as smuggling and extortion, the same activities in which the local tribes had been
engaged for decades" (McCary, 2009, 47). Near Ramadi, for example, the Albu Risha
tribe lost control of portions of the Baghdad{Amman road that generated prots
through \taxing" and extortion (Simon, 2008). Near al Qaim, AQI demanded \an
excessive cut" from the smuggling income of the Albu Mahal and Abu Nimr tribes
(Todd, 2006, 4:32). The future leader of the Awakening movement, Sheikh Sattar
al Rishawi, also felt the pinch. Having \made a fortune by nabbing cars moving
along the unguarded roads of Anbar Province," Sattar felt his wealth threatened by
AQI's encroachments (Kukis, 2006). Attempts by the sheikhs to resist the group's
5Accounts vary in their emphasis among a number of factors leading to the schism between
AQI and the tribes. Although nearly all cite AQI's encroachment on tribal smuggling operations
as a contributor, varying explanations focus on excessive violence against tribal leaders (Simon,
2008); diering visions for a post-war Iraq (Lynch, 2007); forced intermarriage (Kilcullen, 2007);
and fundamentalist prohibitions on personal behavior (Green, 2010). Long (2008) addresses this
debate directly and concludes that \most importantly, al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia was competing for
control of revenue sources|such as banditry and smuggling|that had long been the province of
the tribes.... While [the] violence was not irrelevant, it does not appear to have been the central
motive for the shift.... The primary motive was not moral; it was self-interested."
190demands were met with erce, demonstrative retaliation. These attacks intimidated
the tribal leaders, but also alienated them. Dissent within the alliance mounted.
As Anbar's sheikhs confronted the vulnerability of their sources of wealth, they
showed a new willingness to negotiate cooperative agreements with the Americans.
Glimmers of what would later become the Awakening shone as early as 2004, but
neither the Anbari tribes nor the American forces were ready to commit decisively.
On at least four occasions in 2004 and 2005, individual tribes reached out to American
forces to forge tactical alliances against AQI in their areas. With the exception of
small elements of U.S. Special Forces and \occasional experiments by innovative local
commanders," however, the American military was unwilling or unable to support
the tribes or to protect their leaders (Biddle, Friedman and Shapiro, 2012, 10{12).
With the \surge" of American troops in late 2006 and early 2007 came additional
manpower and, more importantly, a new approach to counterinsurgency. American
focus shifted toward engaging with and protecting the population, giving more at-
tention to the social, political, and economic environments in which they operated.
At the same time, disaection with AQI reached a level at which a broad coalition of
tribes, known as the Anbar Salvation Council, agreed to align with the Americans.
The results were dramatic and almost immediate. Muhammad Fanar Kharbeet, son
of a prominent Anbari sheikh, explained how the tribes were able to accomplish what
the U.S. military alone could not:
The Coalition Forces has the very strong military ability. The civilians and
the tribes, they have a dierence that the Coalition Forces doesn't have.
It's that they're local|they found and knows who comes from outside.
They know who are the insurgents and who are al Qaeda in general, such
that there is no more al Qaeda or anything else. You wouldn't believe me.
191I'm not exaggerating that in two months, in two months everything was
nished.6
Echoing these sentiments, U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Michael Silverman marvelled
at the extent to which the situation had changed, stating, \For three years we fought
our asses o out here and made very little progress. Now we are working with the
sheiks, and Ramadi has gone from the most dangerous city in the world to a place
where I can sit on [a local sheikh's] front porch without my body armor and not have
to worry about getting shot."7
The scal strategy that emerged from bargaining between the American mili-
tary and the Anbari tribes was that of indirect rule, evident in three characteristics
surrounding the policy. First, the authority of the sheikhs within their communities
upheld the tribes' end of the bargain. Second, agreement required that the Americans
(and the Iraqi government, by extension) cede extensive political autonomy to the
tribes. And, third, the provision of targeted material benets to the sheikhs cemented
the deal.
Most of western Iraq's communities are socially solidary, and thus tribal leaders
speak on behalf of their people as a whole. McCary (2009, 46) observes that,
In al Anbar, it was the Sunni tribal sheikhs, not the general populace, who
decided that al Qaeda's goals no longer coincided with the best interests
of their people. Neither the central Iraqi government nor the U.S. military
could control insurgent activities until the Sunni tribal sheikhs decided to
take away their support and safe haven.... It is the Sheikhs who decide
whether their tribesmen serve as willing foot soldiers in the insurgency or
dedicated volunteer militiamen in local security forces.
6Quoted in McCary (2009, 51).
7Quoted in Jae (2007).
192Colonel Sean MacFarland's experience testies both to the power of the sheikhs and
the extent to which the insurgency depended upon the support of the communities in
the areas where they operated. MacFarland stated that, \Once a tribal leader ips,
attacks on American forces in that area stop almost overnight."8
In exchange for their cooperation, the sheikhs insisted on retaining autonomy
for the areas they controlled. This meant, in part, that the tribes themselves|not the
American military or the Iraqi government|would secure their areas. Initially, some
American protection was welcome, but only while it was needed. The \Sons of Iraq"
militias, organized and equipped by the Americans but recruited locally, patrolled
their own neighborhoods. The Iraqi government even granted exceptions so that
the Albu Mahal, mentioned above, could take control of the Iraqi Army brigade in
their region (Malkasian, 2007, 55). Likewise, the Albu Risha dominated the Ramadi
police. And crucially, Anbar's tribes re-established their hold over the contested
smuggling networks, as the Americans turned a \blind eye" to this \extralegal revenue
generation" (Long, 2008, 80{81).
Yet what sweetened the deal and helped keep it alive through many dicult
months was the chance for the sheikhs to get rich and to reinforce the bases of
their power. The Americans directed benets to key actors in the province primarily
through reconstruction and security contracts. In order to do so, they drastically
changed their contracting procedures. What had been a strict process that required
competing bids and emphasized transparency became one in which key sheikhs could
direct patronage to their constituents (McCary, 2009, 50). \These guys do everything
with money," Marine Lietenant Colonel John Reeve noted. \Every deal goes to the
sheik. He then trickles the money down to reward sub-tribes who cooperate and pun-
ish those who don't."9 Jae (2007) provides a vivid illustration of how reconstruction
8Quoted in Michaels (2007).
9Quoted in Jae (2007).
193contracts enabled a scal strategy of indirect rule. \To understand how the U.S.
managed to bring relative calm to Iraq's unruly Anbar province, it helps to pay a
visit to Sheik Hamid Heiss's private compound," he writes.
On a recent morning, a 25-year-old Marine Corps lieutenant from Ohio
stacked $97,259 in cash in neat piles on Sheik Heiss's gilded tea table.
The money paid for food for the sheik's tribe and for two school renova-
tion projects on which the sheik himself is the lead contractor. Even the
marble-oored meeting hall where the cash was handed over reects re-
cent U.S. largesse: The Marines paid Sheik Heiss and his family $127,175
to build it on his private compound. Such payments have encouraged
local leaders in this vast desert expanse to help the U.S. oust al Qaeda
extremists and restore a large measure of stability and security.
Many observers express misgivings over the compromises Americans made to imple-
ment indirect rule in Anbar. For Colonel MacFarland, however, the results spoke for
themselves. \No matter how imperfect the tribal system appeared to us," he stated,
\it was capable of providing social order and control through culturally appropriate
means where governmental control was weak" (Smith and MacFarland, 2008, 52).
In broad strokes, the strategy of indirect rule eventually adopted by the Ameri-
can military in Anbar exhibits striking parallels to the approach employed in the Sulu
Sultanate in the Philippines a hundred years earlier. Until the nal decades of Span-
ish rule, a network of Sulu datus maintained their livelihoods and economic status
through external trade in deance of Spanish attempts to extend colonial rule. Simi-
larly, Anbari shaykhs proted from cross-border smuggling operations that subverted
American attempts to control western Iraq.
When exogenous changes threatened their sources of economic vitality, a cohe-
sive social structure enabled the elites to cut credible deals with the external powers
194that promised cooperation in exchange for autonomy, money, and access to the prof-
itable trade networks. In Sulu, the key change was technological: steam power and
modern guns gave western navies a decisive advantage in establishing blockades of
the islands' vital ports. In Anbar, the change was political: the sheikhs' erstwhile
Qaeda allies arrogated the smuggling networks at the heart of the sheikhs' prosperity.
In either case, continued access to wealth came to depend on a bargain with the
occupying power. Stretched thin by military obligations elsewhere in the countries,
the occupying powers readily granted material resources and considerable autonomy
to the elites in return for cooperation and the provision of security. The credibility
of the bargains required the authoritative positions of the local leaders within their
communities; the willingness to bargain required the elites' dependence upon the
occupying power for their economic well-being.
8.2 The Battle for Helmand Province, Afghanistan
Afghanistan's Helmand province was the site of a major American-led campaign that
began in 2009. The operations that took place in two of Helmand's districts oer a
natural experiment for the theory of scal strategies. The districts of Marja and Nawa,
similar in many respects, had contrasting communal structures. The American-led
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) secured control of Nawa through a
scal strategy of indirect rule. ISAF injected massive amounts of aid into the district
economy, but channeled the funds through powerful local leaders who were given
discretion over the distribution of these benets in exchange for their cooperation in
pushing out the Taliban. Marja lacked the local solidarity found in Nawa; there were
few local leaders with whom to transact, exchanging private benets for cooperation
on security. The result there was a strategy that combined the provision of public
195goods with oers of selective incentives, almost all of which was provided directly by
the ISAF forces. Economic security played a unique role in Helmand. In the province's
unusual circumstances, economic vulnerability made attaining popular support more
costly for the government forces|the opposite of the theory's prediction. As such,
this case suggests a caveat to the theory.
The districts of Marja and Nawa share much in common. Both lie in the narrow
swath of fertile agricultural land in central Helmand province, along the Helmand
River. They sit approximately 25 miles south of the provincial capital of Lashkar
Gah and are separated from one another by about 15 miles. Population estimates are
rough, but Marja and Nawa are each home to 50,000{80,000 people, making them
among the most populated districts of the province.10 Nearly all the inhabitants
are ethnic Pashtuns. And beginning in 2006, both districts were dominated by the
Taliban, which shut down local schools and markets and reaped huge sums from its
control of opium production there.11 The undermanned contingent of British forces
operating in the area from 2006 until 2009 was powerless to challenge the Taliban
and faced nightly attacks on their small base.
Marja and Nawa dier starkly, however, in their levels of communal solidar-
ity. The majority tribe in Nawa, the Barakzai, dominates the area, but maintains
a close and congenial relationship with the smaller tribes in the district. Relation-
ships among the Nawa's tribes are \far more harmonious" than those elsewhere in the
province (Chandrasekaran, 2010b). All tribes have seats on the district's community
council and a voice in local governance (Dressler, 2011, 18). Marja, by contrast, ex-
hibits deep fragmentation. In the 1950s, settlements in Marja sprung from the barren
desert after the construction of a major canal system designed by American engineers.
10Marja is sometimes portrayed as a town, but in fact consists of dozens of settlements spread out
over nearly 100 square miles.
11Dressler (2010b, 1) cites Taliban revenues of $200,000 a month from taxes on opium processing
factories in Marja alone.
196The Afghan king populated the newly fertile land with settlers from throughout the
country, \which is why the local people today come from scores of dierent tribal back-
grounds and aliations" (Wakeeld, 2009). The eects of the mid-century population
movement shaped the local communal structure in a way that persisted through the
years. Chandrasekaran (2010c) observes, \This decades-old experiment in Afghan
social engineering has now complicated eorts to nd the same sorts of tribal leaders
who inuence the population in other Afghan communities. They simply don't exist
in Marja."
In large-scale operations that began in Nawa in July 2009 and in Marja in Febru-
ary 2010, ISAF military and civilian agencies distributed a similar|and massive|
array of goods. In the spring of 2011, the U.S. military in Helmand was spending
about $500,000 every 10 days on discretionary development projects and local se-
curity forces (O'Hanlon, 2011). In Nawa alone, development aid allocated between
July 2009 and March 2011 totalled nearly $25 million|a gure that equates to $300
per resident in a country where the per capita GDP was approximately $900 (CIA,
2012; Dempsey, 2011). Aid money hired workers to dredge canals, dig wells, build
schools, improve roads, and restore mosques. It provided vocational training, farm
equipment, health services, police gear, and much more.
In Nawa, these goods were distributed primarily through existing local lead-
ership. Seizing an opportunity to bolster their standing and authority within their
communities, the district's elite allied with the U.S. Marines. Tribal leaders in Nawa
were willing to partner with American forces against the Taliban \in part so they
could reassert themselves as the chief power brokers in the area" (Chandrasekaran,
2010c). Abdul Manaf was the district governor and most powerful local gure. An
American Foreign Service Ocer working in Nawa at the time recounts,
197[Manaf] saw American military and nancial might as a way to consol-
idate his power to achieve local hegemony, hoping this could calm the
district. In an eort to support the Afghan government, U.S. and British
development aid was funneled through local Afghan ocials, most no-
tably Manaf and a nascent community council. Central to both parties'
responsibility was the allocation of American funding|usually to Manaf
and the council's own political and economic ends (Dempsey, 2011).
Among the people of Nawa, Manaf takes credit for the infusion of aid and employment
opportunities. The American forces there support his credit-claiming \because they
want the people to appreciate Manaf, and in turn, they want Manaf to appreciate the
Americans." Among the Marines, Manaf takes credit for bringing quiet to the district
and driving the Taliban out. By the spring of 2010, schools were well-attended, the
main bazaar was bustling, and American patrols hadn't red a shot in ve months
(Chandrasekaran, 2010b).
In the absence of local leaders to partner with in Marja, ISAF made an unsuc-
cessful attempt to emplace an alternative. The military planned for a ready-made
district government composed of ocials from Afghan ministries|a \government-
in-a-box"|to accompany the February oensive and oversee civic works and the
distribution of aid. For the most part, though, the ocials were ineective, viewed
as illegitimate, or absent altogether (Dressler, 2010a, 6{7). Instead, an American
\district stabilization team" administered projects in Marja similar to those directed
by the district governor and council in Nawa (Chandrasekaran, 2010c). The Marines
in Marja had a force more than twice the size of that in Nawa, but faced a more
entrenched enemy and a more hostile population. In July, an assessment noted that,
\Marjah's residents remain hesitant to engage with U.S. and Afghan forces for fear of
retribution. Afghans in the town also view eorts to rejuvenate the town's bazaars,
198build clinics, and restore schools as insucient to fully sway them to the Coalition's
side" (Dressler, 2010a, 4). More succinctly, ISAF commander General Stanley Mc-
Chrystal warned his ocers that, after months of inconclusive operations, Marja had
become \a bleeding ulcer" (Nissenbaum, 2010).
While the eect of dierences in communal solidarity between Marja and Nawa
conforms with the theory of scal strategies, a close look at the economic characteris-
tics of these districts challenges assumptions behind the theory's other key variable.
Helmand is noted for being the source of more than half of all the opium produced
in Afghanistan, and Marja and Nawa are key contributors to the province's yield.12
Poppy is the predominant crop in both provinces. In 2008, the average family in
Nawa cultivated more hectares of poppy than any of Helmand's 13 other districts;
families in Marja's district ranked third in this measure (UNODC, 2009, 81). Sixty to
70 percent of Marja's farmers relied on poppy for their livelihoods (Nordland, 2010).13
Unlike wheat, which is expensive to transport and can rot if mills aren't working or if
conict hinders getting it to market, poppy is generally more protable and makes it
easier for farmers to adapt to uncertain conditions. Said one Helmand farmer, \Peo-
ple are committed to grow poppies, because there aren't any other crops where we
can make enough money to ll our children's stomachs." Another stated, \The poppy
is always good, you can sell it at any time. It is like gold, you can sell it whenever
and get cash."14
As a result of their dependence upon the opium crop, the communities of Marja
and Nawa were economically vulnerable to crop destruction. In a study on opium
production in central Helmand between 2008 and 2011, Manseld (2011, 60) notes,
\When cultivating opium poppy, livelihoods in these areas proved resilient to shocks
12At it's peak in 2008, Helmand accounted for 103,590 of the 157,253 total hectares under culti-
vation in Afghanistan (UNODC, 2009, 80).
13This gure is not available for Nawa.
14Quoted in Rubin (2012) and Rubin and Rosenberg (2012), respectively.
199and stresses. However, without opium poppy there are growing signs of economic
distress and the adoption of coping strategies that will undermine future earning
capacity." A subsequent study found that farmers unable to grow poppy were more
likely to consume less food; withdraw their children from school; delay healthcare
expenditures; take on debt; and sell productive assets such as livestock, land, or
vehicles (Manseld, 2012, 33).
But because poppy eradication was a goal of the U.S. military in the areas it
controlled, the economic vulnerability of the Helmand population provided the Amer-
icans no leverage in bargaining for local support|invalidating an aspect of what the
theory of scal strategies envisions. In economically vulnerable communities like Ne-
gros and Sulu in the Philippines (or in Anbar, Iraq after AQI began preying on local
smuggling revenue), the communities had an incentive to support the government
forces to avoid disruption to crucial sources of wealth. In Helmand, the Americans
targeted the local source of wealth because it was also a key source of revenue for
the insurgency. So, to the residents of Marja and Nawa, American or Afghan gov-
ernment control meant a threat to their economic well-being. \To farmers, [ISAF]
bases represent a capacity to enforce a ban on opium production and eradicate the
crop." By contrast, they see \the presence of the Taliban as important in determin-
ing whether their crop is vulnerable to eradication ...claiming that the eradication
force was afraid to enter the area after Taliban attacks" (Manseld, 2011, 39{40).
Employing their own scal strategy to thwart the American oensive, the Taliban
not only oered protection to poppy farmers, but also decided to waive their usual
tax on opium production and charge farmers reduced fees on their harvests (Rubin,
2012). Local Taliban commanders spread the message that, \The government is just
200trying to destroy the crop, threaten the people and destroy your economy. We want
to support the economy of the people and keep your crop safe."15
Recognizing that their goals of severing Taliban nances were at cross purposes
with their eorts to win popular support, American forces responded to the dilemma
in two ways. First, the U.S. reoriented its counternarcotics strategy to focus on
interdiction of the opium trade rather than eradication of the poppy crop. Richard
Holbrooke, the White House's Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan,
declared eradication policy \a failure," stating that the eorts \did not result in any
damage to the Taliban|but they put farmers out of work and they alienated people
and drove people into the arms of the Taliban."16 The Americans shifted from crop
destruction to an emphasis on interdicting smugglers and laboratories where poppy
is processed into opium. \We don't trample the livelihood of those we're trying to
win over," said a spokesman for the military command.17 Second, Americans oered
a range of positive incentives to encourage farmers to switch voluntarily from poppy
to other crops. A series of initiatives known as \alternative livelihood development"
provided vouchers for licit crop production, distributed wheat seeds and fertilizers,
provided grants for tools and machinery, and oered technical assistance to farmers
(Dressler, 2011, 29). One program instituted in Marja, the Accelerated Agricultural
Transition Program, also oered farmers $300 for every hectare of poppy eld plowed
over and a signed pledge not to plant again (Chivers, 2010).
But the military implemented both of these responses ineectively. First, while
American forces stopped destroying poppy elds themselves, they continued to sup-
port aggressive Afghan-led eradication championed by Helmand's governor (Rubin,
2012). In places like Marja, it appears that Afghan authorities made some attempt
15Related by an interview subject in Manseld (2012, 34).
16Quoted in Shanker and Bumiller (2009).
17Quoted in Nordland (2010).
201to target only Taliban-allied farmers for crop destruction, but selective eradication
was beset by corruption. Often, the farmers who escaped eradication were those who
paid bribes or had family or political connections (Rosenberg, 2012; Shah and Rubin,
2012). Second, both Taliban threats and the problems distributing aid that were
noted above also disrupted the implementation of poppy-alternative programs. And
once under way, aid and employment programs revealed a disconnect between the
goals of civilian agencies and those of the military. By some accounts, the civilian
agency responsible for implementing many of the employment programs tended to
view reconstruction and aid delivery as ends in themselves. \It sees them as con-
tractual agreements. The military implications aren't the top priority," said one U.S.
ocial. The military, by contrast, \regards cash-for-work as a critical component of
U.S. counterinsurgency operations, allowing the Americans to lure disaected, unem-
ployed young men away from Taliban recruiters."
The Americans nonetheless had sucient military force to establish a threshold
of security needed to begin reconstuction and aid distribution. \[T]he overwhelming
strength of the Marines, and large numbers of Afghan Army and police forces brought
in to increase security, eventually tipped the balance," and Marja's residents slowly
became willing to take jobs and accept aid from the Americans (Gall, 2011). ISAF
spent hundreds of thousands of dollars a week to consolidate their gains. Despite
initial setbacks, both Marja and Nawa were, in the summer of 2012, generally viewed
as secure and under ISAF control. The usual \metrics" of counterinsurgency success
were present: brisk local economies, children in school, new construction, police on
the streets, and a population willing to provide information about insurgent activity
(e.g., Dressler, 2011; O'Neill, 2012; and Shah, 2012). Poppy production fell by about
a third in the year after the oensives, but subsequently leveled o (UNODC, 2011).
202Given the sizeable inux of military and scal resources into the districts, even-
tual ISAF control of the area is hardly surprising. From the perspective of the theory
of scal strategies, part of what is instructive about the battle for Helmand province
is the diculty of using material benets to extend control over communities whose
source of well-being is more secure under the control of the enemy. Even setting aside
insurgent threats to collaborators, it seems clear that only enormous material incen-
tives can convince individuals or communities to support combatants who threaten
the sources of their livelihoods. As apparent as this observation may seem in ret-
rospect, it is at the heart of the misjudgements made by AQI in Anbar and ISAF
in Helmand. A combatant who seeks simultaneously to control a community and to
undermine its source of wealth should expect to rely heavily on coercion.
...
As the examples from this chapter demonstrate, money is as much a weapon of
modern civil war as it was a century ago. Not only do strategies of persuasion,
conciliation, and co-optation appear to be permanent xtures of irregular warfare,
but the cases suggest that the socioeconomic conditions on which their eects depend
persist as well. The concluding chapter considers the risks of strategies built around
the provision of material benets on the conduct of irregular warfare and the prospects
for enduring peace when hostilities end.
203Chapter 9
The Promise and Peril of Money in
Irregular Warfare
Pay close attention to the impact of your spending and understand who benets
from it. And remember, you are who you fund. How you spend is often more
important than how much you spend.
- General David Petraeus, 20101
Much of the preceding discussion has demonstrated the value of scal strategies to
armies struggling to secure popular support, force insurgent capitulation, and ulti-
mately establish control over contested territory. Cases from the Philippines, Iraq,
and Afghanistan depict conciliation and co-optation as indispensable compliments
1Petraeus (2010).
204to the application of coercive force as a commander nds his manpower, arms, or
ammunition stretched thin. However, the constraints that commanders face include
not only military and scal resources, but time. The imperatives placed on comman-
ders often force them to privilege immediate xes over enduring solutions. Yet scal
strategies have long-lasting eects on the societies in which they are employed, and
the institutions that form around them may undermine future political, social, or
economic stability. Fiscal strategies, in short, come with both promise and peril.
Future research should investigate the trade-o sometimes inherent in pursuing
short-term pacication at the expense of long-term peace. It should also aim to
identify the sources of combatants' time horizons and incorporate a \discount factor"
into models of scal strategy choice. For now, though, it bears commenting briey
on the hazards implicit in that choice.
Consensual rule, seemingly the most benign of scal strategies, threatens to
undermine local self-suciency and create dependence upon sources of public goods
that are not sustainable. This is a perennial challenge for external aid, even to areas
not facing violent upheaval. The American military in Afghanistan has used the
provision of public goods to a nearly unprecedented extent as a counterinsurgency
tactic. The massive scal resources expended bear risks proportionate in scale, even
where they have helped to check violence for now. One participant comments,
[T]he overriding long-term problem is that the Afghan government's suc-
cess was based almost entirely on American inputs.... While this ap-
proach clearly succeeded tactically, as a strategy it is fatally awed. As
these hefty U.S. inputs of money and military might inevitably evapo-
rate, the power dynamic will shift away from the local government to
other interests ...[O]ur current practice of [counterinsurgency] fails to
understand that the only meaningful metric for success is a transfer of
205sustainable sovereignty to the institutions we can easily create, but which
the Afghans must learn to run (Dempsey, 2011).
These risks are avoidable, in theory, if public goods provision centers on building
local institutions and human capital. But these are painstaking endeavors for which
military forces are not usually well-equipped. Further, they cannot always meet the
commander's need for an immediate impact.
Indirect rule carries the risk of creating local tyranny or conditions for future
confrontation. Private goods can empower certain individuals or segments of a com-
munity whose moral or political interests diverge from those of the incumbent. Civil
war gives prominence to those who are ruthlessly violent. As Loyd (2001, 162) ob-
serves of Bosnia, \The meek and humane were the war's losers. The vanguard of
those quick or bad enough to get with the new agenda reaped immense prots in
terms of personal power ..." Through indirect rule, combatants risk complicity with
barbarism by helping to create \new war economies [that] produce actors with skills
in the use of violence, whose existence and power derives from the war" (Kalyvas,
2006, 58). Partnership with a local Leviathan is attractive to a commander struggling
to bring order, but it may fund savage repression. Another danger is that indirect
rule can strengthen potential competitors and sow a later showdown. Taking a page
from their Ottoman predecessors, Britain attempted to employ indirect rule in early-
twentieth century Iraq. They passed the governorship of Lower Kurdistan to Mahmud
Barzinji, a trusted and inuential Kurdish sheikh. But the British miscalculated and
had to retake the city of Sulaimaniyya by force after Barzinji, in an attempt consol-
idate power over his rivals, declared an independent Kurdistan in May 1919 (Tripp,
2002). Monitoring and enforcing the terms of a bargain for indirect rule can mitigate
its risks. But the turmoil of conict can make monitoring dicult. More troubling,
206if the combatant becomes dependent on his client as alternatives erode, enforcement
becomes impossible.
A divide-and-rule strategy can rupture dormant fault lines in a community,
triggering new conict and spirals of revenge. The approach oers selective incentives
meant to elicit betrayal in the form of denunciation or taking up arms against the
other side. Motivations for betrayal and collaboration are not dened exclusively|or
even primarily|by the rift that separates the insurgents from the government. In
other words, betrayal may not be the result of one's distaste for the political agenda
of the rebels; rather, any idiosyncratic motive that intertwines with the war will
suce. Family feuds, class animus, ethnic rivalries, jealousy, and personal revenge are
within the galaxy of possible motives. A divide-and-rule scal strategy taps economic
motivations, but its selective incentives also spur individuals to act on other \urge[s]
for private vindication." Betrayal, committed for whatever reason, in turn begets
revenge. \Civil wars and guerilla wars abound with instances of extreme cruelty, and
it seems plausible to assume that this is because of the numerous accounts to be
settled" (Frijda, 1994, 264, 267). Paramilitary groups, a ubiquitous feature of divide-
and-rule strategies, are unsurprisingly notorious for meting out revenge (Mason and
Krane, 1989, 185). \Abuses are always possible," counsels (Trinquier, 1964, 34).
\The organization will have to be seriously controlled, so that it remains solely a
means of protection against the external enemy ..." Likewise, denunciations must
be carefully vetted to ensure that the military does not become an unwitting party
to an internecine dispute. But a divide-and-rule strategy risks fracturing or further
inaming a community by sowing distrust or the seeds of revenge.
Coercive rule may exacerbate the very issues at the heart of the unrest it is
employed to confront, or it may create new impediments to establishing an enduring
peace. As American counterinsurgency doctrine counsels, \Any use of force produces
207many eects, not all of which can be foreseen. The more force applied, the greater the
chance of collateral damage and mistakes. Using substantial force also increases the
opportunity for insurgent propaganda to portray lethal military activities as brutal"
(HQDA, 2006, I:27). Where hostility over the conduct of the government is a source
of civilian support to the insurgency, repressive measures by the military add to
popular resentment and to sympathy for the insurgent agenda. Coercive rule also risks
creating new grievances among the population that fuel support for the rebels and
diminish the perceived legitimacy of the government. Even mildly coercive population
control measures and increased troop presence inevitably create friction that stirs
indignation. Coercive rule may also make tenuous any political accord that brings
hostilities to an end. Any outcome short of full political separation or the complete
destruction of one side means that the combatants will continue to live with one
another \under the same roof." A lasting peace requires a political solution that both
sides accept, and nding such an agreement may be more dicult if civilians as well
as insurgents feel they were merely beaten into submission.
...
\Control of the masses," states Trinquier (1964, 33), \is the master weapon of modern
warfare." This dissertation has presented evidence in support of a theory that species
a logic underpinning combatants' use of conciliation and persuasion alongside coercion
to assert \control of the masses" in civil war. It demonstrates a pattern that reveals
where and how money is usefully employed to that end and suggests why it \works."
The provision of material benets has military signicance only when oered to those
whose preferences are subject to inuence and who have the capacity to act on those
preferences. These traits are reective of a community's economic vulnerability and
its sociopolitical structure.
208Fiscal strategies are perennial features of irregular warfare, but they are un-
derstudied and thus often misunderstood by scholars and misapplied by practition-
ers. Several points emerge from this dissertation that have implications for how scal
strategies may be studied and employed. First, although both persuasion and coercion
seek to inuence the rational calculations behind the decisions taken by individuals,
they are conceptually distinct. In the course of the war, the fungibility of material
incentives can create cascading eects that have no analogy to the indirect eects of
violence. Material incentives can expand the power and the choices available to those
who receive them, where recipients of violence see their choices further constrained.
In the aftermath of the war, as the discussion above highlights, the institutions and
concentrations of power that result from conciliatory strategies have abiding forms
and eects distinct from those of coercive strategies. Built with foresight, these insti-
tutions can serve the long-term stability of the state; built recklessly, they diminish
the prospects for enduring order.
Second, scal strategies appear in dierent manifestations that have dierent
eects. Strategy is the conceptual link between means, ways, and ends; merely spend-
ing money is not a scal strategy. A scal strategy is dened by how money is spent
to achieve a desired eect. The framework introduced in this dissertation classies
scal strategies according to the selectivity of the goods provided|and thus their
intended beneciaries|with the understanding that dierent segments of the com-
munity have distinct inuence on the community's support for a combatant. This
framework is not the only one that might usefully distinguish among dierent forms
of the strategic use of scal resources, but studies or policies that fail to make such
distinctions at all are bound to be inconclusive or ineective.
Third, individuals are not merely the targets of scal strategies, but active
participants in the process that creates them. Current American doctrine speaks
209of \human terrain" as if the interests and activities of noncombatants were static
features of the landscape that military forces must navigate (CALL, 2009a). Much
scholarly literature portrays the civilian population as an aggregated entity whose
fortune is subject to decisions taken by the combatants. By depicting a bargaining
process in which civilians negotiate with a military force, this study demonstrates
that noncombatants are political actors in their own right who contribute to the
dynamics of the war. By depicting individuals as participants in that bargaining
process, this study acknowledges that individual interests and motivations may not
be encapsulated by simple labels|ethnicity, religion, or class, for example|that
correspond to the war's macro-level. The value of popular support confers agency to
noncombatants; the potentially outsized impact of personal choices gives signicance
to individuals' interests and actions.
And fourth, this study adds to the chorus of work extolling the military virtue of
learning while ghting. The web of power, interests, and motivations within the civil-
ian population in the midst of civil war is fraught with complexity, the signicance of
which is not readily comprehensible from the outset of a conict or the outside of a
community. Successful scal strategies, like successful military operations generally,
result from continuous synthesis of new information and from persistent experimenta-
tion, evaluation, and adjustment. The theory of scal strategies points to a set of key
factors in the strategic setting and baseline expectations that can serve as starting
points for learning and adaptation.
Profound consequences accompany decisions made in war. How to deploy the
assets he has|how to allocate his limited resources in money and military force|is a
fundamental decision that faces the theater-level commander and the company-grade
ocer alike. The commander who uses co-optation as eectively as coercion avoids
not only unnecessary waste of treasure, but needless sacrice in blood.
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